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Why, it’s just as if we were supplying drinks, with two fountains at our 
disposal: one would be of honey, standing for pleasure, the other 
standing for intelligence, a sobering unintoxicating fountain of plain 
salubrious water.  We must get to work and make a really good 
mixture.  
!"#$%&'(, Plato.
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ABSTRACT
Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis (SMH; Damasio, 1994, 1996) integrates 
emotion with rational decision-making using evidence drawn from neurology, 
neuroscience and performance on a now widely cited decision-making test developed 
to model real-life in a laboratory setting (the Iowa Gambling Task; Bechara, Damasio, 
Damasio and Anderson, 1994).   The SMH posits a critical input from an embodied 
emotional system (somatic markers) in making decisions in choice situations.  But 
Damasio’s consideration of how the undamaged brain interacts with the body has 
some interesting and somewhat controversial implications in the context of modern 
psychological research on choice behaviour.  In interpreting behaviour on the IGT in 
accordance with the SMH three central assumptions have been made: a) that somatic 
markers indicate the goodness or badness of alternatives and without them decision-
making cannot become optimal, b) this somatic biasing or guidance can occur 
unconsciously or in the absence of explicit knowledge, and c) that the system operates 
so as to maximize or achieve the best outcome in the long-term.  The Experiments 
described in this thesis have explored the validity of the second and third assumptions 
and found that they are not accurately reflected in behaviour on the IGT.  The 
importance of information about the IGT in the instructions participants receive 
suggested that explicit knowledge about the task is a more critical factor than any 
somatic input.  No evidence of a somatic influence prior to the emergence of explicit 
knowledge sufficient to guide behaviour was found.  Instead there were indications 
that knowledge precedes somatic activity on the IGT. Novel manipulations of the 
reinforcement contingencies in individual decks also revealed that immediate 
outcomes of choices are an important determinant of subsequent behaviour.  Selection 
does not solely depend on long-term outcomes.  
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1CHAPTER ONE 
DECISION-MAKING, REASON AND EMOTION
1.1 A PHILOSOPHICAL BEGINNING
The Dualistic tradition of splitting the human psyche into a rational and emotional or 
appetitive parts began in Classical Greek philosophy (Barnes, 1998a).  As a general 
definition Greek philosophy considered the psyche to be the nature of life marking out 
what is animate from the inanimate (Barnes, 1998b).  Later dualistic formulations 
have been attempts to resolve the apparent discrepancy between a representation of a 
mental life found through introspective enquiry with the quantifiable nature of the 
known physical universe found through observation and measurement (e.g. Descartes, 
1965).  Although this dualistic philosophy is no longer held by the majority of 
academic or scientific thinkers it has had a profound impact on Western culture’s lay 
understanding of human life (Rachlin, 1989; Churchland, 1993).  For example, many 
people still consider human behaviour to be governed by two competing forces: one 
reason-based that operates through careful long-term planning and the weighing of the 
pros and cons of a given situation; and one emotion-based that operates in the moment 
regardless of consequence (Rachlin, 1989; Damasio, 1994).  In this conception the 
rational force checks the emotional one and leads to beliefs that, for example, one can 
“lose control” when angry.  
Recently, Antonio Damasio has advanced a theory that has resurrected the 
challenge against dualism (Damasio, 1994, 1996, 1999).  His somatic marker 
hypothesis (SMH) is an attempt to integrate emotion and reason using evidence drawn 
mainly from the behaviour of certain neurological populations and compared to that 
2of their healthy controls.  But Damasio’s consideration of how the undamaged normal 
brain interacts with the body has some interesting and somewhat controversial 
implications in the context of recent psychological research on choice behaviour.  The 
SMH will be briefly outlined, as will the Damasio’s related theory of emotion, before 
the implications are critically evaluated.  
1.2 THE SOMATIC MARKER HYPOTHESIS
The somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) integrates emotional processing as a vital 
component of decision-making, a process that in dualistic tradition is the preserve of 
reason.  In the SMH decisions in uncertain or ambiguous situations are influenced, 
guided or biased by bodily representations of the potential goodness or badness of the 
available alternatives.  They direct the individual towards choices that have previously 
been good or beneficial, or guide them away from those that have been bad or 
detrimental.  These bodily representations are called somatic markers (somatic from 
the Greek !"#$ meaning body) and they are the products of visceral activity that is 
also a fundamental aspect of emotional processing.  Indeed the SMH is the central 
pillar in Damasio’s theory of emotion, itself an attempt to provide a holistic 
conception of human functioning.  Although, as will be elaborated below, neither this 
theory of emotion nor its central hypothesis are novel (Dunn, Dalgleish and 
Lawrence, 2006), both have captured the attention of researchers across diverse fields 
(as well as the general public) and provoked much enquiry into the relationship 
between emotion and choice. This reason alone makes the SMH worthy of further 
enquiry, but it is the assumptions made about human choice, and in the experimental 
tools used to test them, that are of interest to cognitive and behavioural researchers.  
3Before discussing the assumptions of the SMH it is necessary to give a short 
account of a decision-making task that influenced the development of this hypothesis 
and is used to provide empirical support.  This task is the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; 
Bechara, Damasio, Damasio and Anderson, 1994).  In the IGT participants must make 
a series of selections from four decks of cards (in its original formulation the task was 
manual and the decks were on a table in front of participants).  The participants’ task 
is to make as much money as possible, or avoid making a loss.  They are free to select 
from any deck and in any order.  Each selection wins money but some cards contain 
penalties.  The decks vary along three dimensions: the immediate gain, the expected 
long-term gain and the schedule of losses.  Each selection of a card from deck A or B 
gives a larger immediate reward ($100) than selection of a card from deck C or D 
($50).  But the penalties in A and B are also larger meaning that the cumulative loss in 
decks A and B exceeds the cumulative gain, whereas the opposite is true for C and D.  
After ten card selections from decks A or B the cumulative loss is -$250 whereas after 
ten card selections from decks C or D the cumulative gain is $250.  So decks A and B 
have high immediate gain but long-term loss, whereas decks C and D have low 
immediate gain but long-term gain.  In this way decks C and D can be considered the 
advantageous (or good) alternatives while A and B are the disadvantageous (or bad) 
alternatives.  The third dimension in which the decks vary is the schedule of losses.  
The negative expected value (the probability of win multiplied by win amount minus 
the probability of loss multiplied by loss amount) for decks A and B is achieved with 
five losses of an average -£250 in every ten cards selected from deck A whereas in 
deck B there is one loss of -£1250 in every ten cards selected.  Similarly, the losses on 
decks C and D mirror the losses on A and B, but their magnitude is reduced (-£50 and 
-£250 respectively) to result in a positive expected value from their selections.
4The SMH has three main assumptions which will be briefly stated then 
explored further in the subsequent sections.  The first assumption is that there is a 
causal role for somatic markers in decision-making.  Without somatic markers 
decisions are not guided towards the good options.  This assumption is clear from the 
interpretation of the behaviour of healthy controls and patients with damage to the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMpfc) on the IGT (Bechara, Tranel, Damasio and 
Damasio, 1996; Bechara, Damasio, Tranel and Damasio, 1997a).  While controls 
learn to choose advantageously (i.e. for a profit in the long-term), and develop 
somatic markers (measured using skin conductance responses or SCRs) that 
differentiate between good and bad alternatives, patients with VMpfc damage do not.  
They select the alternatives that are disadvantageous in the long-term, but that offer a 
larger immediate gain, and they do not develop differential somatic markers.  This has 
been interpreted as showing that without somatic markers advantageous choices are 
not made, or in another way, somatic markers are necessary for advantageous choice 
behaviour.
The second assumption comes from a strong version of the SMH where 
somatic markers bias decision-making covertly in the absence of knowledge about the 
contingencies of the choice environment or indeed knowledge sufficient to guide 
behaviour.  The empirical result on which this claim is based stems from an earlier 
claim that the IGT is cognitively impenetrable, or that participants do not acquire a 
full understanding of its contingencies despite superior memory and IQ scores 
(Bechara et al, 1994).  Bechara et al (1997a) recorded SCRs and asked participants 
questions about their knowledge of the task as they completed the IGT.  The authors 
claimed that SCRs generated prior to deck selection differentiated between the 
advantageous and disadvantageous decks before participants had any conscious 
5knowledge about the nature of the deck types.  Tranel, Bechara and Damasio (1999, 
p.1055) claimed:
“… in normal individuals non-conscious biases guide reasoning and decision-
making behaviour before conscious knowledge does, and without the help of 
such biases, overt knowledge may be insufficient to ensure advantageous 
behaviour … we believe that the autonomic responses detected in our 
experiment (especially those evident [before participants articulate any 
hunch]) are evidence for a non-conscious signalling process.” 
This claim assumes that somatic activity precedes knowledge and indeed may help in 
the acquisition of knowledge.  It can be interpreted as an instantiation of implicit 
learning, itself a controversial concept in cognitive psychology (e.g. Shanks and St. 
John, 1994).  
The final assumption is that the somatic system somehow calculates 
“goodness” or “badness” of a choice based on its long-term, average overall outcome.  
Or in other words the somatic system maximises.  This is implied in the first 
assumption – in healthy individuals somatic markers guide decision-making towards 
the options with the positive expected value.  It is also implied in the standard analysis 
of IGT behaviour – net score.  This is calculated by summing the number of cards 
selected from the advantageous decks (C and D) and subtracting the sum of the 
number of cards selected from the disadvantageous decks (A and B), regardless of one 
decks’ schedule of losses.  Positive scores indicate a preference for the advantageous 
decks while negative scores indicate a preference for the disadvantageous decks.  
Thus, the analysis of choice on the IGT is solely in terms of expected value.
6This thesis looks at the second and third assumptions in the context of normal, 
i.e. undamaged, decision-making behaviour in healthy participants.  In particular it 
considers why maximizing behaviour is found and whether choice is dependent on 
expected value.  The related claim that choices proceed in the presence of differential 
somatic activity but the absence of knowledge is also examined in the last chapter.  
But before that point the support and criticism of these three assumptions of the SMH 
are explored.
1.3 THE ASSUMPTION OF THE CAUSALITY OF SOMATIC MARKERS
The support for the assumption of a causal role for somatic markers in decision-
making comes mainly from observations of neurological patients and the location of 
their brain damage in the context of the SMH.  To evaluate this support it is necessary 
to explore Damasio’s theory of emotion in more detail as well as describe how the 
SMH fits into it.
!"#"! $%&%'()*' +,-)./ )0 -&)+()1 %12 +,- ')&%+(3 &%.4-. ,/5)+,-'('
The SMH arose out of the work of Damasio and his colleagues in their attempts to 
quantify and explain the impairment in the real-life decision-making of people with 
damage to the VMpfc.  These patients show deficiencies in their decision-making, the 
results of which often include the inability to retain pre-morbid employment, 
unsuccessful management of personal finances and entering unsound financial 
investments, the breakdown in pre-morbid relationships and new relationships that do 
not last (Damasio, 1994; Goel and Grafman, 1997).  Damasio and colleagues found 
no impairments in a series of standard neuropsychological tests yet the patients 
7showed abnormal decision-making behaviour, especially when the decisions involved 
personal or social matters (Damasio, 1994).  This behaviour remained enigmatic until 
one patient reported that when viewing stimuli that would have pre-morbidly 
produced an emotional reaction, he felt none.  This observation was confirmed in 
other patients with VMpfc damage (Damasio, 1994) and led Damasio to link 
abnormal real-life decision-making with emotional blunting.  For example, when 
presented with disturbing images containing scenes of violence people with VMpfc 
damage reported they did not experience the emotional reaction they would have done 
pre-injury.  This was measured objectively using SCR recording (Damasio, 1994).  
The impairment in real-life decision-making and impaired emotional responding led 
Damasio to develop the SMH and his wider theory of emotion.  The SMH is 
essentially the operation of this architecture in decision environments.  But since 
much of human activity involves making decisions (Rachlin [1989] has argued that all 
behaviour is choice behaviour) it can be seen as a general theory of human 
functioning and so the two will be discussed synonymously.
Damasio (1994, 1996; Bechara and Damasio, 2005) conceives of an emotion 
as the changes in body and brain states that are triggered by the operation of a 
dedicated brain system that processes the meaningful events in the external or internal 
environment.  Although changes in neural activity occur (e.g. neurotransmitter release 
and the modifications of connections between the neural representations of stimuli), 
the crucial part of this emotional system is that the perception of the meaningful event 
produces changes in the body’s physiology (e.g. heart rate, endocrine release).  When 
the status of the somatic state is signalled back to the brain it acts as the evaluation of 
the meaningful event.  In this theory a feeling is the perception of this change.
8In the latest revision of the SMH (Bechara, 2003; Bechara and Damasio, 2005) 
meaningful events are called primary or secondary inducers.  Primary inducers are 
defined as “innate or learned stimuli that cause pleasurable or aversive states” and 
“concepts or knowledge that through learning automatically and obligatorily elicit 
emotional responses” (Bechara and Damasio, 2005, p340).  In previous formulations 
of the theory these two features of primary inducers were separately called primary 
and secondary emotions (Damasio, 1994; 1996).  Primary emotions were conjunctions 
of the somatic state and the commensurate brain state, while secondary emotions were 
associations between primary emotions and categories of stimuli in the environment.  
But the reformulation of the SMH has grouped them together presumably to keep the 
terminology simple and to separate them from a new concept – secondary inducers.  
These are essentially thoughts and memories about primary inducers.  
The concepts and language used to describe these meaningful events are very 
close to the concepts of primary and secondary reinforcers used in the long history of 
associative learning and studies of animal choice.  This may be coincidental but it is 
reasonable to assume that Damasio’s theory was influenced by these earlier 
descriptions.  Even if this is not the case, much of the neural architecture that 
underlies Damasio’s theory has also been explored in animal learning but with 
different interpretations of systemic interactions.  Before discussing these differences 
it is necessary to give a brief account of the brain anatomy involved in representing an 
emotional event in the SMH.  Bechara and Damasio (2005) have detailed the series of 
events and important structures as follows: 
1. The features of a primary inducer and the somatic state associated with 
it are linked in the amygdala.  An explicit route for processing the features of 
the inducer is via early sensory and higher-order association cortices, while 
9processing via the thalamus offers an implicit route.  The somatic state is 
evoked by efferent connections from the hypothalamus and autonomic 
brainstem nuclei to the body resulting in changes in the internal milieu (“all 
biochemical processes occurring in an organism at any given moment, 
Damasio, 1994, p. 118), and in other structures having efferent connections 
with the body (e.g. ventral striatum, periaqueductal grey, brainstem nuclei).  
The nature of these changes charges the somatic state with a degree of polarity 
that represents the “goodness” or “badness” of the primary inducer.
2. Once somatic states are induced, the condition of these states is 
signalled to the brain where the brainstem nuclei and some somatosensory 
cortices (e.g. insula/secondary somatosensory cortex, primary somatosensory 
cortex, and cingulate cortex) represent the somatic state.
3. Once this primary inducer to induced somatic state relationship has 
been experienced once, Bechara and Damasio (2005) contend the pattern of 
brain activity for that somatic state is formed.  This then allows secondary 
inducers (thoughts or memories) associated with a primary inducer to re-
activate that pattern of somatic activity (although at a weaker level).  This 
association is dependent on VMpfc.  It holds the link between temporally 
congruent brain activity in a) areas that represent categories of events (based 
in higher-order association cortices), b) the structures that generate somatic 
states, and c) the neural patterns that represent the feeling of the somatic state.  
So the VMpfc operates as the connector between brain areas where knowledge 
of events is represented and areas where the somatic patterns of feeling for 
those events or situations is represented.  In effect, it is analogous to a 
telephone switchboard operator. 
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4. When any part of this system is re-activated for example by 
encountering a primary inducer in the environment or thinking about one 
(secondary induction), Bechara and Damasio (2005) envisage that the system 
is reactivated, in whole or in part.  This happens in one of two ways, but 
always involves a re-activation of the somatic state and consequent 
modulation of brain activity.  Either the somatic state re-activation occurs in 
the body (the body loop) or it occurs in a neural representation of the body 
state (the “as-if body” loop).  
5. Dependent on which parts of the system are re-activated, the resulting 
somatic activity can operate unconsciously or be perceived consciously as a 
good or bad feeling, or as an incentive or alarm signal.  The SCR activity 
found on the IGT by Bechara et al (1997a) is envisaged to reflect this 
unconscious processing (Bechara and Damasio, 2005, p. 341).
The SMH is an instantiation of Damasio’s theory of emotion in a decision 
environment. Options for action become secondary inducers when they are considered 
and this instils a somatic valence by linking representations of their outcomes (in the 
first instance), previous outcomes, or outcomes in similar situations with the somatic 
activity that is (in the first instance) or was invoked in their presence.  In this way the 
system for processing emotion and for evaluating alternatives (i.e. making decisions) 
are fundamentally intertwined.  The main support for the interactions within this 
neural architecture has come from examination of what happens when parts of this 
system are damaged.  And the empirical test used for this examination has been the 
IGT.  This evidence is explored next.
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A significant strength of the SMH is this specification of its neural architecture. One 
of the main reasons for the critical role of the VMpfc is that it receives input from all 
sensory regions including somatosensory cortices (Rolls, 2004).  These regions are 
also interconnected and among them have access to information about the whole body 
(Damasio, 1994, p.180).  The VMpfc also has efferent and afferent links with several 
bio-regulatory sectors of the brain including brainstem neurotransmitter nuclei and 
some in the basal forebrain, as well as the amygdala, anterior cingulate and 
hypothalamus.  Through these connections the VMpfc has direct links to every area 
for motor or chemical response in the brain.  This architecture has been well described 
by others (Ongur and Price, 2000) although not necessarily interpreted in the same 
way (e.g. Rolls, 2004, 2005).
The consequences of lesions to the VMpfc described by Damasio (1994, 1996) 
are abnormal real-life decision-making that appears not to take the long-term into 
account, an absence of emotional reactivity where it would be expected, and normal 
performance on standard neuropsychological tests.  On the IGT patients with VMpfc 
damage preferentially select the disadvantageous decks and do not generate 
anticipatory SCRs (aSCRs) prior to making a selection, where healthy controls’ 
aSCRs differentiate between the expected value of the decks (Bechara et al, 1994, 
1996, 1997a).
Consistent with the SMH framework bilateral amygdala damage also impairs 
decision-making (Tranel and Hyman, 1990; Nahm, Tranel, Damasio and Damasio, 
1993) and emotional processing.  The amygdala’s role in the SMH is to provide the 
affective link to situational stimuli.  Consistent with this role, amygdala damage 
results in an absence of physiological activity in a fear conditioning task (Tranel, 
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Bechara, Damasio and Damasio, 1996) as well as prior to and following card 
selections on the IGT (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio and Lee, 1999).  Performance 
measured by net score was impaired relative to controls.  Coupled with the VMpfc 
patient data it appears that there is support for the SMH framework and that the 
absence of somatic markers (at least as measured by SCRs) is associated with 
impaired IGT performance.  Indeed the claim that the IGT measures emotion-based 
learning comes directly from these results.  In support, Peters and Slovic (2000) have 
also reported that self-reported measures of affective reactivity added explanatory 
power to predictions of the choice among the decks in a modified version of the IGT.  
This result suggests that affective processing can provide some contribution to IGT 
performance.
However, it is by no means clear that the relation between somatic markers 
and IGT performance is anything other than correlational.  It is possible that rather 
than reflecting the presence of an emotional biasing system, the aSCRs in healthy 
participants reflect the development of understanding of the task contingencies.  This 
possibility will be returned to in section 1.4.  The causality debate revolves around 
precedence and can also be thought of as a restatement of the classic chicken or the 
egg conundrum.  Do somatic markers guide choice behaviour prior to consciously 
available knowledge or is this knowledge achieved earlier and the somatic markers a 
result of it?  The support for the strong version of the SMH has come from two lines 
of investigation.  The first line, and strongest support, comes from clinical studies 
where patients with little SCR activity also show behavioural impairment on the IGT, 
in the absence of impairment on other neuropsychological tests.  The second is linked 
and has explored individual differences in SCR activity and behavioural performance.  
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Here the assumption is that poor deck selection is based, in part, on low SCR activity. 
Both methods have support in the literature but the results are not uniform.
Bechara et al (1999) replicated their aSCR and post-selection SCR results in 
controls and two patient groups.  An amygdala-damaged patient group displayed the 
same deficit in aSCRs and in IGT performance as VMpfc-damaged patients, but 
additionally displayed no post-selection SCRs.  These results implicated the amygdala 
in the somatic marker circuit.  Further support for the SMH was provided by the non-
differential aSCRs displayed by some normal participants (n = 3, 23%) who did not 
choose advantageously.  However, one patient with VMpfc damage (20% of their 
population) also performed advantageously, though they did pick more bad cards than 
healthy controls, but no mention is made of this individual’s aSCRs.  If they were 
similar to the rest of the VMpfc-damaged sample then this may suggest that IGT 
performance is not dependent on functioning somatic markers.  In a comparison of 
anticipatory and post-selection SCRs from early and late periods of the task, a similar 
pattern was found between controls and the VM-damaged group in post-selection 
SCRs (smaller magnitude in later trials implying habituation), whereas only controls 
showed the expected increase in aSCRs.  However, there are some problems with this 
account.  No description of how early and late periods were defined is made, while 
the authors provided neither graphical representation of the data involved nor any 
statistical examination of these differences.
Bechara and Damasio (2002) also looked at aSCR in four periods while 
participants carried out their progressive version (A′B′C′D′) of the IGT.  In this 
version the worse decks have increasing punishment with every ten choices, while 
best decks have increasing reward.  The periods were the “pre-punishment” (trials ~1 
– 10), “pre-hunch” (trials ~11 – 20), “hunch” (trials ~21 – 60) and “conceptual” (trials 
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~61 – 100) stages obtained from Bechara et al’s (1997a) analysis of their participants’ 
knowledge of the IGT contingencies.  Healthy controls’ aSCRs, combined across the 
disadvantageous decks, increased between periods 1 and 2 then remained relatively 
constant.  The large punishment on deck B is likely to fall in this second period and 
may form part of the explanation for this.  Little change was observed in aSCRs for 
the advantageous decks.  However, no analyses of these observations are reported 
making any conclusions based on them tentative.  When participants’ SCRs were split 
into groups determined by their behavioural performance, a three-way interaction of 
deck type by group by block was found but not explored.  Figure 5 in Bechara and 
Damasio (2002) suggests that aSCR for the bad decks increased from the first to the 
second block for the impaired participants too.  This suggests that these behaviourally 
impaired individuals do not respond to the somatic marker in the same way as 
unimpaired individuals, which further suggests that the somatic marker alone may not 
be enough for successful performance on the IGT. Annoni, Ptak, Caldara-Schnetzer, 
Khateb and Pollerman (2003) found a similar result.  They describe a patient (M.F.)
with a cerebellar lesion who shares the affective blunting and preference for the 
disadvantageous decks reported in patients with VMpfc damage, yet who generated 
greater aSCRs to the disadvantageous decks as reported by Bechara et al (1996, 
1997a) in healthy controls.  This might suggest that the aSCRs alone are insufficient 
to guide behaviour.  
This possibility has some support.  While the majority of published studies of 
VMpfc-damaged patients’ IGT behaviour where SCRs have also been recorded have 
replicated the absence of aSCRs, the difference in aSCRs between deck types has not 
been replicated in all samples of healthy controls.  Some studies have replicated it 
(Tomb, Hauser, Deldin and Caramazza, 2002; Suzuki, Hiota, Takasawa and 
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Shigemasu, 2003; Crone, Somsen, Van Beek and Van Der Molen, 2004) while others 
have not (Campbell, Stout and Finn, 2004; Kleeberg, Bruggiman, Annoni, Melle et al 
2004).  Indeed studies in which physiological measurements were recorded during 
IGT performance have often found different results.  For example, Suzuki et al (2003) 
used a student sample and found a difference in aSCRs between the advantageous and 
disadvantageous decks.  They also found a difference in post-selection SCRs between 
deck types, and between trials with and without punishment. In some support of the 
SMH a correlation was found between post-selection SCR-level in the first half with 
selections from A and B in the second half.  However, both high and low post-
selection SCR groups reduced disadvantageous selections in the second 40 trials, and 
the low SCR group’s advantageous selections were above chance levels.  There was 
no relationship between aSCRs and performance. 
Carter and Pasqualini (2004) suggested that the SMH implies that those people 
with stronger somatic responses would show faster learning on the IGT.  In contrast to 
Suzuki et al (2003), no correlation in post-selection SCRs with their performance 
measure (the amount of money won) was found.  Instead, and again unlike Suzuki et 
al, aSCR level did correlate with money won.  Money won also correlated with a 
measure of neuroticism.  This relationship was reduced when aSCR level was 
partialled out, indicating that aSCR size may mediate this relationship.  The results of 
these studies suggest that SCR level does relate to IGT performance in some way, but 
differences in which SCR-type related to the performance measure clouds 
understanding.  
One potential factor may be the method used to measure aSCRs.  Campbell et 
al (2004) did not find any difference in aSCRs between deck types in their healthy 
controls or patients with Huntingdon’s disease.  This may be because their 
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participants did not show preference for the advantageous decks until the fourth trial 
block and even then the preference was not large. Alternatively, unlike Bechara et al 
(1996, 1997a, 1999) Campbell et al (2004) used a computerized version of the IGT 
and the timing of SCR recording was automatic.  Kleeberg et al (2004) also reported 
no difference in aSCRs between deck types and used the computerized IGT with 
automatic SCR recording.  Carter and Pasqualini (2004) noted that they switched 
from a computerized IGT to the manual version after pilot studies found that 
participants stopped generating SCRs after a few selections.  But if SCRs are 
indicative of somatic markers and if their presence is dependent on test medium it 
begs the question of what else influences SCRs and if this also affects somatic 
markers.  Yet aSCR differences between deck types have been reported using a 
computerized task (Suzuki et al, 2003; Crone et al, 2004). 
Crone et al (2004) presented a detailed analysis of physiological correlates of 
IGT performance.  They explored the findings of Bechara and colleagues (Bechara et 
al 2000, Bechara and Damasio, 2002) that a proportion of healthy controls performed 
like VMpfc patients.  Crone et al hypothesised that an absence of somatic activity was 
linked to poor performance on the IGT, a similar suggestion to that put forward by 
Peters and Slovic (2000).  They split their participants into three groups based on their 
behavioural performance and then compared these groups on the somatic measures 
recorded during the IGT – heart rate and SCR.  Crone et al found that mean skin 
conductance level (SCL) compared to individual baseline was higher preceding a 
choice from A and B in both the moderate and best performing group.  For the best 
performers this interacted with punishment frequency so that mean SCL was higher 
prior to choosing A rather than B.   Similarly, in good performers heart rate slowed 
more prior to choices from decks A and B (heart rate slowing is greater when 
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preparing for an aversive event; Somsen, Van der Molen, and Orlebeke, 1983).  This 
was not found in the worst or moderate groups.  The difference in anticipatory SCL 
was also positively correlated with the number of advantageous selections.  
Differences in both somatic measures post-selection were found to be due to receiving 
punishment rather than reward, and this tended to be higher when the punishment was 
infrequent.  However, in this case there were no differences between performance 
groups.  These results from a large sample (n = 96) with two somatic responses 
recorded suggest that somatic activity prior to making selections on the IGT is linked 
to learning on the IGT. 
However, although an impressive and detailed study, Crone et al’s (2004) 
results cannot inform on whether somatic markers precede knowledge or vice versa.  
They provide no quantification of change in physiological arousal across time (no 
doubt due to the statistical nightmare it produces) and this makes identifying the 
direction of any mechanism for feedback harder to extract i.e. are good performers 
faster learners (do they understand the contingencies earlier)?  Crone and van der 
Molen (2004) did find that more of their best performing participants had greater 
knowledge of the decks than participants who did not perform as well.  It is also 
feasible that the best-performing group have higher post-selection somatic activity 
earlier on the task and this influences anticipatory activity.  However, this possibility 
cannot be examined from Crone et al’s data as presented.  It would make sense to 
suggest that anticipatory somatic activity migrates following feedback, and perhaps it 
does this faster in good performers.  But does it do it faster because their 
physiological arousal system facilitates that or because they develop an understanding 
of the task faster?  Crone et al (2004, p.539) consider this question citing Bechara et al 
(2002): 
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“…primary inducers are the reward and punishment events.  Secondary 
inducers are the thoughts, and memories of prior choices, preceding a decision.  These 
are secondary because they can only be formed after experience with the 
consequences (positive or negative) of choices in that situation.”  
So Crone et al state that the IGT performance in the worst group (“decision-making 
impairment”) “arise from a weak somatic response generated by secondary (i.e. 
acquired) inducers”.  They cite Bechara et al (1997a) and consider whether their poor 
performers rely on a more explicit learning strategy (rather than listening to their gut 
feelings - a similar contention to that proposed by Evans, Kemish and Turnbull, 
2004).  But the assumption is that Bechara et al’s (1997a) interpretation was correct 
and aSCR changes precede knowledge expression.
While this is a possibility there is also evidence to suggest that a somatic 
marker is not required for successful performance on the IGT at all.  This evidence 
comes from studies using the IGT with patients with clinical damage to various parts 
of their affective system.  North and O’Carroll (2001) found no difference in 
behaviour between healthy controls and patients with spinal chord damage (a 
complete transverse lesion at the C6 level).  In these patients no connections between 
the peripheral nervous system and the brain exist.  One would expect the absence of 
peripheral somatic activity would interfere with IGT performance but it did not.  This 
result leaves two ways out for the SMH.  First, other somatic connections with the 
brain are more important than afferent feedback through the spinal chord e.g. 
connections via the bloodstream, the vagus and other cranial nerves.  These routes are 
important within the SMH according to Bechara and Damasio (2005, p.342).  Second, 
reliance on the “as-if body” loop of the hypothesis.  This is a possibility given that 
North and O’Carroll’s patient participants were tested some time after their injury was 
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sustained.  However, if the “as-if body” loop is invoked it does not explain why the 
body loop mechanism is utilised in learning for other non-injured participants.  It is 
also problematic that as the IGT provides a new situation for these participants (i.e. 
there is no stored representation of somatic feedback) the SMH framework would 
presumably require activation of the body loop.  But it may be the case that the time 
between injury and IGT exposure was long enough for compensatory activation of the 
“as-if body” loop in new situations.
Heims, Critchley, Dolan, Matthias et al (2004) have also reported IGT 
performance in patients with pure autonomic failure (PAF) that was superior to their 
control participants.  PAF results in peripheral denervation of autonomic neurons 
meaning no peripheral autonomic input.  Dunn et al (2006) point out prolonged PAF 
results in changes to the structure of the brain regions involved in the representation 
and regulation of body state (loss of grey matter volume in anterior cingulate and 
insula).  Such atrophy would compromise both the body and “as-if body” loops of the 
SMH meaning that normal performance on the IGT is problematic for the theory.  
However, like North and O’Carroll (2001), Heims et al suggest that other forms of 
somatic feedback are still intact in these patients.  Together these studies suggest that 
disruption of the brain’s connection with the autonomic nervous system does not 
affect performance on the IGT in the direction predicted by the SMH account.  
However, the results from both studies can still fit the SMH by virtue of the 
undamaged pathways connecting the viscera to the brain in both patient groups, or by 
incorporating the “as-if body” loop of the SMH.  While the first is a reasonable and 
testable hypothesis, the second option is less so.  If the SMH is to be maintained on 
the basis of the “as-if body” loop it questions whether the IGT can provide a good test 
of the SMH.
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Although not involved in somatic activation within the SMH architecture, 
there are suggestions that damage to the insula and somatosensory cortex impairs IGT 
performance (Bechara, Tranel, Damasio and Damasio, 1997b).  These areas are where 
representations of stimuli or situations are held.  Consistent with the SMH framework, 
when patients with damage to either the right or left hemisphere were compared to 
age-matched controls only right hemisphere damage resulted in impaired 
performance.  This right hemisphere effect has also been investigated in VMpfc (or 
the wider orbitofrontal cortex, OFC).  Tranel, Bechara and Denburg (2002) found that 
right, but not left, lesions were associated with more impairment in everyday 
decision-making and impaired IGT selections.  Bechara and Damasio (2005) have 
linked this laterality to the polarity of somatic state.  Right VMpfc processes negative 
somatic states while the left VMpfc processes positive somatic states.  The main 
distinctive variable on the IGT is the punishment on the decks so this suggestion is 
plausible.  Clark, Manes, Nagui, Sahakian, and Robbins (2003) similarly found that 
the laterality of frontal lesions affected performance on the IGT relative to controls.  
However, damage is rarely limited to one prefrontal region (Clark and Manes, 2004) 
and impairment was positively correlated to lesion size, implicating prefrontal regions 
outside of those specified in the SMH.
In summary, the neural architecture of the SMH has been well specified and 
there is a large body of research that provides evidence supporting it.  Many lesion 
studies by the Iowa group exploring these neural substrates are consistent with the 
predictions of the SMH.  However, other studies suggest disruption of somatic 
systems does not have the disruptive effect predicted from the SMH.  There are also 
ambiguous accounts of the degree to which somatic activity is necessary for 
advantageous performance to develop on the IGT.  Together these studies question 
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whether the assumption that somatic markers are necessary for unimpaired decision-
making is justified.  
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One of the strengths of the SMH, and perhaps a contributing factor to its success, is 
that it has an intuitive appeal.  References abound in popular culture and folklore 
inviting us to make decisions based on our “gut instincts” when we are unsure about 
the wisest course, or even if we are not.   However, reintegrating body processes via 
emotion into mental processes is not a novel concept.  James (1884) and Lange (1885) 
were the first to argue that emotion was the perception of bodily changes in reaction 
to environmental stimuli. Damasio (1994) acknowledged the contribution of these 
peripheral feedback theories of emotion as the basis for the SMH.  In including a 
mechanism for cognitive input, secondary inducers, he maintains he has overcome the 
criticism of James-Lange theory that internal as well as external events can affect and 
effect emotional processing.  But the addition of an “as-if body” loop is also not a 
new addition.  James (1884) considered it and Dunn et al (2006) cite a number of 
examples of earlier expressions of this idea in considerations of emotion.  However, 
Damasio has extended this discussion by specifying in greater detail how such a 
mechanism would work.  
Despite the increased specification of the SMH relative to earlier theories, 
Rolls (2005) has criticised it for the same reasons James-Lange theory was rejected.  
The major argument against it is that empirical evidence has failed to show the causal 
link from peripheral responses during emotional behaviour to emotional behaviour.  
In fact, there is much evidence that such a link does not exist including work showing 
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that preventing peripheral feedback through surgical severing of the spinal chord (e.g. 
Cannon, 1927) does not abolish emotional responses.  Neither are emotional 
responses evoked by artificially stimulating autonomic changes through injections of 
adrenaline or noradrenaline (Rolls, 2005).  Indeed Rolls maintains that the peripheral 
nervous system does not produce changes diverse or specific enough to encompass 
the range of emotions that can be experienced.  Perhaps the most damning criticism of 
James-Lange theory, and by extension the SMH, is attributed to Wittgenstein by 
McGinn (2003).  His thought refutation imagines the horribleness of grief when some 
loved one dies.  It cannot be explained in terms of the horribleness of bodily 
sensations.  While they may be unpleasant they are not the object of grief.  James-
Lange theory fails because it does not take into account the intentionality of emotion, 
or what the emotions are about.  These are generally things outside the body.
Rolls (1990, 1994, 2005) has developed a theory of emotion that does take this 
intentionality into account.  He proposes that emotions are states produced by 
rewarding and punishing stimuli.  Much of his published work has explored the 
architecture of this system and much of it overlaps with that proposed by Damasio to 
underlie the SMH (e.g. a central role for the OFC and the amygdala).  However, the 
interpretation of how that architecture works differs between the theories.  For Rolls, 
behaviour is produced in response to learned reinforcers that also elicit autonomic 
responses via the OFC and the amygdala.  There is no need to place peripherally 
mediated changes (somatic markers) as a causal mechanism for changing the 
behaviour into this system.  Rolls suggests that such an addition would be less 
efficient, especially in a rapidly changing environment.  It would take longer to 
execute a behaviour if, in order to determine a stimulus’ value, it first had to be passed 
through the visceral system or a cortical representation of it, rather than have a direct 
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link between areas representing reinforcer value (OFC, amygdala) with structures that 
effect behavioural responses.
Damasio et al (1991) anticipated this criticism through parsimony and argued 
that the somatic system is evolutionarily ancient and is very effective.  But this is not 
a strong refutation as it does not explain why a more complex system would evolve 
instead of a simpler one.  But Damasio and colleagues have made an articulate case 
for how the development of decision-making based on language (reason) can be 
integrated into a phylogenically and ontogenically older decision system based on 
bio-regulatory mechanisms involved in maintaining body homeostasis.  Indeed, this is
one reason why Damasio (1994) has rejected a Knowledge-Somatic hypothesis for 
guiding behaviour on the IGT.  In the evolutionary and developmental framework of 
the SMH, somatic signalling precedes the emergence of language (or reason) as a 
behavioural guide.  But Rolls’ account remains a more parsimonious account of the 
interactions in neural architecture that overlap in his and Damasio’s account.  Rolls 
(1999, 2005) has also offered a deficit in reversal learning as an account of the 
impaired VMpfc performance on the IGT.  
Patterson, Ungerleider and Bandettini (2002) have offered an alternative view 
on the role of somatic markers as indexed by SCRs in IGT function – that they have 
no causal function.  They found that SCR activity appeared to be independent from 
performance on the IGT and also in a working memory task.  Using functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to examine brain activity, and SCR recordings, 
the authors found that SCR changes were correlated with activity in a number of 
regions, including the VMpfc, during performance on both tasks.  But these changes 
were not related to task performance and instead suggested that SCRs are generated 
during complex tasks but are not specifically related to any aspect of them.  These 
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results do pose a problem for the SMH if SCR activity is simply a correlate of brain 
activity or arousal.  There is a get-out clause though.  In recording SCR activity 
during the IGT Patterson et al (2002) failed to distinguish time periods before and 
after card choice.  By combining anticipatory and reactive SCR activity the analyses 
employed would have missed any correlated brain activity that differentiated between 
pre- and post-selection SCRs.  
An interesting addition to the debate is contributed by Amiez, Procyk, Honore, 
Sequeira and Joseph (2003).  They recorded SCRs in monkeys during selection of 
unequally and probabilistically reinforced targets.  They found that SCRs were time-
locked to the monkeys’ arm-movements towards rewarded stimuli, irrespective of the 
choice selected and its outcome.  The authors suggested that the SCRs were indicative 
of anticipatory appetitive behaviour, not of any cognitive process associated with the 
best target.  The absence of any cognitive component does not trouble the SMH, the 
fact that SCR parameters were no different during the evaluatory period and after 
learning had occurred does.  Dunn et al (2006, p. 251) point out that this is 
problematic for the SMH as it suggests that ‘anticipatory’ changes on the IGT relate 
to expectancies of reward and punishment after deck selection has occurred rather 
than directing their selection.  Or, more simply, there is no causal role for aSCRs in 
decision-making.  However, differences between the tasks diminish these concerns.  
In the monkeys’ task they were always rewarded and never punished, making this task 
free from risk as compared with the IGT.  In a similar vein, in this task the monkeys 
were entirely familiar with the environment having experienced it many times, 
whereas the IGT represents a novel environment for human control participants 
(however, VMpfc patients often experience multiple sessions).  Additionally, in 
defence of the SMH the integration of somatic markers and decision-making may not 
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be as developed in monkeys as in humans, although according to Damasio any appeal 
to decision-making through purely rational, cognitive processes assumes the 
development of two systems built one on top the other (this is Descartes’ error) 
neglecting to acknowledge that successful decision-making must have evolved.
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Extensive evidence suggests that a major role for the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), of 
which the VMpfc forms a large part, is learning stimulus-reinforcer associations 
(Rolls, 2004).  For example, the OFC contains secondary taste and secondary 
olfactory cortex in which the reward values of stimuli to these senses are represented.  
The tastes and smells of food are primary reinforcers.  The OFC also contains neurons 
that code the texture of food in the mouth and also neurons with links to visual areas 
that link tastes to what the object is (Rolls, 2004).  Animals choose alternatives that 
have higher value and a key discriminant for primary reinforcers is a better taste e.g. 
higher sugar content.  Rolls and colleagues have also shown that the reward values of 
secondary reinforcers are represented in OFC.  Activity in this area (measured with 
fMRI) is correlated with money won or lost on a reversal learning task (O’Doherty, 
Kringelbach, Rolls, Hornak et al, 2001).  All this has led Rolls (2004, 2005) to 
suggest that part of the function of the OFC in decision-making, social behaviour and 
emotional processing is to represent reinforcers, detect changes in those reinforcers 
being received and then use these changes to rapidly reset the stimulus-reinforcer 
associations.  In turn this would rapidly change behaviour.
Consistent with such a role damage to the ventral prefrontal cortex results in 
deficits in reversing stimulus-reinforcer association or reversal learning as it is better 
known (Rolls, Hornak, Wade and McGrath, 1994; Fellows and Farah, 2003; Hornak, 
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O’Doherty, Bramham, Rolls et al, 2004).  Selection of the previously rewarded 
alternative occurs despite patients being able to report the correct response.  Rolls et 
al (1994) also reported that impairment on this task was highly correlated with 
evaluations of disinhibited behaviour and post-injury emotional state.  
Reversal learning is an explanation for deficient IGT performance because the 
arrangement of the reinforcement schedules on each deck is such that the 
disadvantageous decks serve no punishment until after several selections (3 in deck A 
and 9 in deck B).  Initially, a choice from them is the better option because of their 
higher immediate payoff.  When Fellows and Farah (2005) rearranged the losses in 
these decks so that they occurred on the initial selections, the behaviour of patients 
with VMpfc damage was comparable with that of controls whereas they were 
impaired on the standard version of the task.  Furthermore these authors also reported 
impairment in patients with dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLpfc) damage.  Their 
results are doubly damaging for the SMH in that they suggest that the source of IGT 
impairment for VMpfc-damaged patients is found in a failure to reverse early 
learning, and that damage out with the SMH architecture impairs IGT performance.  
Bechara, Damasio, Tranel and Damasio (2005) have sought to explain these results as 
due to the lesion locations in Fellows and Farah’s (2005) patients.  The damage in 
both VMpfc and DLpfc patients was focused in the right hemisphere and Bechara et 
al (2005) suggest this may implicate a working memory dysfunction as the source of 
their IGT impairment.  However, it is not clear why.  In the previous study they cite in 
support, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel and Anderson (1998) found a single dissociation 
between working memory and IGT performance such that the latter was dependent on 
the former.  Patients with right DLpfc damage were impaired on the working memory 
task but not the IGT.   So although right hemisphere damage impacts working 
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memory, this impairment was not sufficient to impair IGT performance in Bechara et 
al (1998).  More pertinent may be that Bechara et al’s (1998) VMpfc patients had 
bilateral damage.  However, the involvement of systems out with the SMH 
architecture in IGT impairment does question the specificity IGT impairment has to 
identify prefrontal damage.
This explanation in terms of a failure to reverse early learning does not explain 
the behaviour of VMpfc patients on repeated exposures to the IGT, when one 
presumes the impulse to select from A or B has declined, and knowledge can be used.  
However, Dunn et al (2006) have suggested that reversal learning is best understood 
as a failure in response inhibition (after Rescorla, 1997).  In this conception successful 
deck selection requires inhibition of a lose-shift pattern of responding for the 
advantageous decks after a loss.  If VMpfc-lesioned patients cannot perform this 
inhibition the immediate consequences rather than the long-term outcomes will 
govern their selections.  Of course, the reason that they may not be able to perform 
this inhibition may be that no somatic markers act as a guide (Bechara et al, 2005).  
However, Dunn et al have rejected this explanation as a parsimonious alternative 
exists where the inhibitory mechanisms required have been well specified (Rescorla, 
1997).  Otherwise they could be explained by a failure in the somatic marker system 
to mark the long-term outcome% Further, reversal learning has been demonstrated in 
the absence of an intact amygdala (Izquierdo, Suda and Murray, 2004) suggesting that 
emotion signals are not required for reversal.
Bechara et al (2005) have also sought to rebut an explanation by reversal 
learning by arguing that other components of the IGT need to be learned because the 
task is more complex than any reversal learning task used so far.  Turnbull, Evans, 
Kemish, Park et al (2006) offer results consistent with such a defence.  They modified 
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the IGT so that the contingencies of the decks shift in three phases across 100 trials –
i.e. A is bad for 100 trials then good for two forty trial phases then bad again for a 
final 40 trial phase.  Schizophrenic patients with negative symptoms who were 
unimpaired on the standard IGT selected at chance in each of the subsequent phase 
shifts.  This suggests that factors other than reversal learning are involved.   An 
obvious one is a failure to acquire conceptual knowledge of the task i.e. decks that 
offer the lowest immediate reward are best in the long-term.   Thus the failure in 
reversal learning could be explained in terms of a lack of understanding of how the 
task fundamentally worked.  It is not clear if Turnbull et al (2006) controlled for this 
in their task design (they only state that the decks’ contingencies changed so that 
those that were good are bad for two out of three phases and the opposite is true for 
the bad decks).  If they did not then it would seem that their catatonic schizophrenic 
participants did not acquire the knowledge possessed by their control participants and 
schizophrenic patients with positive symptoms.  The issue of participants’ knowledge 
is revisited in section 1.4.
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The assumption that somatic markers are necessary for learning on the IGT has been 
questioned from a number of directions.  While there is convincing evidence that 
damage to areas in the SMH architecture is correlated with the loss of somatic 
markers and IGT impairment, there is also strong evidence that the loss of somatic 
markers does necessarily lead to this IGT impairment.  Indeed, several studies have 
implicated regions out with the SMH framework in IGT impairment.  Further, the 
relationship between regions in the SMH architecture have fit into other explanatory 
frameworks that are also well established (e.g. Rolls, 1994, 2004).  Impairment on the 
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IGT can also be explained parsimoniously within this framework without resorting to 
somatic markers.  In short, the assumption that somatic markers are necessary for 
decision-making appears to have little support.  However, it is still possible that SCRs 
aid decision-making by biasing choice in the absence of knowledge.
1.4 THE ASSUMPTION THAT DECISION-MAKING PROCEEDS IN THE 
ABSCENCE OF KNOWLEDGE
The assumption that decision-making on the IGT proceeds in the absence of 
knowledge about the task contingencies stems from two claims made by the Iowa 
group.  The first is that choice on the IGT is “cognitively impenetrable” (Dunn et al, 
2006).  This claim originated in Bechara et al’s (1994) report that healthy participants 
with above average IQ and memory scores were unable to report the IGT deck 
contingencies.  The second claim is a modification of the first and originates in an 
empirical test of this hypothesis.  Bechara et al (1997a) found 70% of their healthy 
controls could report “conceptual” knowledge of the IGT contingencies on average 
after 80 trials.  All acquired “hunch” knowledge (that one of the advantageous decks 
was good, but not specifically why) earlier and Bechara et al (1997a) claimed that 
aSCR activity that differentiated between deck types was found prior to the 
appearance of this knowledge.  The second claim is fundamental to the second 
assumption of the SMH that learning proceeds through an emotion-based system in 
the absence of knowledge sufficient to guide behaviour.  
Recently, Maia and McClelland (2004) have challenged this second claim that 
selection is made in the absence of knowledge.  They found that when they asked 
their participants more specific questions than used by Bechara et al (1997a) they had 
30
consciously available knowledge sufficient to guide their choices earlier than reported 
by Bechara et al (1997a).  Crucially, this knowledge was present prior to when 
Bechara et al reported the differential aSCR activity.  This meant that participants’ 
selections are made with some knowledge of the likely consequences and therefore 
does not require an explanation dependent on unconscious somatic markers.  Bechara 
et al (2005) have challenged this claim by pointing out that Maia and McClelland’s 
(2004) participants still sampled from disadvantageous decks despite the professed 
knowledge.  They claimed this leaves room for somatic markers as an explanation for 
why learning continues until only advantageous selections are made.  Maia and 
McClelland (2005) rejected this interpretation and offered the more parsimonious 
account that in any choice environment in which there is uncertainty participants must 
attempt to balance exploitation with exploration. Therefore, given that learning also 
develops it is not surprising that participants continue to select from disadvantageous 
alternatives until they reach a point at which they have gathered enough information.
Maia and McClelland’s (2004) study is good evidence against both the first 
and second assumptions of the SMH in relation to the IGT.  It also raises the 
possibility that while somatic markers may be anticipatory they may reflect 
knowledge of a more risky choice.  Dunn et al (2006) have also suggested that a 
parsimonious account of the SCR data is that greater somatic activity leads to the 
behavioural impairment as aSCRs are larger prior to selection from disadvantageous 
decks.  However, this second explanation does not fit the result of Tomb et al’s (2002) 
study where they switched the deck contingencies such that the advantageous decks 
involved the larger magnitude wins and losses and found aSCRs were higher prior to 
selection from these decks.  Damasio, Bechara and Damasio (2002) rejected the claim 
that aSCRs are based on reinforcer magnitude suggesting instead that the polarity of 
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the somatic marker has reversed and that the aSCRs being measured by Tomb et al 
(2002) indicate an incentive to approach.  This data can still be interpreted in line with 
a knowledge-somatic hypothesis since in Tomb et al’s modified task the advantageous 
decks now have the largest losses.  aSCRs may reflect this knowledge.  This 
hypothesis is tested in Chapter 5.
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Regardless of when participants acquire knowledge of the contingencies and its 
source, some knowledge is required to succeed.  To profit on the IGT requires that 
participants are aware of the current value of the available alternatives, have some 
representation of the long-term outcomes of these alternatives and select on the basis 
of them.  Full knowledge requires awareness that within each deck there is an 
internality that relates the former to the latter.  If knowledge is required to profit on 
the IGT then working memory must be involved.  This possibility is supported by 
Patterson et al’s (2002) finding that SCR activity during both the IGT and a working 
memory task correlated with activation within the same cranial network.  
The assumption that learning proceeds through unconscious somatic biasing 
can be tested by either loading working memory using a secondary task while 
participants complete the IGT or attempts can be made to dissociate the working 
memory from IGT performance.  Bechara et al (1998) attempted to do the latter and 
claimed that working memory is dissociated from the decision-making required for 
the IGT.  Participants who were impaired on the IGT were also impaired on a working 
memory task, but impairment on the working memory task did not also result in IGT 
impairment.  So IGT performance was dependent on intact working memory.  The 
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participants were patients with damage to the VMpfc, the DLpfc and healthy controls.  
The DLpfc has been associated with the regulation of working memory Levy and 
Goldman-Rakic (2000).  The sub-optimal behaviour of VMpfc patients was again 
replicated in two groups, with more anterior or posterior lesions respectively, but only 
the posterior group was impaired on the working memory task (the delayed non-
matching to samples task, DNMS).  The DLpfc patients could also be split into two 
groups.  Neither were impaired on the IGT but only those with right hemisphere 
damage were impaired on the working memory task.  So although right hemisphere 
damage impacted on working memory, this damage was not sufficient to impair IGT 
performance in Bechara et al (1998) although such DLpfc damage has been reported 
as sufficient in others (Fellows and Farah, 2005).  
Other investigations of a working memory role in IGT performance have used 
dual-task methodologies and shown mixed results.  Hinson, Jameson and Whitney 
(2003) found a secondary task that loaded working memory (retaining the order of a 
string of digits in memory) impaired performance relative to a non-working memory 
task (repeating digits flashed on-screen) on a modified version of the IGT.  This 
version had only three choices, where only one was the best, one was intermediate 
and one was worst.  In a second study, Jameson, Hinson and Whitney (2004) 
restricted the impact of the working memory load to the central executive component 
rather than the phonological loop.  Bechara and Martin (2004) also found that 
substance dependent participants who were impaired on the progressive IGT variant 
were also impaired on the delayed non-matching to samples (DNMS) task used in 
Bechara et al (1998).   As the delay on the DNMS task was not a significant factor in 
performance the central executive components (switching and response inhibition) 
were implicated.
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In contrast, Turnbull, Evans, Bunce, Carzolio and O’Connor (2005) found no 
difference in performance between healthy controls in three working memory 
manipulations.  In one, random number generation was used to load the central 
executive; a second used non-executive articulatory suppression; while a third had no 
secondary task.  These authors interpreted these results as evidence that IGT 
performance is not dependent on working memory but rather an example of emotion-
based learning.  However, there was a trend for superior performance in the no 
secondary task condition which might undermine this interpretation.   
A central executive role is also suggested by another study from this group.  
Turnbull, Berry and Bowman (2003) developed the Firefighters Task as a descriptive 
analogue of the IGT.  Participants must assess the quality of four trainee firefighters 
through examination of their daily logs.  These logs are analogous to the IGT decks 
and contain examples of good or bad deeds (e.g. saving someone from a fire or 
accidentally dropping them from a ladder as they are being rescued).  Like on the IGT 
the logs were sampled one at a time.  Turnbull et al reported that healthy participants 
were worse on the Firefighters Task than on the IGT and claimed that as the task was 
more impersonal no somatic markers were generated to aid decision-making.  
However, no physiological recordings were made to back up this claim.  Another 
interpretation may be that participants had descriptive information about each 
firefighter to remember and this memory load was greater than that required for the 
IGT.  A test of this hypothesis would be to correlate performance on the Firefighters 
Task with performance on an established test of working memory.
Other manipulations of the IGT designed by this group also inform on a role 
for working memory.  Bowman, Evans and Turnbull (2005) found no effect of 
imposing a 6 second time constraint for selections on IGT performance relative to no 
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time constraint, suggesting that increased time to think about the alternatives does not 
improve performance.  However, six seconds is not much of a time constraint and 
Cella, Dymond, Cooper and Turnbull (2007) have recently shown that increasing the 
time constraint to 2 seconds does impair performance relative to a 4-second or 
unrestricted inter-trial interval.  This suggests that success on the IGT is reliant on 
having time to think about the alternatives.  
The suggestion that reasoning processes are involved in IGT performance is 
also suggested by the results of Reavis and Overman (2001)’s study using the 
California Weather Task (CWT).  On the CWT participants must learn the probability 
with which combinations of four symbols predict the chance of rain.  Male 
participants who completed the CWT prior to the IGT had a superior performance 
relative to other males who completed the tasks in the opposite order.  This result 
suggests that participants learned something of the contingent nature of choices in the 
CWT that aided their IGT selections.  Reavis and Overman also reported that this 
effect was absent in their female participants opening the possibility of a gender 
difference in performance.  This difference has been documented during development 
(Overman, 2004) and infancy (Kerr and Zelazo, 2004; although Garon and Moore, 
2004, found the opposite result). Reavis and Overman’s (2001) gender difference has 
been replicated in adults (Bolla, Eldreth, London, Kiehl et al, 2003) but not in the 
majority of studies where such a comparison has been reported.  To be on the safe 
side, Evans et al (2004) recruited females from two age-matched populations who had 
left school at sixteen or gone on to university.  They found a “paradoxical” effect of 
education whereby the university students had significantly lower net scores than the 
early school-leavers in the final two IGT blocks.  This was despite the student sample 
scoring higher on a test of intelligence (the NART; though Monterosso, Ehrman, 
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Napier, O’Brien and Childress [2001] found a significant correlation between IQ and 
IGT net score).  Evans et al interpreted this behavioural difference in terms of 
emotion-based learning and claimed their non-student population were more reliant 
on this system while use of it had been discouraged in the student population.  An 
alternative interpretation is that the students were not as motivated to do well despite 
the use of real rather than facsimile money reinforcers i.e. the discount curves for the 
students may have been shallower.  They may also have been more apathetic about 
the task’s outcome given that some of them were participating as a course 
requirement.  This issue of reinforcer value will be explored in Chapter 2.
Gutbrod, Krouzel, Hofer, Muri et al (2006) bring evidence from two patient 
groups that bear directly on the issue of the importance of somatic activity and 
knowledge.  Both patient groups were amnesic, but the location of damage differed 
between them.  In the ‘anterior’ group lesions were located in the basal forebrain and 
orbitofrontal cortex.  The ‘posterior’ group had more heterogeneous damage affecting 
temporal areas and regions adjacent to the hippocampus.  Gutbrod et al recorded 
SCRs and probed knowledge to investigate the hypothesis that consciously available 
knowledge is required to make advantageous decisions on the manual version of the 
IGT.  Conscious knowledge was assessed using Bechara et al’s (1997a) general 
questions method every twenty trials and immediately post-test using two explicit 
memory tasks.  The first was a recognition test where participants were shown four 
possible sequences of twenty gains and losses and asked to match them to each of the 
decks.  The second task was to identify the long-term consequences of each of these 
sequences.  In both tasks getting all answers correct gave a score of 4.
Gutbrod et al (2006) found that for both patient groups mean net score 
hovered around zero while it increased across twenty trial blocks in healthy controls.  
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All healthy controls were classified as having achieved “hunch” level knowledge and 
75% (n = 6) reached “conceptual” knowledge.  This is comparable with Bechara et 
al’s finding.  Only 27% (n = 3) patients had hunch knowledge (2 from the anterior 
group) and only one had conceptual knowledge (the same patient from the posterior 
group who also displayed hunch knowledge).  However, the authors do not go into 
any detail about when any participant arrived at either level of knowledge and this is 
disappointing given their simultaneous examination of SCRs.  In both post-test tasks 
the healthy controls were nearly perfect.  Patients were able to identify a schedule’s 
long-term consequences but not to match the schedule to the deck (the posterior group 
were better at this task although both were worse than controls).  Physiologically, two 
results are of note.  First, aSCRs to disadvantageous choices increased across block in 
controls but not in either patient group.  Crucially, the difference in aSCR between 
deck types only reached significance in the fifth block.  Second, larger punishment 
SCRs were found to deck B in all groups.  (A third result of interest is that 
participants with damage to the amygdala did not show lower punishment SCRs than 
other patients, contrary to results presented by Bechara et al, 1999).  The key point 
here is that behaviourally healthy participants showed a switch to advantageous 
behaviour in the second block, yet the difference in aSCR did not appear until the 
final block (although there is a statistical issue here as relatively few disadvantageous 
selections were made).  But as the authors do not discuss the emergence of knowledge 
in their participants, and as they use the same methodology as Bechara et al (1997a) 
this result can only suggest that task knowledge preceded SCR change.  An additional 
point is that, while the absence of an aSCR difference in amnesic patients and their 
non-preferential choice behaviour might support the SMH, these patients did exhibit 
differential punishment SCRs like the control group.  The difference is that the 
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amnesic patients did not have consciously available knowledge about the task 
contingencies.  Gutbrod et al (2006) claim that their results demonstrate that 
consciously available knowledge is required for an aSCR difference between IGT 
deck types to emerge.  However, as the authors acknowledge, there is a problem with 
this account given the version of the IGT they used.  In order to record post-selection 
SCRs that had returned to baseline following aSCR activity, Gutbrod et al (2006) 
delayed feedback on deck selection for 10 seconds.  The authors suggest that they 
may have inadvertently made the task extremely difficult for their amnesic 
participants by making the contingency between deck choice and reward or 
punishment difficult to notice.  This methodological modification would explain why 
Turnbull and Evans (2006) found that their amnesic patient learned to select 
advantageously on a standard version of the IGT without the large delays in feedback.  
But Gutbrod et al’s (2006) results do suggest that being unable to explicitly learn the 
contingencies of choice and outcome on the IGT severely impact on learning on this 
task. 
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A knowledge-somatic hypothesis is plausible in light of Maia and McClelland’s 
(2004) data showing that knowledge sufficient to guide behaviour occurs very early in 
IGT selection.  However, the counter claim is that knowledge alone is insufficient to 
guide behaviour on the IGT and this leaves room for a weaker version of the SMH 
where somatic markers act as guides.  VMpfc-damaged patients acquire knowledge of 
the contingencies yet still choose the disadvantageous options (Bechara et al, 1997a).  
While an explanation through a failure in reversal learning can explain IGT behaviour 
in one instance, it is more difficult to explain on the multiple occasions on which 
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these patients have been tested (some of the same VMpfc patients participated in each 
of Bechara et al, 1994, 1996, 1997a, 1998).  Although a failure of response inhibition 
is a realistic possibility it is difficult to comprehend why the VMpfc patients would 
continue to select the worst decks each time they are exposed to the task.  But such 
behaviour is not restricted to VMpfc patients on the IGT.  Despite knowledge that 
some behaviours have negative consequences many people continue them.  Drug 
addictions persist in the face of well-known health concerns and potential legal issues.  
Even addicts of legal drugs like tobacco persist in their habit despite knowledge of the 
health risks and in many cases compound their irrational behaviour by paying pension 
contributions.  However, these behaviours can be accounted for by a failure to inhibit 
responses to stimuli with high short-term values.  This will be returned to in section 
1.5.  
The behaviour of healthy controls who perform in the impaired range on the 
IGT may be explained by their failure to acquire knowledge of the deck 
contingencies.  However, there are some other factors that may impact on IGT 
behaviour.  One example is risk seeking.  Rather than select the alternative that is 
safer participants may be lured to the disadvantageous decks by the prospect of the 
larger immediate gain, despite the risk of a large loss.  Similarly damage to the 
VMpfc may lead to greater risk seeking behaviour.  However, there does not appear to 
be strong evidence to support this hypothesis.  Sanfey, Hastie, Colvin and Grafman 
(2003) developed a task to measure risk-taking in patients with prefrontal lesions that 
either excluded or were restricted to the ventromedial region.  In the task participants 
are offered a choice between two decks of cards and must select one.  There are five 
decks in total and the expected value is the same in each.  What differs is the variance 
of loss magnitudes and the proportion of cards with a positive outcome (out of 25 
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possibilities).  Healthy control participants showed a preference for safe decks, 
minimising selections from decks with a larger variance and therefore more risk of a 
large loss.  The VMpfc group could be split in two, with one group no different to the 
controls.  A second group was indeed risk-seeking but they could not be distinguished 
from the first group on the basis of lesion location.
Another task developed to test risk-taking behaviour is the Cambridge Gamble 
Task (CGT; Rogers, Everitt, Baldacchino, Blackshaw et al, 1999).  On each trial 
participants are presented with 10 boxes in two colours, behind one of which a token 
has been randomly placed.  The proportion of each colour varies between trials. 
Participants are invited to place a bet from their accumulated points on the location of
the token (yellow or blue box).  The proportion of bets on less likely alternatives 
measures risk taking.  Control participants tend to select more likely outcomes and 
adjust their betting relative to the probability of being correct i.e. they bet more when 
the ratio of yellow: blue is 9:1 than 6:4.  Patients with VMpfc damage did not show a 
preference for risky or safe options nor was their betting consistent with their choice.  
Indeed, compared to controls bet amounts were reduced.  However, Monterosso et al 
(2001) found that performance on the CBT and choices in the latter half of IGT were 
not correlated.  Clark and Manes (2004) have suggested that risky behaviour is 
reduced following impairment to decision-making as a compensatory strategy.  
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The results of Maia and McClelland’s (2004) study and investigations into the 
contribution of working memory leave little need for an unconscious somatic system 
biasing learning on the IGT.  A weaker version of the SMH would have somatic 
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markers influence decision-making overtly as well as covertly.  Indeed Damasio 
(1994, p. 184, 214) has advanced this account.  However, if participants possess 
knowledge sufficient to guide behaviour there is little need for a somatic marker 
system to explain learning.  This claim cannot be fully dismissed until it is determined 
when knowledge sufficient to guide behaviour and differential somatic activity 
emerges.  But regardless of whether the weaker SMH version is correct, it is the 
stronger claim made by this group (Bechara et al, 1997a; Tranel et al, 1999) that 
researchers have seized and assumed in experiments using the IGT e.g. as a task that 
requires emotion-based learning (e.g. Turnbull et al, 2005).
1.5 THE ASSUMPTION OF A MAXIMIZING SYSTEM
The standard analysis on the IGT compares selections solely in terms of the expected 
value of the decks regardless of the other differences within these decks.  Bechara et 
al (1994) never discuss why they set up the IGT in the manner they did.  One can 
speculate that variations in the schedule of losses between decks with the same 
expected value was intended to make the task less clear to comprehend.  But their 
interpretation of IGT performance and somatic marker activity ignores these potential 
differences and only considers long-term outcomes. Thus Bechara et al (1996) 
interpreted the behaviour of their VMpfc patients on the IGT in terms of a “myopia 
for the future”.  Bechara, Tranel and Damasio (2000) investigated this and two other 
hypotheses as explanations for the sub-optimal performance of VMpfc patients.  A 
hypersensitivity to reward and a hyposensitivity to punishment were not supported by 
behaviour on a reversed version of the IGT.  Here the immediate consequence of 
selection was an immediate loss.  This was higher in the advantageous decks but 
subsequent gains were sufficient to make a profit, whereas the disadvantageous decks 
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had a lower immediate loss but lower rewards insufficient to avoid an overall loss.  
VMpfc patients still persisted in selecting the disadvantageous decks in contrast to 
controls.  This behaviour did not support either hypothesis based on the sensitivity to 
reward or punishment.  To test whether VMpfc patient performance could be 
normalised, the ‘progressive’ IGT variant was created where the losses were increased 
or decreased across ten card blocks within each of the disadvantageous or 
advantageous decks respectively.  VMpfc patients were still impaired relative to 
controls and showed no sign of learning so expressing their behavioural deficit in 
terms of the long-term outcomes of their deck preferences is reasonable.  
Several neuropsychological pathologies are associated with behaviours that 
are similar to those observed in patients with VMpfc damage and many researchers 
have suggested that this might imply a similar underlying deficit (e.g. VMpfc damage 
in drug addicts).  The irrational and personally destructive behaviour of drug addicts 
has been characterised as myopic in that lure of the high payoff from another hit 
outweighs the long-term consequences of such decisions (Vuchinich and Tucker, 
1988; Herrnstein and Prelec, 1992; Bickel and Marsch, 2001).  Supporting this 
conception abnormal IGT performance has been reported in various substance 
dependent populations (e.g. Petry, Bickel and Arnett, 1998; Grant, Contoreggi and 
London, 2000; Bechara, Dolan, Denburg, Hindes et al, 2001; Rotherham-Fuller, 
Shoptaw, Berman and London, 2004; but see Dunn et al, 2006 for an extensive 
review).  However, in a detailed examination of the behavioural performance and 
physiological activity of a large sample of recovering drug addicts (n = 46), Bechara 
and Damasio (2002) and Bechara, Dolan and Hindes (2002) found that only a 
subgroup (23%) resembled VMpfc patients and could be classified as myopic for 
future outcomes.  They were impaired relative to controls on both the progressive 
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versions of the standard and variant IGT, and did not develop differential aSCRs 
between good and bed decks.  Another subgroup (41%) were abnormal on the 
standard progressive task, but not the progressive variant, and their SCRs to reward 
were larger than the other groups suggesting hypersensitivity to reward as an 
explanation.  A further subgroup displayed behaviour and SCRs consistent with the 
majority of healthy controls.  These results suggest drug addiction cannot be classified 
as simply myopia for the future.  Similarly, although the authors state their results 
suggest a VMpfc involvement in drug addiction, the similarity of behaviour on the 
IGT does not mean that the underlying deficit (if there is one) is anatomically the 
same.
Regardless of the accounting ability and involvement of an underlying somatic 
system, the typical analysis used on the IGT implies that expected value is the 
deciding factor in IGT choice.  This is also the assumption of a description of VMpfc 
patient behaviour in terms of myopia for the future.  This assumption is not 
unreasonable given the long history of research to find a descriptive model of human 
decision-making.  The predominant position in this literature assumes that 
normatively human choice does maximize, but numerous challenges demonstrate 
conditions in which such an assumption is not descriptive.  The following sections 
introduce some of this literature.
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Rational Choice Theory (RCT) is a collective term for the various theories of human 
choice that developed following earlier mathematical explorations of probability in, 
for example, insurance to assess risk and in economics to investigate consumer 
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behaviour.  To be rational a decision maker must be able to weakly order outcomes 
dependent on preference and, most importantly, make choices so as to maximise 
something (Edwards, 1954).  In Rational Choice Theory this something is usually 
called utility .  Utility is best defined as the “goodness” of an option as it is used as a 
measure of how consequences realise values or goals.  Rational Choice Theory 
assumes a decision maker will choose the alternative that maximises utility (Edwards, 
1954).  This assumption fits into the common sense view of decision-making and has 
become the basis of most economic thought.  Rational Choice Theory is thus a 
normative theory of decision-making.
But people do not behave as if maximising expected value e.g. they buy 
insurance and play lotteries (despite the operators of such schemes making a profit 
because the price of the product is greater than their expected value).  The first 
demonstration that human behaviour may not be descriptively rational is known as the 
St Petersburg Paradox.  Here a decision maker is invited to buy a ticket to play a game 
where the event of interest is when an unbiased coin lands on heads.  If this event 
occurs on the first toss they are paid £2.00, £4.00 if it is the second toss, £8.00 if it is 
the third toss and so on.  Despite the prospective payoff being infinite people will not 
pay more than a few pounds to play.  Bernoulli (1738/1954) suggested that this is 
because the value of money is a decreasing function of amount won (or indeed 
possessed, so that £1000 means more to a poor man than to a rich man).  He 
suggested that people act so as to maximise expected utility rather than expected 
value.  As the value is relative to the amount possessed (or won) the expected utility 
of the St Petersburg Paradox is not infinite at all and the paradox is resolved.
In the mid-twentieth century von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944) 
Expected Utility Theory (EUT) provided a mechanism for measuring utility under 
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risk and it became the primary model of RCT.  (In economics risk and uncertainty 
refer to similar situations.  Under risk, the probabilities of the options are known, 
whereas under uncertainty they are not [Edwards, 1954]).  The assumption in EUT is 
that a decision-maker will maximize expected utility.  Challenges to EUT as a 
descriptive as opposed to a normative theory of human choice have primarily 
involved testing its axioms.  The most important of these are the ordering of 
alternatives dependent on preference that has already been outlined above (sometimes 
referred to as weak ordering) and transitivity (if options can be ordered that order 
should be transitive, e.g. If A is preferred to B and B preferred to C, then A is 
preferred to C); cancellation (if the available options share identical characteristics 
then these should cancel each other out and be ignored, i.e. choice should only depend 
on the characteristics which differ.  This is also known as the sure-thing principle
[Savage, 1954]); dominance (an option is dominated if it is inferior to another option 
in at least one aspect.  Dominated options should never be adopted); continuity (when 
faced with a gamble between the best and the worst outcome versus some 
intermediate outcome, the decision maker should prefer the gamble as long as the 
odds of the best outcome are good enough); and invariance (the decision maker 
should not be affected by the way in which options are presented).  Violation of these 
principles does not result in expected utility being maximised (von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, 1944/1947).  Many violations of the axioms of EUT have been 
described (e.g. Allais, 1953, demonstrated a violation of the sure-thing principle; 
Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971, 1973, demonstrated preference reversals that violate 
the transitivity axiom) and have resulted in modifications or new models to account 
for them (e.g. subjective expected utility theory, prospect theory).  But these models 
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still hold that utility is maximised and thus can be counted as examples of Rational 
Choice Theory.  
The assumption that behaviour will maximize utility is not necessarily implied 
from an examination of the decision-making literature.  Yet this assumption is made 
in relation to the influence of any somatic system and in behaviour on the IGT.  It is 
effectively a four alternative variable ratio environment made complex by the 
inclusion of punishing events to predominantly rewarding schedules of reinforcement.  
Such choice environments have been studied extensively in the animal learning 
literature and are worthy of review to look at the conditions in which maximization is 
or is not achieved.
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Animal choice behaviour is an extension of the research into animal learning.  Choice 
was initially explored in environments with two operant alternatives that differed in 
amount (e.g. sugar concentration in available liquids).  The value of one alternative 
relative to another can then be inferred from the animal’s behaviour e.g. using the 
proportion of selections, or more generally the proportion of time spent selecting it, 
relative to the other option (Rachlin, 1989).  More complicated choices have been 
explored using more complex operant schedules.  Variable ratio schedules require a 
variable number of responses around a mean before reinforcement whereas variable 
interval schedules require a response within an amount of time that changes around 
some mean time.  In symmetrical choice tasks the alternatives are for the same 
reinforcer, although not necessarily the same amount of reinforcer.  In an 
asymmetrical choice environment the alternatives are different (e.g. water or food 
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pellets).  Similarly, asymmetrical choice can also refer to one-choice environments 
where the options are to respond or not.  
The repeated choice between alternatives on such reinforcement schedules 
gives some insight into the processes that influence choice behaviour.  Indeed Rachlin 
(1989, 2004) has proposed that behaviour can be viewed as the inter-temporal choice 
of available alternatives.  In most cases animals will choose the alternative that offers
them the highest amount or rate of reinforcement.  But situations in which animals, 
including humans, do not maximize have been found.  One example of such an 
environment is a variable ratio/variable interval schedule where the choice of the 
option with the greater local reinforcement rate (e.g. a smaller delay till the next 
choice or a larger value reward) reduces the overall rate of reinforcement by 
increasing the delay or reducing the value on each alternative.  Choice environments 
such as this are examples of what is known as the Harvard Game (after its place of 
inception).   An illustration of how this environment might appear out with the 
laboratory is provided by the menu problem:
You are on a packaged holiday where all your meals are prepaid.  The only 
available restaurant serves only two meals with approximately equal nutritional value 
– lobster and fish cakes.  The only difference between the options is hedonic value 
where the fish cakes are relatively bland and its hedonic value changes little despite 
regular or occasional consumption whereas the lobster has a higher hedonic value.  
Due to its richness, eating the lobster everyday would rapidly reduce its hedonic value 
and may even reduce your desire for seafood.  Such a situation would lead to a lower 
overall payoff across all your meals than if you ate mainly the fish cakes with the 
lobster on occasion.  This would lead to a maximization of payoff across your meals 
and is the behaviour predicted by Rational Choice Theory.  Melioration, on the other 
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hand, predicts a choice of lobster until such time as its hedonic value falls below the 
fish cake, whereupon choice will switch and eventually settle into matching between 
the, now relatively low, hedonic values of each option.
Vaughan and Herrnstein (1987) describe an environment with a similar 
structure to the menu problem.  Figure 1.1 displays this choice environment.  It 
represents the value of two alternatives & and ' as a proportion of the number of 
choices from '. Here alternative ' is equivalent to the fish cakes in the menu 
problem.  Similarly, on most occasions a higher payoff will be obtained by choosing 
& (lobster), but with each choice that payoff is reduced.  However, by choosing ' the 
value of option & is increased.  The situation is simple because one alternative 
provides a higher payoff (&) than the other ('), but it is complex because there is an 
internality such that the proportion of choices affects the overall payoff.
The structure of the IGT therefore mirrors much of the choice environment on 
a Harvard Game.  In both the participant is faced with a choice between a larger or 
smaller immediate gain, but with repeated selection of the former the overall payoff is 
not maximized.  The participant must switch to the smaller immediate payoff in order 
to maximize in both cases.  There is no internality between these choices on the IGT 
in contrast to the Harvard Game.  The internalities of repeated selection come within 
the reinforcement schedules of each deck.  This may make the task easier and be a 
reason for the rapid development of maximizing behaviour in a normal population.  
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Figure 1.1:  The Harvard Game environment.  The delay from each alternative is 
plotted as a function of the proportion of choices of alternative '.  The dotted line 
represents the average delay per trial as a function of the proportion of choices from 
each alternative over the previous ten trials.  The maximizing equilibrium (the 
distribution of choices that maximizes overall payoff) is achieved when all responses 
are allocated to alternative ', while the melioration equilibrium is gained when all 
responses are for & (this diagram was originally published in Herrnstein, 1990).
The behaviour of non-human animals in Harvard Game environments has 
generally resulted in a preference for the option with the higher local reinforcement 
rate.  Such behaviour conforms to a behavioural mechanism called melioration 
(Herrnstein and Vaughan, 1980).  This is a effectively a restatement of the Law of 
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Effect (Thorndike, 1898) whereby an animal will devote time or effort to an option 
proportionate to its value at the time of the choice.  If these values are unequal then 
behaviour on successive choices is redistributed towards the more favourable 
alternative.  An equilibrium will result if there is a distribution of responses that 
equalises the reinforcement available from each alternative, or where the average 
reinforcement rate from the available options matches.  Melioration is a molecular 
mechanism of a more general theory of behaviour called the Matching Law 
(Herrnstein, 1961, 1997).
The Harvard Game thus provides an environment where maximization and 
melioration make different predictions.  When the options were three-minute variable 
interval (VI) schedules and the internality was an additional 1 minute VI schedule that 
incremented with selection of ', but paid out with selection of &, Vaughan, Kardish 
and Wilson (1982) found that pigeons spent more time on &.  This behaviour is 
predicted by melioration as selection of this alternative provides the higher local rate 
of reinforcement whereas maximization predicts greater choice of ' as it would 
increase overall reinforcement rate.  Similar results have been reported in humans by 
Herrnstein and colleagues (Herrnstein and Prelec, 1991; Herrnstein, Loewenstein, 
Prelec and Vaughan, 1993) in a version of the Harvard Game where the payoffs were 
equal in amount but choice of & led to an inter-trial interval two seconds shorter than 
choice of '.  However, the length of the delay increased with the proportion of 
choices from & in the previous ten trials.  
Melioration as a descriptive theory of human behaviour is supported under 
these conditions on the Harvard Game.  Yet humans do maximize in their everyday 
life. People are capable of saving, of dieting, of giving up addictive substances (or 
avoid taking them up for fear of becoming addicted).  So an appropriate question 
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seems to be under what conditions maximization or melioration dominate.  Herrnstein 
et al (1993) reported a second condition of their delayed reinforcer version of the 
Harvard Game reported above.  When the internality affected reinforcer amount (i.e. 
' is always worth more than & but repeated selection of ' reduces the payoff from 
both), participants tended towards maximization.  Several other manipulations of this 
methodology revealed that the tendency to meliorate was attenuated with feedback on 
previous choices; when the reward functions were parallel (as in Figure 1.1) rather 
than crossed (requiring non-exclusive selection of the maximizing alternative); when 
the averaging window for the internality was shorter rather than longer; and when 
payoff values rather than delays were used. 
Herrnstein et al (1993) attributed the source of meliorating behaviour to 
limitations on information processing.  In the experiments above when more 
information was available on the contingencies between alternatives (the internality) 
people tended towards maximization.  As the authors point out this is not surprising.  
Melioration only requires knowledge of the local reinforcement rates of available 
options whereas maximization also requires this knowledge, as well as knowledge of 
the internality when present and an understanding about how to use this information.  
Silberberg, Thomas and Berendzen (1991) and Tunney and Shanks (2002) have 
shown that given information and practice participants can learn to maximize on 
similar schedules.  However, for maximization to develop requires a large number of 
trials (400 trials and 150 trials of unreinforced practice in Herrnstein et al (1993); 500 
–700 trials in Tunney and Shanks, 2002).
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The assumption that behaviour on the IGT conforms to Rational Choice Theory is 
implicit in the analysis of performance and in descriptions of behaviour in terms of 
the SMH in both healthy controls and patients with brain damage.  This section has 
shown that while Rational Choice Theory is the normative theory of human choice 
violations have been demonstrated.  These have included simple one-shot 
hypothetical decisions and more complex choice environments.  The Harvard Game is 
one such example and presents a curious contrast due to the similarity of its choice 
environment with the IGT if viewed solely in terms of expected value.  While 
maximization is rapidly acquired on the IGT only some conditions of the Harvard 
Game result in a similar outcome (Herrnstein et al, 1993; Tunney and Shanks, 2002) 
and this typically involves a long series of trials.  This suggests that there are features 
of the IGT environment that permit rapid learning and choice on the IGT may not 
simply be determined by expected value.  If that is the case then any description of 
behaviour in these terms may not be completely accurate and may miss important 
information about behavioural influences on the IGT.
1.6 AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EXPERIMENTS
The SMH makes a number of assumptions about human decision-making that have 
been reviewed in this chapter.  The assumption that somatic markers have a causal 
impact on decision-making looks hard to support given the evidence that when they 
are absent, decision-making as measured using the IGT, can operate normally.  The 
weaker claim that somatic markers augment a decision-making process may be true 
but it is unnecessary given that more parsimonious accounts of behaviour in 
reinforcing situations exist.  This challenge to the necessity of somatic markers is also 
52
undermined by findings that normal performance on the IGT, the main empirical test 
of the SMH, can be adequately explained by the presence of knowledge sufficient to 
guide behaviour.  However, the possibility that somatic markers precede the 
emergence of this knowledge has not been ruled out.  Nor has the hypothesis that 
somatic markers result from the anticipatory expression of such knowledge.  The 
experiment that tests these competing claims is reported in Chapter 5.
Together the evidence against these first two assumptions of the SMH 
suggests that performance on the IGT is not sufficient to support the SMH.  It is 
reassuring to note that this conclusion has been independently reached by other 
researchers (Dunn et al, 2006).  But behaviour supportive of Rational Choice Theory 
is found using the IGT.  This is interesting in itself because it conflicts with behaviour 
in an equivalent choice environment from the behavioural choice literature - the 
Harvard Game.  Although maximization is found in some conditions of the Harvard 
Game, unlike in the IGT it is not rapidly learned.  If an underlying rational somatic 
marker system cannot account for this behaviour then other factors must be involved.  
This thesis details experiments that investigate what these might be.  This is important 
because the IGT has become a regularly used test of decision-making in clinical 
populations, as well as a tool to measure the development of decision-making in a 
normal population.  It has even been cited as a test of VMpfc functioning despite the 
large body of evidence implicating other factors important for IGT performance.  If 
normal behaviour on the IGT is not solely influenced by the expected value of choices 
then claims that the behaviour of patients with VMpfc damage or drug addictions is 
myopic for the future may not be complete. While important for understanding what 
influences normal performance on the IGT and therefore what may go wrong in 
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patient populations, these experiments also help to illuminate the conditions under 
which maximization develops.
Experiments 1, 2 and 3 of this thesis demonstrate that the information 
participants receive about the task has a significant effect on learning behaviour in 
healthy participants, suggesting that knowledge about the choices is an important 
contributory factor to IGT performance.  Experiments 4 to 8 explore manipulations of 
the short-term contingencies of the IGT decks and reveal that choice is not made 
solely in terms of expected value.  Finally Experiment 9 tests the competing claims 
that knowledge or somatic activity is the important factor in influencing learning on 
the IGT.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE EFFECT OF TASK INSTRUCTIONS AND REINFORCER TYPE 
ON LEARNING
2.1 INTRODUCTION & OVERVIEW
This chapter details the initial experiments that examine potential factors involved in 
producing optimal behaviour on the Iowa Gambling Task.  Experiment 1 is an attempt 
to replicate the behaviour of healthy control participants reported by Bechara et al 
(1994), using their methodology but on a computerized version of the IGT.  However, 
the behaviour of the participants in this experiment did not correspond to that of 
healthy control participants in the original study – participants in Experiment 1 did not 
choose optimally by the end of the experiment.  Subsequently, Chapter 1 goes on to 
describe experiments which investigate whether aspects of the administration of the 
IGT (the type of instructions or reinforcers participants receive) affect behaviour.  The 
behaviour of participants under each manipulation are described separately and in 
general before a more detailed comparison between experiments is described and 
discussed at the end of the Chapter. 
In Experiment 1 participants followed the methodology of Bechara et al
(1994) with some minor changes and the addition of a second session (identical to the 
first) to investigate whether asymptotic performance could be reached.  The minor 
changes concerned the administration of the task in a computerized rather than a 
manual form.  Computerized administration has now become standard with no 
differences in performance reported due to administration methods (cf. Bechara et al
2000, Bowman et al, 2005).  Participants’ behaviour under these conditions was, on 
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average, no different to chance i.e. they did not show a preference for the 
advantageous decks and so were not behaving as comparable participants did in the 
original studies (Bechara et al, 1994, 1997a, 1999).  
Experiment 2 examined one possible explanation for this failure to replicate.  
It followed exactly the methodology of Experiment 1 except that participants received 
the more detailed instructions used by Bechara et al (2000).  These instructions 
include a hint about how to succeed on the task.  In this experiment participants 
developed a preference for the advantageous decks at the end of the first session 
which continued into the second session.  Experiment 3 was designed to replicate the 
findings from Experiments 1 and 2 but using real money rather than facsimile money 
as a reinforcer.  Despite facsimile reinforcers being used in all the original IGT studies 
(Bechara et al, 1994, 1996, 1997a) and some others, use of these reinforcers is not 
standard.  It has been argued that real reinforcers provide a more realistic incentive 
(Edwards, 1954; Camerer and Hogarth, 1999; Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001; Brase, 
Fiddick and Harries, 2006) and this might differentially affect IGT performance.  
While comparable behaviour was found in both conditions in the first session, 
convincing evidence of learning was only found when participants received the 
instructions with the hint.  When comparisons were made between experiments, it was 
participants who had received the hint instructions who learned to select increasingly 
from the advantageous decks.  The type of reinforcer received did not affect learning.  
The change in participants’ deck selections across blocks of trials as measured by net 
score (advantageous selections minus disadvantageous selections) gave an estimate of 
learning rate.  This was greatest in the first session when participants received 
instructions with the hint, which resulted in advantageous performance in the second 
56
IGT session. Without the hint, performance in the first session was more affected by 
Reinforcer Type and was no better than chance at the end of session two.  
2.2 EXPERIMENT 1
A FAILURE TO REPLICATE NORMAL PERFORMANCE ON THE 
IOWA GAMBLING TASK - THE BEHAVIOUR OF A NORMAL 
SAMPLE IS NOT OPTIMAL.
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Experiment 1 was an attempt to replicate the results Bechara et al (1994) using their 
gambling task with healthy participants.  In this experiment a computerized version of 
the task was used, mainly to aid in experimental administration and for ease of 
comparison with later, perhaps more complex, manipulations of the IGT.  Bowman et 
al (2005) have directly compared the administration methods and found no differential 
performance ensues.  Indeed, the computerized IGT has now become the standard 
version (Bechara et al, 2000).  In the design of this experiment several refinements to 
the method were made.  These are detailed in the method section and were made to 
improve the task. Briefly, these are randomization between participants of deck 
position so the order of advantageous and disadvantageous decks is not fixed; an 
increased number of cards in each deck so it is possible for all selections to be from 
the same deck; a decreased inter-trial interval (ITI); and written not spoken 
instructions were administered.  
An additional session of the IGT was also added to the standard administration 
in an effort to examine the acquisition of maximising behaviour in the IGT.  Over 100 
trials no reported results have detailed participants reaching asymptotic maximising 
behaviour (a net score of 20 across sequential blocks in the task i.e. all cards are 
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chosen from the advantageous decks).  This second session allowed behaviour in a 
second 100 trials to be analysed and, if necessary, compared to the first 100 trials.  As 
participants are known to learn faster with distributed than with massed trials 
(Dempster, 1996) the second session was run 48 hours after the first session.  
It was predicted that the results of Bechara et al (1994) would be replicated i.e. 
that participants would prefer to choose from the advantageous decks by the end of 
the first session (100 trials).  A tentative second hypothesis was that asymptotic 
performance would be reached in a second session of the task.
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Participants were first year undergraduates studying psychology at Keele University 
(n = 20, mean age = 19.7, *+ = 2.11).  Thirteen participants were female and seven 
were male.  All participants received course credit for taking part in this experiment.
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Several changes were necessary in transferring the IGT from a task performed using 
actual decks of cards to one based on a computer.  The inter-trial interval (ITI) was 
reduced.  In the original task the ITI was 6 seconds.  The original time interval may 
have been decided upon because there was a comparison between groups and one 
group included neurological patients who may have required more time to carry out 
the task.  However, given the high functioning of the neurological patients a more 
important factor may have been that the task was performed manually and an ITI of 6 
seconds was necessary to record the relevant data.  Additionally, physiological 
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responses were later collected using the same procedure and a relatively large time 
window was needed between trials.  But as none of these conditions applied in 
Experiment 1 the ITI was reduced to 1.5 seconds to prevent fatigue effects.
Though it is not explicitly stated in Bechara et al (1994) it is clear from later 
papers (Bechara et al, 2000) that participants were given oral instructions before 
starting the task.  This may have been to ensure participants, especially the 
neurological patients, understood what the task involved. However, in this 
experiment the instructions were displayed on screen prior to the start of the 
experiment and participants were instructed to read them.  An opportunity was given 
for them to ask any questions.  This change in procedure was to ensure that
participants were given exactly the same instructions across sessions and that 
experimenter effects did not influence instruction administration.
The number of cards available in each deck was also increased from 40 to 100.  
Bechara et al (1994) explained that since participants rarely select from one deck 
more than forty times this is a reasonable number of cards for each deck.  However, 
pilot studies for this experiment indicated that some participants selected from the 
same deck more than forty times.  Since the task explores decision-making, denying 
participants the opportunity to select from one deck before the end of the task merely 
because there are not enough cards puts a restriction on their choice, especially given 
that there are differences in reinforcement schedules between decks (in the frequency 
of losses).  Reinforcement schedules for these additional cards were copied from the 
original 40 cards to maintain the integrity of reinforcement schedules while still 
preserving the unpredictability of the deck schedules.
Participants were tested individually in a sound-proofed testing laboratory.  A PC 
controlled the experiment.  A program that replicated the Iowa Gambling Task was 
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run on the PC.  Figure 2.1 displays a representative screen shot from the experiment.  
Four ‘decks’ of cards were displayed horizontally on screen labelled A, B, C and D.  
Above the decks a written message (green font colour) informed the participant how 
much they had won after every card selection.  A second written message (red font 
colour) was displayed below the first message and informed the participant when a 
loss was made.  These messages changed depending on participants’ card choices and 
in line with the reinforcement schedules for each deck (Appendix A).  Two bars were 
also displayed at the top of the screen.  A green bar labelled “Cash” displayed how 
much the participant had won on the task so far.  A red bar labelled “Borrowed” 
displayed the amount of money ‘loaned’ to the participant to play the game.  This 
remained at £2000 throughout the task.  Participants used the mouse to select their 
choice of deck.
Figure 2.1:  Screenshot from the computerized Gambling Task.
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A repeated-measures design was used with each participant taking part in two one-
hundred trial sessions.  Following Bechara et al (1998) the sessions were divided into 
twenty trial blocks to investigate participants’ learning rates.  The dependent variable 
was net score calculated by subtracting the number of disadvantageous choices (cards 
selected from decks A and B) from the number of advantageous choices (cards 
selected from decks C and D).
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Before agreeing to participate participants were told that the task would require 
participation in two sessions of 15 minutes separated by at least one day.  Course 
credit was awarded on completion of the second session.  The participants were told 
that they were taking part in a cognitive task in which the goal was to win as much 
fake money as possible.  These were the participants’ only verbal instructions.
Participants were instructed to follow the following on-screen instructions:
“You are going to see four decks of cards on the computer screen.  You must 
make a series of card selections, one card at a time, from any of the four decks 
of cards until you are told to stop.  After selecting each card you will receive 
some money.  After selecting !"#$ cards you will be given money but will also 
lose money. The amount you have won will be displayed on screen as a value 
and in a green bar at the top of the screen.  
To start you off you have been given a loan of £2000.  A red bar will display 
this value to remind you how much money you were loaned to play the game.  
The goal of the game is to maximise profit on the loan of play money (to win as 
much play money as possible).  
You are free to switch from any deck to another, at any time, and as often as 
you wish until you are instructed to stop.
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It is important to know that just like in a real card game, the computer does not 
change the order of the cards after the game starts.  You may not be able to 
figure out exactly when you will lose money, but the game is fair and the 
computer does not make you lose money at random.
Any questions?
No?  Then click on “Start”.”
The experimenter waited in the laboratory room until the participant had asked 
for clarification or until they started the experiment.  If clarification was required the 
experimenter referred to the written instructions and quoted from them.
When the experiment started participants saw four decks of cards displayed 
on-screen (Figure 2.1), labelled A, B, C, and D.  Participants mouse-clicked a card 
from any of the four decks.  The face of the card then appeared on top of the deck (the
colour was either red or black), and a message was displayed on the screen indicating 
the amount of money won or lost.  At the top of the computer screen a green bar 
changed after each selection depending on the amount of money won or lost.  A red 
bar indicated the ‘loan’ given by the experimenter to the participant to encourage the 
participant to continue playing when in the red.  A gain was indicated by the sound of 
a man shouting “Yippee!”, the appearance of a smiley face and a proportionate 
increase in the length of the green bar.  A loss was indicated by the sound of a man 
shouting “Doh!”, the appearance of a frowning face and a proportionate decrease in 
the length of the green bar.  Once the bars were updated the face of the card 
disappeared, and the participant could select another card. 
The backs of the cards in each deck had a uniform appearance just like a real 
deck of cards. Each deck had 100 cards: 50 of the cards had a black face and 50 had a 
red face. The colour of the cards had no meaning in the task but was maintained to 
make the cards more realistic (Bechara et al, 2000).
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The reinforcement schedule for each deck determined the amount of money 
won or lost for selections from that deck.  The schedule of losses for the four fixed 
reinforcement schedules can be found in Appendix A (Bechara et al, 1994).  The on-
screen decks were always labelled A, B, C and D in that order.  However allocation of 
reinforcement schedules to on-screen deck was randomised across participants.  Apart 
from being good experimental practice this randomisation guarded against the 
possibility that participants might inform other members of the sample population 
about how to do well on the task.  Selecting from deck A or B always yielded a win 
£100; selecting from deck C or D always yielded a win of £50.  However on some 
selections a loss was also made.  For decks A and B the loss over ten card selections 
was -£1250.  In deck A this loss resulted from five smaller losses every ten trials 
which totalled -£1250.  In deck B there was one loss of -£1250 every ten trials.  For 
decks C and D the loss over ten card selections was -£250.  In deck C this loss was the 
result of five smaller losses which totalled -£250 in every ten trials.  In deck D there 
was one loss of -£250 in every ten trials.  Thus making ten successive choices from 
decks A and B resulted in an average loss of -£250 whereas making ten successive 
choices from decks C and D resulted in a net gain of £250.  Choices from C and D are 
advantageous in the long-term whereas choices from A and B are disadvantageous 
despite decks A and B having the highest immediate gain.  The experiment was 
always conducted with hypothetical money.  
The task ended after one hundred cards (trials) were selected.  Participants 
were not aware of this is prior to the task ending.  When the task ended a screen 
informed participants that the task had ended and displayed their ‘winnings’.  This 
figure was recorded by the experimenter and its implications (either a profit or a loss 
made on the loan of fake money) were communicated to the participant.
The second session followed exactly the procedure of the first with the 
addition of the following details.  Participants were told that the task was exactly the 
same as it was in the first session.  They were reminded of the amount of money they 
had ‘won’ or ‘lost’.  Participants were then instructed to read the instructions again 
and to ensure they were familiar with them.  Again, the experimenter waited in the 
laboratory room in case the participant had any questions.  If no questions were asked 
the experimenter left the room and the participants completed the task for a second 
time.  Upon completion the amount of money won or lost was recorded and each 
participant was debriefed.  Participation was rewarded with course credit in the form 
of 30 minutes of research participation time.
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Net score was calculated by subtracting the number of cards selected from the 
disadvantageous decks (decks A and B) from the number selected from the 
advantageous decks (decks C and D).  This is the standard measure of performance on 
the IGT and it ranges from a minimum of -100 to a maximum of 100.  A positive net 
score indicates a preference for the advantageous decks.  Additionally, net score was 
calculated in blocks of twenty trials for each participant (displayed in Figure 2.2).  
This allows an estimate of learning rate to be calculated by looking at the change in 
participants’ net scores across block, i.e. the slope 2.  Performance in each session is 
discussed separately bearing in mind that the standard design features only one 
session.
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Figure 2.2:  Mean net score across 20-trial blocks for each session in Experiment 1 
(Facsimile reinforcers and No Hint instructions).  The dashed line represents chance 
selection, or no preference for either advantageous or disadvantageous decks.  Error 
bars are the standard error of the mean.
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Mean net score in session 1 was –6.2 (*+ = 14.92).  A one-sample $-test found that 
this was not significantly different from zero, or selection at chance, $(19) = -1.86, *+
= 14.92, ' = 0.08.  However, in order to investigate whether participants’ performance 
improved across the session two measures were used and again compared to chance 
(zero in both cases).  First, a one-sample $-test revealed that mean net score in the 
final block of twenty trials was not significantly greater than zero, $(19) < 1.0, *+ = 
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6.18, indicating that in the last twenty of one hundred trials participants had no 
preference for the advantageous decks.  Second, it may be the case that participants’ 
performance improved and while not prefering the advantageous decks their selection 
behaviour had moved away from a preference for the disadvantageous decks.  In order 
to assess this possibility learning rate was analysed using the Lorch and Myers (1990) 
regression analysis for repeated measures designs.  Mean learning rate in session 1 
was 0.68 (σM = 0.43), indicating that learning rate was no different from zero, $(19) = 
1.60, *+ = 1.90, ' = 0.13, i.e. participants’ net scores did not increase with increased 
experience of the task.
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Mean net score in session 2 was 4.7 (*+ = 27.14).  A one sample $-test found that this 
was not significantly different from chance, $(19) < 1.0, *+ = 27.14.  A paired 
samples $-test compared net score between sessions and revealed that the increase 
approached significance, $(19) = -2.03, *+ = 24.02 ' = 0.06.  This suggests that 
participants’ performance improved.  However, a one-sample $-test found that mean 
net score in the final block of session 2 was not significantly different from chance, 
$(19) < 1.0, *+ = 8.17.  These results indicate that although net score increased 
between sessions, at the end of the second session participants were still not showing 
a preference for either the advantageous or the disadvantageous decks.  This was 
confirmed when mean learning rate in session 2 was examined, 2 = 0.6 (σM = 0.34).  
This was not significantly greater than zero, $(19) = 1.77, *+ = 1.52, ' = 0.09.  These 
results suggest that even after two sessions on the IGT participants do not show the 
‘normal’ behaviour reported for healthy controls on the IGT.  As such these results 
represent a failure to replicate the basic behaviour shown by Bechara et al (1994, 
1997a, 1999).
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Participants in Experiment 1 did not develop a preference for the advantageous decks 
either after a standard administration of the IGT, or following a second session.  This 
was reflected in the mean net score across both sessions and in the mean learning 
rates.  Although learning rate was positive and mean net score increased between 
sessions, participants in Experiment 1 were still showing no preference for the 
advantageous decks after 200 trials.  A total net score greater than 10 is indicative of 
‘normal’ performance on the IGT as no participant with VMpfc damage had exceeded 
it (Bechara, Dolan, Denburg, Hindes et al, 2001).  In the data reported here even in a 
second session mean net score was lower than this figure.  Thus, Experiment 1 failed 
to replicate the behaviour reported as ‘normal’ by Bechara et al (1994, 1997a, 1999).
One possible explanation of these results is that while the instructions used in 
Experiment 1 were the same as those reported by Bechara et al (1994, 1997a) they 
were not the same as those reported by Bechara et al (1999, 2000).  In these 
instructions participants are given more information about the task, specifically that 
some decks are worse than others and if these decks are avoided a winning strategy 
will be found.  Such a suggestion has been made by Schmitt, Brinkley and Newman 
(1999) to explain similar behaviour in their experimental populations.  However, no 
direct test of this hypothesis has been made.  Experiment 2 was designed to test the 
possibility that this difference in instructions is sufficient to affect participants’ 
behaviour on the IGT.  
2.3 EXPERIMENT 2
‘STANDARD’ IGT BEHAVIOUR REPLICATED USING ‘HINT’ 
INSTRUCTIONS
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In Experiment 1 participants did not behave in the manner reported by Bechara et al
(1994, 1997a) even after two sessions’ experience on the IGT.  At the end of these 
sessions participants did not show a preference for the advantageous decks.  A similar 
result has been reported by Schmitt et al (1999) who found no difference between the 
performance of psychopaths and incarcerated controls.  Neither group exhibited
behaviour consistent with normal performance as both showed no clear preference for 
either advantageous or disadvantageous decks by the end of the session.  Of the 
possibilities Schmitt et al (1999) suggested to explain the contrast between their 
results and those of Bechara et al (1994) the most intriguing was that although their 
instructions were the same as those published by Bechara et al (1994) they were not 
those given in the more detailed procedure published by Bechara et al (1999, 2000).  
In the more detailed instructions participants are given information about the nature of 
the decks and informed explicitly that the decks are not the same, that some are worse 
than others and that by staying away from the worst decks they can win.  Including 
this “hint” in the instructions gives participants much more information about, and 
arguably changes, the nature of the task from one without the hint where the only 
information received about the nature of the decks comes from the results of one’s 
own behaviour. Buehner and May (2004) found that less subtle changes in 
instructions affect human causal learning and Kudadjie-Gyamfi and Rachlin (2002)
have found that including a hint about how to maximise long-term reinforcement in 
the instructions of a choice task improves performance above the contingency-
governed behaviour seen otherwise. Such a difference in instructions for the IGT 
could similarly affect behaviour.
The work of James Blair’s group supports this hypothesis.  Blair and Cipolotti 
(2000) used the Bechara et al (1994) no hint instructions and found no difference 
between psychopathic prisoners and incarcerated controls.  But using the Bechara et al
(1999, 2000) “hint” instructions Blair, Colledge, and Mitchell (2001) and Mitchell, 
Colledge, Leonard, and Blair (2002) found, respectively, differences in performance 
between boys with psychopathic tendencies and age-matched controls, and between 
psychopathic adults and incarcerated controls.  
It may be the case that the instructions given to participants in Experiment 1 
were insufficiently detailed for them to discern the nature of the task.  Experiment 2 
was conducted to test this possibility and as a further attempt to replicate the results 
Bechara et al (1994).  
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Participants were first year undergraduates studying psychology at Keele University 
(n = 20, mean age = 19.2, *+ = 1.06).  Sixteen participants were female and four were 
male.  They received course credit for taking part in this experiment.  
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As Experiment 1 but with the addition of the following instructions (addition in bold):  
It is important to know that just like in a real card game, the computer does not 
change the order of the cards after the game starts.  You may not be able to figure 
out exactly when you will lose money, but the game is fair and the computer does 
not make you lose money at random.  %&& ' ()* !)+ ,! -.)- !"#$ /$(0! )1$ 
2"1!$ -.)* "-.$1!3  4"5 #)+ 6,*/ )&& "6 -.$# 7)/8 75- !"#$ )1$ 2"1!$ -.)* 
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As Experiment 1.
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As Experiment 1.
!"0"0 1.2*3&2
As in Experiment 1 net score was calculated for each session and in blocks of twenty 
trials for each participant.  Figure 2.3 displays the mean net scores across trial blocks 
for each session in Experiment 2.  The same measurement from Experiment 1 has 
been retained to allow a visual comparison to be made.  However, no cross-
experimental comparisons will be made between Experiment 1 and 2.  This is to avoid 
Type I error inflation due to multiple testing as a Factorial cross experimental 
comparison will be made in section 2.5 after Experiment 3 has been presented.  As a 
result, until section 2.5 comparisons between Experiments will be general and 
restricted to descriptions of similarities or differences in their results. 
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Figure 2.3:  Mean net score across 20-trial blocks for each session in Experiment 2 
(Facsimile reinforcers and Hint instructions).  The dashed line represents chance 
selection, or no preference for either advantageous or disadvantageous decks.  Error 
bars are the standard error of the mean.
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Mean total net score in session 1 was –0.8 (*+ = 22.58).  A one-sample $-test revealed 
that this was not significantly different from chance, $(19) >  -1.0, *+ = 22.58.  
However5 the mean net score in the final block was significantly greater than zero, 
$(19) = 2.33, *+ = 9.02, ' = 0.03, indicating that unlike in Experiment 1 participants 
finished the first session with a preference for the advantageous decks.  This was 
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reflected in a mean learning rate, 2 = 1.82 (σM = 0.62), that was significantly greater 
than zero, $(19) = 2.95, *+= 2.76,  ' < . 01.
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Mean total net score was 36 (*+ = 40.26) and significantly greater than chance as 
revealed by a one-sample $-test, $(19) = 4.00, *+ = 40.26, ' < 0.01.  A paired samples 
$-test revealed a significant difference between sessions, $(19) = 4.59, *+ = 35.87, p < 
0.01.  At the end of session 2 mean net score in the final block of trials was 
significantly greater than chance, $(19) = 3.84, *+ = 10.01, ' < 0.01.  Together these 
results and those from session 1 suggest that receiving the Bechara et al (1999) Hint 
instructions results in a preference for the advantageous decks.  Indeed, the preference 
that emerged during session 1 continued into session 2 where learning rate was 
significantly greater than zero, 2 = 1.09 (σM = 0.49), $(19) = 2.22, *+ = 2.20, ' = 0.04.  
Figure 2.3 illustrates that this reflects the increase in net score from block 6 to block 7 
before net score stabilises in a preference for the advantageous decks and flattens out.
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Participants in Experiment 2 developed a preference for the advantageous decks in the 
first session that continued into the second session.  This was reflected in the increase 
in mean net score between sessions and in learning rates that were significantly 
greater than zero in both sessions.  It appears that when the instructions include a 
strategy hint participants performance improves and is more like the behaviour 
displayed by the healthy controls in Bechara et al (1994, 1997a, 1999).  However, it is 
of note that in the first session in Experiment 2 (and in both sessions in Experiment 1) 
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the mean net score is much lower than the average net score of around 39 reported as 
normal by Bechara et al (1994) or the mean net scores in the twenties reported by 
other groups (Petry, Bickel and Arnett, 1998; Grant, Contoreggi and London, 2000; 
Mazas, Finn and Steinmetz, 2000).  According to Bechara et al (2001) a total net 
score greater than 10 is indicative of ‘normal’ performance on the IGT as no 
participant with VMpfc damage has exceeded it.  In Experiment 2, despite 
participants’ learning rate (the change in net score) increasing significantly above 
chance they do not select a comparable number of cards from the advantageous decks.  
The failure to entirely replicate this standard normal behaviour is troublesome.  The 
changes made to the administration of the IGT may be one explanation for these low 
net scores.  I will examine each in turn.
In this experiment the gambling task was conducted on a computer and the 
lack of an experimenter interaction may have affected behaviour.  However, no 
differences in performance were found when behaviour on the computerized task was 
compared to behaviour on the manual task (Bowman et al, 2005) and indeed Bechara 
and colleagues have not reported in any differences attributable to administration 
method (Bechara et al, 1999).
Another change in the methodology and one different from most previous 
studies is that participants were instructed to read the task instructions rather than 
have them read out to them.  This change was made in order to control for possible 
confounding effects due to the experimenter and to avoid any emphasis on any of the 
instructions.  It may be that in the reading of the instructions participants did not fully 
comprehend the nature of the task, or in Experiment 2 pick up on the hint as quickly 
as when spoken instructions were used.  This may be why participants who receive 
the hint instructions improve so much in the second session – after some experience 
on the task it is easier to spot the good decks from the bad.  Participants in both 
experiments were after all told to re-read the instructions.
A third possibility concerns the number of cards in each deck.  Bechara et al
(1994) used 40 cards in each deck. This number was used as participants very rarely 
chose from the same deck more often than 40 times.  However, because this was a 
possibility the number of cards in each deck was increased to 60 cards in their 2000 
methodology (Bechara et al, 2000).  Here there were 100 cards in each deck to ensure 
participants were not limited in their choices in any way.  Thus it was possible for 
participants to select entirely from one deck.  In practice this rarely happened in the 
first session, though in the second session this behaviour increased, presumably as 
participants had gained an understanding of the task.  This change in the methodology 
is unlikely to have affected participant behaviour, especially as in the computerized 
version of the task participants can have no idea of the total number of cards from 
which they are able to select.  This is not the case in the manual version where all 
cards are laid out in piles in front of participants. 
However, focusing on individual decks does present a further possibility.  
Figure 2.4 shows the mean number of cards selected from each deck in each session 
of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2.  What Figure 2.4 shows is that in session 1 of 
Experiment 1 participants selected most cards from deck B and deck D, although only 
selection from B is above chance.  However, by the end of the second session the 
participants have no clear preference for any deck (mean card selections are at 
chance) except in deck A where selection is below chance.  Whereas although 
Experiment 2 follows a similar pattern in session 1, by the end of session 2 selection 
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Figure 2.4:  Mean number of cards selected from each deck between sessions in a) 
Experiment 1 and b) Experiment 2.  Error bars are the standard error of the mean.
a) Experiment 1
b) Experiment 2
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from B is substantially reduced and selection from C is substantially increased.  These 
differences raise two important points.  The first is that selection of the two 
advantageous and the two disadvantageous decks may not be as homogenous as is 
generally reported and assumed in analyses using net score.  Secondly, if this is the 
case, then it is not only the expected values of the choices on the IGT that drives 
learning on the IGT.  This has major implications for the discussion of behaviour on 
the IGT – a point that will be returned to and elaborated in section 2.6 when the 
results of the cross-experimental comparisons have been described.  
The results from Experiment 2 suggest that the instructions participants 
receive impact on learning in the IGT.  Participants’ learning rates were greater than 
chance when the instructions carried a strategy hint.  In both Experiments 1 and 2 
participants’ reward for participating was in the form of course credit with their on-
line performance reinforced with facsimile reinforcers (though they ‘won’ £100 on the 
task, in reality they did not win anything).  Bechara et al (1994, 1997a, 1999) pay 
their participants for taking part but use facsimile reinforcers on the gambling task.  
However, given that the task is named as a gambling task it might be argued that real 
money would be a more realistic reinforcer.  Experiment 3 was run to examine 
whether Reinforcer Type influences performance on the IGT.
2.4 EXPERIMENT 3
THE EFFECT OF INSTRUCTION TYPE USING REAL MONEY 
REINFORCERS 
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The results of Experiments 1 and 2 allowed participants’ Iowa Gambling task (IGT) 
performance to be examined in two conditions in which different instructions had 
been used.  Participants’ performance was better when the instructions carried a 
strategy hint, and replicated the behaviour found in normal participants in Bechara et 
al (1994, 1997a, 1999).  Like Bechara et al (1994, 1997a, 1999), in Experiments 1 and 
2 participants were playing for facsimile reinforcers.  However, given that the task has 
been described as emulating real-life decision environments real money would be a 
more realistic reinforcer.  Real money reinforcers may also improve performance.  
Vulkan (2000, p.111) notes in his review of repeated, binary choice experiments that 
introducing monetary rewards increases maximising behaviour (in the case of the IGT 
this would be increasing advantageous card selections).  Although the standard 
interpretation and analysis of the IGT assumes it is fundamentally a binary choice task 
there are four choices and so it is not clear whether real monetary rewards would have 
a similar effect.  
Bowman and Turnbull (2003) directly compared real versus facsimile 
reinforcers on the IGT.  The schedules of gains and losses were exactly the same in 
both conditions but the values in the real money conditions were one-thousandth those 
of the facsimile money condition.  Thus £100 in facsimile money was £0.10 in real 
money. Bowman and Turnbull (2003) found that Reinforcer Type did not 
significantly affect performance.  However, they report less variance in net scores 
when real reinforcers are used.  Less variance in net scores means any differences 
between groups are clearer.  Their results also suggest that it is the nature of the task 
and not the nature of the reinforcer that is important in influencing performance.  
However, following the learning curves produced by each group in their experiment, 
they suggest that real money reinforcers may have a differential effect on performance 
given more exposure to the task, with performance in the real money condition 
superior to that of facsimile reinforcers.  
What is not clear is the effect that the different instructions may have on 
behaviour when real reinforcers are used.  With the added incentive of actual 
winnings the Hint instructions may be additive resulting in superior performance.  The 
purpose of Experiment 3 was to replicate the results found in Experiments 1 and 2 
using a real money reinforcer.  Such a replication would indicate that it is the task 
instructions and not Reinforcer Type that are important in influencing performance on 
the IGT. Like Experiments 1 and 2 a second session was included to investigate 
participants’ learning.  This second session allows the testing of Bowman and 
Turnbull’s (2003) hypothesis that real money reinforcers will improve performance 
over facsimile reinforcers in the longer term.
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Participants were recruited from the Keele University community through a poster 
advertisement that offered the opportunity to “Earn up to £6” by participating in a 
cognitive psychology experiment.  The data from five participants was excluded as 
three participants did not attend the second experimental session, one was mistakenly 
put into the wrong condition for the second session and one did not follow verbal 
instructions to re-read on-screen instructions prior to the start of the second session.  
As a result forty participants were tested and randomly allocated to one of two 
conditions.  Participants in condition A had a mean age of 24.3 (*+ = 3.99), thirteen 
were female and seven were male.  Participants in Condition B had a mean age of 
25.4 (*+ = 7.22), sixteen were female and four were male.
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The apparatus used was identical to that used in Experiments 1 and 2 with but one 
change due to the change in reinforcers.  The reinforcement schedules used were 
identical to those used in Experiments 1 and 2 except that all figures used were 
divided by 1000, i.e. £100 in Experiments 1 and 2 equalled £0.10.  As a result the 
amount of money ‘loaned’ to the participant to play the game was £2.00 and the 
maximum they could earn in any one hundred trials was £3.00.   
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The design followed that of Experiments 1 and 2 with participants randomly allocated 
to one of two conditions equivalent to these previous experiments.  Participants in 
condition B received the instructions containing the strategy hint.  
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As Experiment 1, with the only adaptations due to the change in reinforcer used.  
Hence, participants were told that they were taking part in a cognitive task in which 
the goal was to earn as much money as possible.  They were told that they could earn 
up to £6 over the two sessions i.e. £3 per session.  However, they were warned that 
there was the possibility that they would earn nothing.  When the task ended after 100 
trials participants were given the amount of money they had earned, reminded that 
they could have earned up to £3 and would have a further opportunity to do so in the 
second session.  Upon completion of the second session any earnings were paid.  If a 
loss had been made participants did not incur the expense.  Each participant was then 
debriefed and reimbursed £2 for expenses incurred in traveling to the university 
campus (the cost of a return bus fare).  This payment was not mentioned until the 
completion of the experiment.  
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As in the previous experiments net score was calculated for each session and in blocks 
of twenty trials for each participant.  Figure 2.5 displays the mean net scores across 
trial blocks for each session in each condition of Experiment 3.  
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When participants received the No Hint instructions, mean net score was 6.1 (*+ = 
15.07) and was not significantly greater than chance, $(19) = 1.81, *+ = 15.07, ' > 
0.05.  Using a one-sample $-test mean net score in block 5 was also no different from 
chance $(19) < 1.0, *+ = 8.86.   However, as in Experiment 2 it may be the case that 
behaviour changed away from a preference for the disadvantageous decks over the 
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Figure 2.5:  Mean net score across 20-trial blocks in each session of each condition of 
Experiment 3.  The dashed line represents chance selection, or no preference for either 
advantageous or disadvantageous decks.  Error bars are the standard error of the 
mean.
session.  To examine this possibility, learning rate was estimated and compared to 
zero (no learning) using the Lorch and Myers (1990) method of regression analysis. 
Mean learning rate approached a significant difference from zero, 2 = 1.08 (σM = 
0.54), $(19) = 1.99, *+ = 2.42, ' = 0.06. This result reflects the increase in mean net 
score from block 1, where participants initially prefer the disadvantageous decks, to 
blocks 3 and 4 where preference is for the advantageous decks until in block 5 when 
mean net score dips back towards zero. These results suggest that participants do 
develop a preference for the advantageous decks despite not receiving the strategy 
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hint instructions.  However, advantageous deck selections dip in the last 20 trials 
suggesting participants, on average, do not know which decks are the best.  If 
participants do have a preference for the advantageous decks this should become 
apparent in session 2.
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Mean net score was 11.3 (*+ = 34.61) but not significantly greater than chance, $(19) 
= 1.46, *+ = 34.61, ' > 0.05.  Similarly, a one sample $-test found that net score in 
block 10 was not greater than chance, $(19) < 1.0, *+ = 10.61.  When session 2 net 
score was compared to net score in session 1 using a paired samples $-test, no 
significant difference was found, $(19) < 1.0, *+ = 34.46.  These results suggest that 
although participants learning rate increased in session 1, by the end of session 2 the 
participants in this No Hint condition were still not showing a preference for the 
advantageous decks.  This conclusion was further supported when learning rate is 
examined.  Unlike in session 1, learning rate is no greater than zero, 2 = 0.36 (σM = 
0.53), $(19) < 1.0, *+ = 2.35.  Like in Experiment 2 when participants receive the No 
Hint instructions no preference for the advantageous decks developed.
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Mean net score was 4.1 (*+ = 24.3) and not significantly greater than chance, $(19) < 
1.0, *+ = 24.3.  When mean net score in block 5 was compared to chance a one 
sample $-test found no significant difference, $(19) = 1.02, *+ = 7.44, ' > 0.05, 
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indicating that after one hundred trials participants were not selecting preferentially 
from the advantageous decks.  However, mean learning rate was positive and 
significantly greater than zero, 2 = 1.41 (σM = 0.46), $ = 3.06, *+ = 2.06, ' < 0.01, 
indicating that mean net score was increasing with experience on the task.  From 
Figure 2.5 it is apparent that participants have comparable behaviour in the first 
session between conditions.  However, Figure 2.5 suggests that participants who 
receive the Hint instructions, unlike those who did not, develop a preference for the 
advantageous decks in the second session.
*.))%0( 4
Figure 2.5 shows mean net score is higher than in session 1 and increases across 
session 2 until flattening out at positive level.  This impression was confirmed when 
mean net score was compared to chance; mean net score = 29.2 (*+ = 42.39), $(19) = 
3.08, *+ = 42.39, ' < 0.01.  A paired samples $-test found this was significantly 
greater than mean net score in session 1, $(19) = -3.54, *+ = 31.74, ' < 0.01.  Unlike 
in the No Hint condition participants also showed a preference for the advantageous 
decks in the final block of the session.  A one-sample $-test found mean net score in 
block 10 to be significantly greater than chance, $(19) = 2.39, *+ = 11.43, ' <0.05.  
Further evidence that participants in this condition developed a preference for the 
advantageous decks was found when learning rate was compared to zero and 
approached a significant difference, 2 = 0.84 (σM = 0.44), $ = 1.89, *+ = 1.99, ' = 
0.07.
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The general findings from Experiment 3 provide support for the hypothesis that the 
instructions participants receive affect their subsequent performance on the IGT.  
Although learning rates in the first sessions in both conditions indicated that 
participants’ net scores became more positive with experience on the task, no 
preference for the advantageous decks was found when mean net scores in the final 
block of the session was compared to chance.  This result suggests that when 
participants are playing for real money reinforcers the instructions they receive do not 
influence behaviour.  However, despite the similarity in session 1 behaviour (as 
illustrated in Figure 2.5), a clear preference for the advantageous decks only develops 
in session 2 in those participants who received the Hint instructions.  
In Experiment 2 it was suggested that learning on the IGT may not be as 
simple as the development of a preference for the advantageous decks.  The 
improvement in participants who received the Hint instructions was reflected in the 
change in their deck selection behaviour between sessions.  These participants 
increased their selections from deck C and decreased their selections from deck B, 
with little change in selection from A or D.  If this is how learning on the IGT 
proceeds the same pattern should be seen for the participants who received the Hint 
instructions in this Experiment.  Figure 2.6 displays the mean number of card 
selections from each deck in each session for each condition in Experiment 3.  A 
similar pattern of results is found.  The major changes in deck selection in participants 
who received the Hint instructions come in a decrease in deck B selections from 
above chance in session 1 to below chance in session 2.  The opposite pattern is seen 
for deck C while there is very little change in the other decks.  This pattern can be 
discerned in the participants who received the No Hint instructions, but it is by no 
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Figure 2.6: Mean number of cards selected from each deck between sessions with 
condition A (no hint instructions) and condition B (Hint instructions).  Error bars are 
the standard error of the mean.
A) No Hint instructions
B) Hint instructions
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means as stark.  It appears that learning on the IGT emerges as a result of a decrease 
in selection from deck B and an increase in selection from deck C.  This point will be 
returned to and elaborated on in the general discussion (section 2.6).
The general findings from Experiment 3 suggest that the instructions 
participants receive influence their performance on the IGT.  This is the same pattern 
of results that was found when participants received the facsimile money reinforcers 
in Experiments 1 and 2.  However, these general findings need to be confirmed by 
comparing across all experiments.  This will permit a comparison between Reinforcer 
Types to assess whether the type of money participants receive affects IGT 
performance.  These analyses will also investigate whether there is any additive or 
differential effect of Instruction and Reinforcer Type. Section 2.5 goes on to describe 
these analyses
2.5 CROSS EXPERIMENT COMPARISONS
INSTRUCTIONS AFFECT PERFORMANCE ON THE IGT
The preceding experiments have described various manipulations in the 
administration of the IGT.  From the general descriptions of their results the 
impression has formed that Instruction Type, not Reinforcer Type, influences IGT 
performance.  In this section the results of these experiments will be compared 
factorially in an attempt to assess the influence of Instruction and Reinforcer Types on 
learning.  This is an important consideration because while the Iowa group and others 
have used facsimile reinforcers and, presumably, the hint instructions, other 
combinations of each Reinforcer and Instruction Type have been used with varying 
results.  For example, Mazas et al (2000) have replicated Bechara et al’s (1994) 
results using the no hint instructions and real money reinforcers.  Like Mazas et al
(2000), Grant et al (2000) and Petry et al (1998) paid participants for taking part (this 
is implied in Grant et al as participants were recruited through newspaper 
advertisements) and found controls performed better than substance abusers, though 
unlike Mazas et al facsimile reinforcers were used.  In addition, Petry et al (1998) 
added an incentive payment of $10 if participants finished the task in profit.  Given
the different methodologies used in the administration of the IGT it is not clear which 
factors are important in influencing IGT performance.  The comparisons reported in 
this section will resolve what has become a hazy picture. 
The preceding experiments were effectively manipulations of two factors 
(Instruction Type and Reinforcer Type).  Experiment 1 looked at the effects of No 
Hint instructions with Facsimile Money reinforcers. Experiment 2 varied the 
instructions and included a Hint while Facsimile Money reinforcers were retained. In 
Experiment 3 Real Money reinforcers were used but in one condition the instructions 
contained No Hint while in the other they did contain the Hint.  Because the standard 
design of the IGT features only one session performance in each session is analysed 
separately. 
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A 2x2x5 (Reinforcer Type by Instruction Type by Block) mixed-design ANOVA was 
performed to investigate differences in net score in each experimental Block due to 
the experimental factors.  Alpha was set at .05 for all tests unless otherwise stated.  
Due to a violation of the assumption of sphericity in the calculation of the repeated 
measures components of the ANOVA the Greenhouse Geisser correction is used 
where appropriate (in analyses in this and subsequent chapters).  
The ANOVA revealed a main effect of Block, ;(3.25, 246.66) = 9.35, <*= = 
43.16, ' < 0.05, indicating that net score differed between some blocks and reflecting 
the trend for net score to increase with exposure to the task.  A main effect of 
Reinforcer Type was also found, ;(1, 76) = 3.84, <*= = 77.08, ' = 0.05; mean net 
score across Block was higher when participants were earning Real Money (M = 1.02, 
σM = 0.62) rather than Facsimile Money (M = -0.7, σM = 0.62).  No other main effects 
or interactions were significant:  Instruction Type, ;(1, 76) < 1.0; Reinforcer Type by 
Instruction Type, ;(1, 76) < 1.0; Block by Reinforcer Type, ;(3.25, 246.66) = 2.20,
<*= = 43.16, ' > 0.05; Block by Instruction Type, ;(3.25, 246.66) = 1.28, <*= = 
43.16, ' > 0.05; Block by Reinforcer Type by Instruction Type, ;(3.25, 246.66) > 1.0.
Net score was greater when the reinforcer used was Real rather than Facsimile 
Money.  This finding that monetary payoffs improve performance is in agreement 
with the behavioural decision-making literature (Hertwig and Ortmann, 2001; 
Camerer and Hogarth, 1999) but it does not replicate Bowman and Turnbull’s (2003) 
result.  They found no effect of Reinforcer Type when comparing the performance of 
a similar population.  Bowman and Turnbull (2003) used Bechara et al’s (1999) Hint 
instructions and the manual version of the gambling task.  In contrast a computerized
version of the task was used here and the effect of Reinforcer Type in this study is 
from data collapsed across groups who received different sets of instructions.  There 
was no Reinforcer Type by Instruction Type interaction in the mixed-design ANOVA 
implying that Hint instructions did not differentially affect performance in either of 
the Reinforcer Type groups.  However, to more clearly compare Bowman and 
Turnbull’s (2003) results with our own, simple effects analyses1 were conducted on 
  
1 Keppel (1991, p.384) recommends against pooling the error variance in mixed factor designs so 
separate error terms were used for the simple effects analyses.
the net scores for Session 1, which is the standard dependent variable. Comparing 
between the two levels of Reinforcer Type for the participants who received the Hint 
instructions is equivalent to Bowman and Turnbull’s analysis.  No effect of Reinforcer 
Type was found, ;(1, 38) = -1.36, <*= = 545.16, ' > 0.05, replicating Bowman and 
Turnbull’s (2003) findings.  However, analysis of the simple effects of Reinforcer 
Type for participants who received the No Hint instructions revealed an effect of 
Reinforcer Type, ;(1, 38) = 6.73, <*= = 224.92, ' < 0.05.  Net score was 
significantly higher (M = 6.1, σM = 3.37) when the reinforcer was Real Money than 
when it was Facsimile Money (M = -6.2, σM = 3.33).  
These findings go some way to supporting Bowman and Turnbull’s (2003) 
result, but also provide support for the impression developed in the preceding analyses 
that receiving the Hint instructions changes behaviour on the IGT.  The results of 
these further analyses indicate that Reinforcer Type does have an effect on IGT 
performance, but that this effect is only apparent when task instructions do not contain 
a Hint.    These results suggest that behaviour on the IGT is influenced in at least two 
ways.  When the only information about the contingencies of the decks is available 
from the results of one’s own card selections (No Hint instructions) mean net score is 
affected by the level of incentive on offer.  Real Money incentives result in more 
selections from the advantageous decks, consistent with the behavioural decision-
making literature.  However, when information on the deck contingencies is available 
(Hint instructions: “some decks are worse than others”) the effect of Real Money 
reinforcers is cancelled out (Experiment 3b: Real Money – Hint) and participants who 
have no financial incentive to do well but information about the nature of the task 
(Experiment 2: Facsimile Money – Hint) are able to succeed.  It may be that the level 
of incentive was not high enough within the Hint conditions, although it was 
sufficient to facilitate a division in performance when participants had less 
information.  This interpretation suggests that there are influences on learning in the 
IGT that are not additive.
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While a main effect of Block is indicative of improved performance and therefore 
learning, more specific information is available from examination of learning rates.  
Learning rate has been considered in the preceding Experiments to indicate if net 
score increases with experience on the IGT.  An advantage of using the slope 2 as an 
estimate of learning rates is it can be compared both within and across groups as well 
as allowing predictions of future performance to be made.   Table 2.1 displays mean 
learning rates and shows that in each condition they are positive indicating that the 
number of selections from the advantageous decks increased with exposure to the 
task.    
In order to determine if these learning rates were different, a 2x2 (Instruction 
Type by Reinforcer Type) independent-measures ANOVA was performed.  No 
significant differences in learning rate were found between Reinforcer Types, ;(1, 76) 
< 0.01, <*= = 5.43, ' >.05; Instruction Types, ;(1, 76) = 2.02, <*= = 5.43, ' > 0.05; 
nor was there any interaction, ;(1, 76) = .61, <*= = 5.43, ' >.05.  The effect of 
Reinforcer Type does not emerge when learning rate is examined implying that 
despite a difference in net scores between some of the experimental groups learning 
rate does not vary between them.  
However, the highest learning rates in Session 1 followed receipt of the Hint 
instructions.  This would suggest that with increased trials the difference between 
participants who had received the Hint instructions and those who had not should 
Table 2.1: Summary of mean learning rates by session in each Experiment.
Reinforcer
Instructions Facsimile Real Money
Session 1
No Hint 0.68 (.42) 1.08 (.54)
Hint 1.82 (.62) 1.41 (.46)
Session 2
No Hint 0.60 (.34) 0.36 (.52)
Hint 1.09 (.49) 0.84 (.44)
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increase.  As a result participants who received the Hint instructions should reach 
asymptotic performance sooner.  Bowman and Turnbull (2003) suggested that with 
more trials a similar difference would be seen between Reinforcer Types.  No 
replication of this trend was found when the conditions are the same as in Bowman 
and Turnbull (2003).  Extrapolating from session 1 data such an effect would only be 
expected when No Hint instructions are used.  However, by looking at participant 
performance in a second session on the IGT these predictions can be investigated.
!"6"0 7.22,(% !
The second session on the IGT allowed an examination of when, and in what 
conditions, asymptotic performance is reached.  The second session also allows a test 
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of Bowman and Turnbull’s (2003) hypothesis that increased trials on the IGT would 
lead to differential performance between Reinforcer Types.  
As in Session 1 a 2x2x5 (Reinforcer Type by Instruction Type by Block) 
mixed-design ANOVA was performed to investigate differences in net score due to 
the experimental factors.  ANOVA revealed a main effect of Block, ;(3.33, 253.36) = 
6.45, <*= = 33.01, ' < 0.05, indicating that net score differed between some blocks.  
Contrary to the Session 1 analysis a main effect of Instruction Type was also found, 
;(1, 76) = 9.05, <*= = 267.60, ' < 0.05; net score was higher when participants 
received Hint instructions (M = 6.52, σM = 1.16) rather than No Hint instructions (M 
= 1.60, σM = 1.16).  Also in contrast to Session 1 no effect of Reinforcer Type was 
found, Reinforcer Type, ;(1, 76) < 1.0.  No other main effects or interactions were 
significant:  Reinforcer Type by Instruction Type, ;(1, 76) < 1.0; Block by Reinforcer 
Type, ;(3.33, 253.36) < 1.0; Block by Instruction Type, ;(3.33, 253.36) = 1.66, ' > 
0.05; Block by Reinforcer Type by Instruction Type, ;(3.25, 246.66) < 1.0.
In Session 1 participants who received the Hint instructions had the highest 
learning rates.  These were not significantly different to those of participants who had 
received the No Hint instructions but did suggest that differential performance would 
be found with more trials on the IGT.  Prior to the publication of these experiments 
(Fernie and Tunney, 2006) a reviewer suggested an alternative explanation – that in 
adding a second session after a 48-hour delay a further change was made to the 
standard IGT procedure.  It is plausible that in re-reading the instructions after some 
experience on the IGT participants who received the Hint were better able to utilise
the help afforded by the Hint instructions and this subsequently affected their 
performance.  However, given that the learning rates following Hint instructions were 
higher in session 1, while not significantly different to those following No Hint 
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Figure 2.7: Mean number of cards selected from each deck by block for each 
experimental condition.  Note that blocks 1 to 5 are session 1 and blocks 6 to 10 are 
session 2.  A mean selection of 5 cards represents chance.  Error bars are removed for 
sake of clarity.
instructions, a distinction in performance did exist between instruction groups and it 
seems plausible this would have occurred whether the second session followed 
immediately or after a delay.
It is puzzling that no effect of Reinforcer Type was found, even at one level of 
the Instruction Type factor.  In Session 1 learning rate was higher in the No Hint -
Real Money condition than in the No Hint - Facsimile Money condition, and a 
significant difference in net score was found between these conditions.  However, this 
effect disappears in the second session.  Figure 2.7 displays mean net score across 
block in all Experiments in this Chapter.  The data in this Figure suggest that there is 
little learning in the No Hint conditions, despite the difference in Reinforcer Type.  
Two explanations for this result spring to mind.   Participants in the No Hint - Real 
Money condition may not have acquired an understanding of the task in the same way 
or to the same extent as those who received the Hint instructions; or the introduction 
of the break between sessions has affected behaviour in some way.  If this were the 
case then a continuation of the Session 1 trend may have been found had the second 
session immediately followed the first. 
!"6"4 8.9'%,%: '9&.2 ,% 7.22,(% !
Learning rates were estimated as in Session 1 by calculating the slope 2 from the 
change in net score across block.  A 2x2 (Instruction Type by Reinforcer Type) 
independent-measures ANOVA found a main effect of Instruction Type, ;(1, 76) = 
10.36, <*= = 1.37, ' < 0.01; no effect of Reinforcer Type, ;(1, 76) = 1.26, ' > 0.05; 
and no interaction, ;(1, 76) = 0.29, ' > 0.05.  These results reflect the rapid rise in net 
score between blocks 6 and 7 in the Hint instruction conditions despite net score 
reaching asymptote in the subsequent blocks.  No such rise occurs following No Hint 
instructions and the learning rate remains flat (Figure 2.7), suggesting that with 
increased exposure to the IGT it is the instructions one receives that influence 
learning.  Figure 2.7 shows that in both No Hint conditions mean net score is no 
different to chance in block 10 of the IGT despite the preceding 180 trials worth of 
experience and a gap between sessions in which to reflect on behaviour (No Hint –
Facsimile Money, $(19) < 1.0, *+ = 8.17, ' > 0.05; No Hint – Real Money, $(19) < 
1.0, *+ = 10.61, ' > 0.05).  
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2.6 GENERAL DISCUSSION
This Chapter details experiments which varied the administration of the Iowa 
Gambling Task in several ways that had the potential to influence performance.  
Participants were either given instructions that included a hint or did not, and received 
either real or facsimile money reinforcers.  Performance was assessed by comparing 
net score across experimental blocks and between conditions.  An effect of Reinforcer 
Type was found in the first experimental session.  However, this effect was only 
apparent when participants received No Hint instructions, suggesting that Instruction 
Type influenced behaviour on the IGT despite no main effect emerging over the first 
one hundred trials.  An effect of Instruction Type did emerge in the second 
experimental session as signalled in the first session by larger learning rates following 
receipt of the hint instructions.  In fact, there was little evidence of learning in the 
participants who had received the instructions without the hint: after 200 trials mean 
net score in these groups was not significantly different to chance in the final 20-trial 
block.  In addition, the effect of Reinforcer Type was not sustained into a second 
session in contrast to Bowman and Turnbull’s (2003) prediction.
In the discussion of the general results of Experiments 2 and 3 it was 
suggested that selection was not uniform within the advantageous and 
disadvantageous decks, and in fact, learning was being driven by a reduction in 
selection from deck B and an increase in selection from deck C.  This would be an 
important finding because the analysis of IGT performance using the net score 
measure assumes that the advantageous and disadvantageous decks are similar enough 
to allow the number of cards selected from them to be collapsed together.  While this 
is true of the long-term gains, the decks also differ in the immediate gain and, 
crucially, the schedule of losses.  Each deck is different from the others on at least one 
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of these three dimensions.  Wilder, Weinberger and Goldberg (1998) and 
MacPherson, Phillips and Della Sala (2002) have reported that participants’ card 
selection is not uniform within the advantageous and disadvantageous decks.  Both 
studies report that their normal and clinical samples selected more cards from the 
decks where they received frequent gains without loss (decks B and D).  This 
selection behaviour is consistent with what is observed in the animal operant 
conditioning literature and suggests that the ratio of wins to losses is important in card 
selection (Greenberg & Weiner, 1966).
From their published reports (Wilder et al, 1998) or personal correspondence 
(MacPherson et al, 2002) it is clear that both studies used Facsimile Money 
reinforcers and No Hint instructions.  In Experiment 1 (Session 1) this preference for 
decks B and D was also found.  In fact, this pattern was found in all Experiments (see 
Table 2.2).  More information about the effect of Reinforcer Type reported in the 
cross-experimental comparisons can be found by comparing in Table 2.2 selection 
from decks B and D between Reinforcer Types when No Hint instructions are 
received.  When Real Money was the reinforcer, selection was lower from deck B and 
higher from deck D than when Facsimile Money was the reinforcer.  Comparing 
between Instruction Types, the mean total number of cards selected within each deck 
are much the same, which was reflected in the earlier cross-experimental comparisons 
of net score.  
Figures 2.8a and 2.8b display the number of cards selected from each deck 
across block and within each experimental factor.  This more detailed examination of 
deck selection than provided in Figures 2.4 and 2.6 reveals changes over time that are 
not found when only total cards selected are looked at.  It is apparent from Figure 2.8a
that selection from deck A remains consistent and below chance in all conditions, 
Table 2.2:  Mean number of cards selected from each deck per session by Instruction 
Type and Reinforcer Type.  
Session 1 Session 2
Instruction Instruction
Reinforcer No Hint Hint  No Hint  Hint
A
Facsimile 20.45 (3683) 18.8 (367E) 21.85 (36E8)    14.05 (464F)
Real Money 20.65 (36@8) 16.85 (@6FG) 18.65 (36H3)    15.45 (36FG)
B
Facsimile 32.65 (46@4) 31.6 (464E) 25.8 (46G7)      17.95 (46H3)
Real Money 26.3 (36EF) 31.1 (4688) 25.7 (46H3)      19.95 (86EE)
C
Facsimile 21.65 (3677) 21.05 (36I8) 25.55 (46E4)     34.2 (E6FG)
Real Money 21.95 (36EG) 23.9 (46HH) 28.25 (E63G)     33.2 (E6FI)
D
Facsimile 25.25 (36GE) 28.55 (4644) 26.8 (467I)       33.8 (E674)
Real Money 31.1 (46@8) 28.15 (467E) 27.4 (86@)         31.4 (E634)
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while selection from deck D changes little despite remaining above chance.  These 
observations do not tell us much more than what is available from looking at total
card selections.  However, this more local examination reveals that selection from 
deck B decreases while selection from deck C increases.  This implies that the 
learning rate calculated from net score is driven by differential selection within the 
advantageous and disadvantageous decks.  Indeed in Session 2, where the effect of 
Instruction Type is found, this trend is even more apparent and shows that participants 
who received the Hint are correctly identifying the worst decks.  
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Figure 2.8a:  Mean number of card selections in each block in Experiments 1 and 2.  
Error bars are removed for the sake of clarity.  The dashed line represents chance.
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Figure 2.8b:  Mean number of card selections in each block in Experiment 3.  Error 
bars are removed for the sake of clarity.  The dashed line represents chance.
The observation that there are differences in preference for decks with the 
same long-term expected value but different short-term contingencies implies that 
learning in the IGT is not only governed by expected value.  This is of interest 
because it may shed light on basic learning processes’ sensitivity to the magnitude 
versus the frequency of reinforcement.  This in turn has implications for researchers in 
all fields using the IGT.  If clinical participants show differential deck selection within 
decks with the same expected values, then the contingencies offer a greater insight 
into what is influencing their behaviour on the IGT.
While these observations are interesting they must be interpreted cautiously.  
As the number of cards selected from one deck is dependent on the number selected 
from the others analysis using parametric statistics would violate the assumption of 
independence, making any analysis of differences between decks difficult to 
investigate, and this is the reason why only observations of the data have been 
reported here.  However, the question of how the short-term deck contingencies 
impact on learning in the IGT is important.  Therefore, Chapter 3 describes 
experiments where the frequency and magnitude of loss are manipulated to assess 
their importance on learning on the IGT.
The main finding from these Experiments is that the instructions participants 
receive affect their subsequent performance on the IGT.  This should not come as a 
surprise.  Being told that “some of the decks are worse than others and that if you stay 
away from the worst decks you will win” should affect participants’ ability to 
distinguish between decks and thereby improve on the IGT.  It is perhaps the strength 
of the gambling task paradigm that differences in performance between sub-
populations and control groups are found without using the  Hint instructions (Mazas 
et al, 2000; Petry et al, 1998; Grant et al, 2000).  However, in altering the instructions 
participants are given, the nature of the task is less one of learning from behaviour as 
in a traditional decision-making task (or operant conditioning task), but one of 
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monitoring behaviour to distinguish between opposing (good and bad) options (c.f. 
Kudadjie-Gyamfi and Rachlin, 2002).  This should certainly have an impact on 
participants’ ability to describe what is going on as the task progresses (Bechara et al, 
1997a; Maia & McClelland, 2004).
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CHAPTER THREE
MANIPULATIONS OF LOSS FREQUENCY AFFECT LEARNING 
ON THE IGT
3.1 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
In Chapter 2 it was suggested that participants’ preferences within the advantageous 
and disadvantageous decks on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) were not uniform.  
Similar results have also been found in the few studies where deck selection from 
individual decks has been reported (Crone & van der Molen, 2004; MacPherson et al, 
2002; Wilder et al, 1998).  In these studies participants showed a preference for the 
two decks with infrequent losses (decks B and D) regardless of the long-term value of 
selecting from these decks; results that are in line with the Law of Effect (Thorndike, 
1898).  As these decks have a lower frequency of punishment, or a higher frequency 
of reward, the Law of Effect predicts that they will be chosen more often.  
Experiments 2 to 3 replicated and extended these findings.  If only the mean number 
of cards selected in each session is considered, as in MacPherson et al (2002) and 
Wilder et al (1998), more cards were selected from decks B and D.  But in a second 
100-trial session on the IGT more cards were selected from the advantageous decks.  
This is the normal behaviour reported by Bechara et al (1994, 1997, 1999).  However, 
the number of cards selected from any individual decks in a session does not tell the 
whole story. By plotting the number of selections from each deck over 20-trial blocks 
across the two sessions it appears that participants generally avoided the deck with 
high immediate reward but frequent higher losses (deck A) and an above chance 
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preference for the deck with low immediate reward but infrequent relatively large 
losses (deck D) did not change.  No more information was added from this 
examination for these decks compared to that provided by looking at mean number of 
cards selected.  However, in decks B and C changes across block were found.  
Participants initially preferred the deck with high immediate rewards and infrequent 
very large losses (deck B) but moved away from it with time (and with increasing 
losses), and developed a preference for the deck with low immediate rewards but 
frequent low losses (deck C).  This change in selection from B to C appeared to 
underlie participants’ learning on the IGT in Experiment 2 and the Hint condition of 
Experiment 3.
Very little work has examined selection from individual decks on the IGT or 
the relative importance of frequency or magnitude of punishment in choice behaviour.  
The majority of studies have considered the difference in selection from decks based 
on their expected values.  However, some observations of differential selection within 
the advantageous and disadvantageous decks were summarised in the previous 
chapter (e.g. MacPherson et al, 2002, Wilder et al, 2002) and others have been 
reported in more detail.  
Mintzer and Stitzer (2002) used the computerized IGT as one of a battery of 
neuropsychological tests to assess the cognitive performance of patients receiving 
methodone maintenance treatment for drug addiction.  While patients had lower net 
scores than matched controls, their selection pattern differed within the decks with the 
lowest frequency (B & D), but not the highest frequency (A & C), of loss.  Selection 
bias was measured by subtracting the number of selections of B from the number 
selected from D.  The average net score for the patient group (-9.06, !" = 16.25) was 
significantly different from the control group (2.14, !" = 14.13).  This measure 
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indicates that patients preferred deck B to deck D more than controls did.  But the 
interesting measure is that although controls showed a slight preference for deck D 
(their D-B score was higher than zero), this was not different to zero indicating these 
participants were indifferent between the decks and suggesting that their improved 
performance relative to the patients was not a function of selection from deck D.  The 
comparable measure for decks A and C, revealed no significant difference between 
groups, but the C-A measure was greater than zero for the control group (patients = 
5.28, !" = 14.69; controls = 9.76, !" = 13.94).  This shows that control participants 
preferred deck C to deck A, and coupled with the D-B selection measure, suggests 
that increased selection from C as well as decreased selection from B as compared to 
the patients was responsible for the higher net scores in that group.  It is also of note 
that net scores for the control participants were not as high as reported by the Iowa 
group but are comparable to the lower values found in Experiments 1 to 3 and by 
others (e.g. Kleeberg et al, 2004; Rotherham-Fuller et al, 2004; Ritter, Meador-
Woodruff and Dalack, 2004; Bowman et al, 2005; Harmsen, Bischof, Hohagen and 
Rumpf, 2006).  Mintzer and Stitzer (2002) comment that previous studies of drug 
addicted populations have not reported differences as a function of loss frequency, but 
suggest that increasing frequency of loss may eliminate their reported effect.  They go 
on to suggest further examination of this area is needed to understand the performance 
of their, and presumably other, clinical populations.  
Fischer, Blommaert and Midden (2005) also noted differential activity within 
the disadvantageous decks.  They examined performance on a manipulated version of 
the computerized IGT using real money reinforcers and no hint instructions.  They 
found differential selection within the disadvantageous decks with deck A selected 
below chance and deck B selected above chance.  Neither selection from decks C or D 
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were greater than chance.  This contributed to an average monetary loss for 
participants, and occurred despite the manipulations to the original IGT design.  The 
major changes in their task from the original IGT, aside from the computerisation and 
payment of real money, were fourfold.  Firstly, gains and losses were reported 
separately in each deck (to facilitate computerisation of the experiment; but see also 
Peters and Slovic, 2000, discussed below).  This meant that in the decks with low loss 
frequency there were nine gains of (10¢ in deck B; 5¢ in deck D) and one loss (115¢ 
in deck B; 20¢ in deck D), and in deck A there were five gains of 10¢ and five losses 
of 15¢.  The second major change was in deck C.  To avoid net yields of 0¢, the 
number of gains without loss was increased from five to seven.  However, to maintain 
the expected value of +25¢, five of these gains were of 5¢, one was of 2¢ and one was 
of 1¢.  The 3 losses were all of 1¢.  These changes maintained the choice conflict in 
that decks A and B still had larger immediate gains but decks C and D had positive 
expected values.  However, these manipulations make the probability of gain less 
certain for the participants (although the number of net gains remains the same) and 
magnitudes of loss are changed.  This is especially relevant for selection from deck C.  
The third change was the randomisation of reinforcement schedules within each deck 
and this point is returned to in the discussion.  The final major change was the 
addition of a money transfer aspect.   In the original manual version of the IGT 
participants were required to give the experimenter money when they lost.  This 
feature was restored by making participants move money from the computer dealer’s 
account area to the participant’s account area of the screen, or vice versa.  This 
change had an interesting consequence. In a pilot study Fischer et al (2005) reported 
that participants developed a dislike for decks A and C compared to B and D.  
However, from their observations and debriefings of participants they discerned that 
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participants found the transfer of money with more frequent losses tedious.  The 
authors suggested that the large number of mouse movements involved in these 
transfers may make avoidance of them indicative of some optimising process.  
However, this may be only one of the elements involved in the development of dislike 
since similar patterns have been found in the computerized IGT without the money 
exchange (Mintzer and Stitzer, 2002).
Crone, Somsen, Van Beek and Van Der Molen (2004) also report evidence of 
a division in selection behaviour from the four IGT decks on their computerized 
‘donkey’ version of the task developed for children but used with adults in this study. 
They found an interaction between loss frequency and the net gain of the decks, such 
that participants selected more cards from the deck with the lower rather than the 
higher frequency of loss within the disadvantageous decks (deck B versus deck A), 
but no such division was found for the advantageous decks.  However, an interaction 
was also found between loss frequency, net gain and performance group.  Further 
post-hoc ANOVAs found that participants in the best performing group selected less 
from decks A and B, and more from deck C, with no difference in deck D selection 
between performance groups.  Examination of Figure 2 in this study, shows that 
participants in the best performing group select a similar number of cards from decks 
B and C (~34%), at chance from deck D (~24%) and below chance from deck A
(~8%).  The pattern was different in the moderate and worst performing groups where 
above chance selection from deck B predominated (moderate group – A: ~16%, B: 
~35%, C: ~24%, D: ~24%; worst group - A: ~25%, B: ~40%, C: ~16%, D: ~19%.  
Selection from the advantageous decks is roughly equal, but below chance in the 
worst group, and selection from A at chance, whereas the opposite pattern is found in 
the moderate group.   These data suggest that differential selection from the IGT 
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decks may drive overall performance.  However, no data were presented looking at 
the change in selection from individual decks across blocks.  Trial block was involved 
in a three-way interaction with performance group and gain amount, as well as the 
two-way interactions involving these factors.  In discussing these results the authors 
concluded that only the good performers improved (selected more good decks) across 
trial blocks.  This effect could have been driven by decreasing selection from B and 
increasing selection from C as in the Experiments reported in Chapter 2.  However, no 
four-way interaction between factors was revealed.
Physiological measures of heart rate and skin conductance were also recorded 
by Crone et al (2004) and augmented the information available from the behavioural 
effects.  Generally, heart rate slowed more and skin conductance was increased 
following infrequent losses.  Heart rate has been found to slow in anticipation of an 
aversive event (Somsen, van der Molen, & Orlebeke, 1983) and skin conductance 
response is a widely used measure of physiological arousal (Dawson, Shell, & Filion, 
1990).  Somatic activity of this sort is hypothesized to underlie decision-making on 
the IGT (Bechara et al, 1996; Damasio, 1996; but see Chapter 5).  Crone et al (2004) 
performed further analyses to investigate whether heart rate and skin conductance 
were sensitive to the magnitude or the frequency of the losses.  The physiological 
measures were compared following losses from decks A and D.  In these decks the 
mean magnitude of losses is the same but the frequencies are different (losses are 
more frequent in deck A).  No differential effects were found suggesting that the 
physiological measures were sensitive to the magnitude and not the frequency of 
losses.   This result was found despite the large number of tests carried out to explore 
all factorial interactions and the consequent risk of Type I error inflation.  
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To some extent these behavioural and physiological findings fit with the 
behavioural results from Experiments 1 to 3 in that little change in selection from 
decks A and D was found, while changes in selection were apparent following 
experience of the high magnitude losses in deck B.  However, in Experiments 1 to 3, 
selection from D was above chance whereas selection from A was below chance, 
suggesting that the frequency of loss does influence selection.  The results of this 
study suggest that behaviourally, good performance is somewhat mediated by choices 
from decks B and C, much like in Experiments 1 to 3.
In a further study, Crone, Bunge, Latenstein and van der Molen (2005) 
investigated the performance of children and adolescents on the standard and variant 
versions of the ‘donkey’ IGT.  In their experiment participants were randomly 
assigned within each age group (7-9 years; 10-12 years; 13-15 years) to one of three 
conditions: a high-complexity condition with 4 options each with punishment 
frequency at 50% (equivalent to two deck A’s and two deck C’s); a low-complexity 
high-punishment frequency condition (equivalent to deck A and C); and a low-
complexity low-punishment frequency condition (equivalent to deck B and D).  They 
found that the improvement in performance with increasing age reported in previous 
studies (e.g. Crone and van der Molen, 2004) was only apparent in the low-
complexity low-punishment frequency condition where the youngest age group 
showed chance selection from each deck, whereas the older age groups preferred the 
deck with the positive expected value.  Children in the middle age group were slower 
to develop this preference.  Examining deck switching behaviour Crone et al found 
that the younger children switched selection more frequently in this condition.  The 
authors argued that the younger children discounted the infrequent (large) punishment 
in this condition more quickly than the older age groups.  These results demonstrate 
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that punishment frequency does influence selection behaviour, but that it should 
disappear into adolescence.  However, even if a fourth condition with high-
complexity and low-punishment frequency (BBDD) had been used it would not be as 
complex as the standard IGT where the frequency of punishment varies with deck 
types.  
Peters and Slovic (2000) have criticised the design of the IGT by commenting 
that losses, gains and expected values are confounded as the highest magnitudes occur 
in the disadvantageous decks.  This makes it difficult to determine if participants are 
selecting on the basis of size of gains, size of losses or expected value.  They make no 
mention of the frequency of losses.  Instead they created an alternative task based on 
the IGT.  In this task, two decks have higher gains (B & D) and two have higher 
losses (B & C), but decks C and D have a positive expected value whereas decks A 
and B have a negative expected value.  Unlike on the IGT gains and losses are not 
presented together on the same selection.  In altering the IGT Peters and Slovic 
equalised the probability of loss in each of the decks to .5, with the exception of deck 
C where the probability of loss is .2 (as a result this deck also has a slightly higher 
expected value).  While this task may allow discrimination between the magnitudes of 
gains, losses and expected values, arguably making it a better task than the IGT, such 
a manipulation does not tell us anything about the influence of loss frequency on 
behaviour on the IGT.  However, it is of note that the average participant in the Peters 
and Slovic task chose deck C – the deck with the lowest frequency of loss.  But this 
was also the deck with the highest expected value.
It was mentioned in Chapter 2 that a basic associative learning principle like 
the Law of Effect (Thorndike, 1898) predicts that decks with the lowest frequency of 
loss be preferred.  This is supported by the results on Peters and Slovic’s (2000) 
109
modified task.  What is not clear is why behaviour on the standard gambling task, 
with its arrangement of reward on every trial and infrequent losses does not conform 
all the time.  Barron and Erev (2003, Experiment 4), have shown that in small 
feedback-based problems decision makers have a tendency to underweight rare 
outcomes.  Small feedback-based problems have three features: they are repeated, 
each single choice is not very important overall, and there is no objective information 
– decision makers must rely on the immediate feedback obtained in the situation in 
the past.   Yechiam, Stout, Busemeyer, Rock and Finn (2005a) have claimed that the 
choice on the IGT is an example of a small feedback-based decision situation, 
although they make no mention of any effects instructions have so their description is 
characteristic of the IGT when participants are not given the hint instructions.  They 
investigated the influence of foregone payoffs on the selection behaviour in two 
manipulations of the IGT – where foregone payoffs were included or not and where 
reinforcer magnitude had been increased by a factor of 1.5 or not (the non-
manipulated condition was equivalent to the standard task).  Foregone payoffs are 
where the outcome of an unchosen alternative is revealed.   Yechiam et al (2005a) 
investigated the influence of foregone payoffs on performance of a high-level drug 
abusing population (predominantly university students) versus controls.  However, the 
study is of interest in the context of this Chapter because it investigated selection over 
150 trials in each IGT deck.  The manipulation of reinforcer magnitude produced no 
significant effects so results were pooled across this condition.  For controls in the 
unmanipulated condition, selection from deck A was always below chance, and 
actually decreased with time.  Selection from B remained above chance, and appeared 
to increase in the first 100 trials.  Selection from C was below chance but did show 
some increase over all blocks, whereas in D selection increased from above chance in 
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the first block. One possible reason for the difference in selection patterns compared 
to the Experiments 1 to 3 is that reward magnitude was ten times higher – participants 
earned $1 and not £0.10 per selection from decks A and B (the difference in currency 
is unimportant.  It is the relative size within the currency that increased magnitude).  
Yechiam et al (2005a) found that the influence of the foregone payoffs was larger for 
the drug abusing group in B and D, but a different pattern of results was found – with 
foregone payoffs selection from B switched from learned avoidance without them to 
constant above chance selection with them.  In A, foregone payoffs resulted in an 
initial attraction to this deck that reduced over time.  This different results pattern lead 
Yechiam et al (2005a) to caution against aggregating across the disadvantageous 
decks and to advocate a more detailed examination of selection patterns without 
collapsing across the frequency difference.  An examination of Figure 2 in this study 
reveals that the control participants have similar selection from decks A and B with 
and without foregone payoffs.  But providing foregone payoffs actually increased 
selection from D and decreased selection from C.  This is informative: when 
participants know what they missed out on they prefer the advantageous deck with the 
lower frequency of loss.
The reinforcement schedules on the IGT were constructed to contrast decks 
with positive and negative expected values, but larger or smaller immediate gains. 
Nowhere in the IGT literature is there any explanation for why within decks with the 
same expected values, the reinforcement schedules were constructed in the way they 
were.  It can be assumed that the task was constructed with four decks as using two 
decks would mean that the task was too simple, whereas any more than four would 
increase the complexity.  But it is not clear why within each deck type one deck has 
an infrequent, but relatively high magnitude loss, whereas the other deck has a more 
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frequent with consequently smaller relative magnitude losses.  As detailed in Chapter 
1 Bechara et al (1994) gave no indication of why they created the decks with different 
schedules of punishment.  However, it is clear from their standard analysis and the 
omission of any mention of this variable from recent published descriptions (Bechara 
and Damasio, 2005) that they believe selection is equivalent from decks with the same 
expected value.  This is not what was found in the experiments reported in Chapter 2, 
and not found in those studies that have reported selection patterns from individual 
decks.  From these studies it is clear that there is differential selection within decks 
with negative expected values and possibly within the advantageous decks.  The 
following Experiments were designed to investigate the influence of loss frequency 
on this choice behaviour on the IGT.
The hypothesis developed in this chapter is that deck selection on the IGT is 
not merely governed by the long-term consequences of the decks.  The contention is 
that participants readily learn to avoid the disadvantageous deck with the higher 
frequency of loss and initially prefer the disadvantageous deck with the lower 
frequency of loss, while within the advantageous decks differential selection is less 
clear, but participants in general prefer the deck with the more frequent losses (and 
lower net losses). A possible explanation for this behaviour is the amount of 
information available to participants about the ‘goodness’ or otherwise of the decks. 
This information can only come from the schedule of losses, and the frequency of loss 
with which loss occurs. In the decks with the less frequent loss there is less 
information about their ‘goodness’ as there are less penalties, giving less opportunity 
to gather information about the long-term ‘goodness’ of the deck. Whereas in the 
decks with more frequent losses, there are more losses and therefore more information 
about the overall nature of the decks. A further aim of Experiment 5 was to test the 
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hypothesis that the frequency of loss provides information to participants about deck 
‘goodness’ and so affects learning behaviour.
3.2 EXPERIMENT 4
ADVANTAGEOUS CARD SELECTION DIFFERS BETWEEN DECK 
COMPARISONS WHEN CHOICE IS BETWEEN TWO IOWA GAMBLING 
TASK DECKS.
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The results from Experiments 1-3 suggested that participants’ preferences within the 
advantageous and disadvantageous decks on the IGT were not uniform.  The aim of 
the current experiment was to further investigate participants’ deck preferences and 
their effects on learning in the IGT by investigating behaviour when a simpler choice 
was offered.  In four conditions, choice was examined between one advantageous and 
one disadvantageous deck from the IGT.  This design permits the examination of 
learning as measured by the change in preference for the advantageous deck.  As the 
expected values of the decks in each condition are the same, any difference in 
behaviour implies that the contingencies of the individual decks, and not expected 
values, are governing selection on this task.  Any differential learning between 
conditions can be attributed to differences in the magnitude and frequency of losses 
on the individual decks.  This would provide support for the observations from 
Experiments 1 – 3 that deck selection varies within disadvantageous and 
advantageous decks.  Table 3.1 displays the deck contingencies in each condition.  
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Following the results of the previous study where the change in selection from 
decks B and C were hypothesized to underlie learning, it was anticipated that learning 
would be slowest when the choice is between these two decks.  Due to the general 
avoidance of deck A in the earlier studies it was predicted that the fastest learning 
would be seen when deck A was one of the choice options. Similarly, due to the 
preference for deck B it was predicted that learning would be slowest in the 
conditions were it was one of the response options.  Differences in learning between 
conditions where the disadvantageous decks are different and the advantageous decks 
are the same would suggest that selection from the disadvantageous decks is not 
uniform and would provide behavioural support for Crone et al’s (2004) results.  
Differences in learning between conditions where the advantageous decks are 
different but the disadvantageous decks are the same would suggest that selection 
from the advantageous decks is not uniform.  This would conflict with the results 
from Crone et al (2004) but provide support for the hypothesis that change in 
preference for deck C underlies learning on the IGT.
!"#"# ./'0)*
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Forty-eight participants (thirty-nine female) were recruited from the undergraduate 
and postgraduate populations at the University of Nottingham.  Participants were 
recruited through a poster advertisement that offered the opportunity to earn up to £6 
by taking part in a cognitive psychology experiment.  Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of four conditions (see Table 3.1).  
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Table 3.1: The deck contingencies (reward magnitude and mean loss magnitude in 
pence, and loss frequency) in each experimental condition.
Deck Comparison
A:C A:D B:C B:D
Reward Magnitude
(pence) 10:5 10:5 10:5 10:5
Mean Loss Magnitude
(pence) 25:2.5 25:25 125:2.5 125:25
Loss Frequency
()[loss]) 0.5:0.5 0.5:0.1 0.1:0.5 0.1:0.1
,))$%$&-+
Participants were tested individually in a testing laboratory.  A PC controlled the 
experiment.  A 2-alternative forced choice task was created and run on the PC.  The 
task was based on published descriptions of the Iowa Gambling Task, except that 
participants made choices from two rather than four decks of cards.  The 
reinforcement schedules for each deck were the same as those published by Bechara, 
et al (1994) for the first 40 cards.  For the remaining 160 cards in each deck the 
reinforcement schedules were based on the format of the first 40 cards:  Deck A, five 
losses totalling £1.25 per ten card selections; Deck B, one loss of £1.25 per ten card 
selections; Deck C, five losses totalling £0.25 per ten card selections; Deck D, one 
loss totalling £0.25 per ten card selections.  The task format was exactly the same as 
that reported in the preceding experiments except that choices were made from two 
decks and not four.  All reinforcers were real money.
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A between-subjects design was used to compare participants’ learning between four 
advantageous deck to disadvantageous deck comparisons.  Learning when choosing 
between decks A and C, decks A and D, decks B and C and decks B and D was 
compared.  The number of selections made from the advantageous decks was 
recorded for each of ten twenty-trial blocks.  From this measure the slope, 0, was 
calculated as an estimate of learning rate.  
#%1(.2-%.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four deck comparison conditions.  
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 3 except that participants took part in 
only one session of 200 trials and they saw on-screen, and chose between, only two 
decks of cards rather than four.  After 100 card selections participants were invited to 
take a short break.  The length of this break was determined by each participant and 
was not recorded.  As there were only two choices no hint was provided.
!"#"! 1/2+3'2
The number of card selections from the advantageous deck (C or D) in each condition 
was recorded for each participant in each of ten twenty-trial blocks.  Table 3.2 
displays the mean number of advantageous selections in each experimental group 
over the first half, the second half and the whole experiment.  
To investigate whether the number of advantageous selections differed 
between groups, a 4x10 (Condition by Block) mixed design ANOVA was performed.  
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There was no interaction, 3(11.42, 167.43) < 1, MSE = 24.88,  > 0.05.  However, 
ANOVA revealed a main effect of Block, 3(3.81, 305.53) = 12.82,   < 0.001, 
indicating that the number of advantageous selections differed between blocks (it 
increased with block).  A main effect of Condition was also found, 3(3, 44) = 3.87, 
MSE = 139.33,  < 0.05.  Pairwise comparisons found that the number of 
advantageous selections was significantly greater in condition A:C versus condition 
B:C, 3(3,440) = 6.06, MSE = 23.4,  < 0.05; and in condition A:D versus condition 
B:C, 3(3,440) = 4.70, MSE = 23.4,  < 0.05.  There were no significant differences 
between any other groups, 3(3,440)< 1.
Table 3.2:  Mean number of advantageous selections in each experimental group.
Deck comparison
Trials A:C A:D B:C B:D
1 - 100 12.75 (0.80) 12.52 (0.76) 7.43 (0.93) 11.32 (1.09)
101 - 200 15.3 (1.24) 14.73 (1.01) 11.25 (1.71) 13.38 (1.69)
1 - 200 14.03 (0.86) 13.63 (0.83) 9.34 (1.16) 12.35 (1.37)
41&.5  67. 8$9'8-8 *-80.% 1: $2;$*&$/.1-+ +.<.(&'1*+ )1++'0<. '+ =>?  3'/-%.+ '* 
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Figure 3.1 shows the mean number of advantageous card selections in each 
condition across ten twenty-trial blocks.  While advantageous selection appears to 
increase at roughly the same rate in each condition, it is always lower when the choice 
is between decks B and C.  Learning would be indicated by an increase in the number 
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of advantageous selections with increased exposure to the task.  As a measure of 
learning rate the slope, 0, was calculated for each participant.  Table 3.3 gives the 
mean learning rates for the first and second 100 trials and for all trials in each 
experimental condition and shows that overall learning rate is greatest when the 
choice is between deck C and a disadvantageous deck.  
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Figure 3.1:  Mean number of advantageous selections across twenty ten-trial blocks in 
each experimental group.  Error bars are the standard error of the mean.
A one-way ANOVA was run to investigate whether learning rate differed 
significantly between deck comparison conditions.  No significant differences in 
learning rate between conditions were found, (3, 44) < 1, @!A = 0.44, ) < 0.05.  
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Table 3.3:  Mean learning rate () in each experimental condition across first 100 
trials, second 100 trials and all trials.  
Deck comparison
Trials A:C A:D B:C B:D
1 - 100 1.04* (0.37) 0.54 (0.31) -0.01 (0.51) 0.75 (0.40)
101 - 200 0.54* (0.24) 0.38 (0.24) 0.93* (0.39) 0.46* (0.20)
1 - 200 0.58* (0.21) 0.45* (0.13) 0.69* (0.25) 0.47* (0.17)
41&.5 3'/-%.+ '* )$%.*&7.+.+ $%. &7. +&$*2$%2 .%%1% 1: &7. 8.$*?  B'*2'($&.+ 
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In previous experiments using the IGT selections have most commonly been 
examined in one hundred-trial sessions.  Examining the data in a similar way reveals 
that there appears to be no learning in the first 100 trials in condition B:C (see Table 
3.3).  This result is in line with the experimental hypotheses.  However, in the second 
100 trials participants learn at almost twice the rate of participants in the other 
conditions.  This mirrors the results from the previous experiments where a preference 
for deck C is found to develop with increased experience of the decks.  Table 3.3 
displays a summary of the results of Lorch and Myers (1990) regression analyses on 
learning rates.  These regressions revealed that while learning rate was greater than 
zero across all 200 trials in all conditions, in the first 100 trials it was almost flat in 
condition B:C and was no different from zero in conditions A:D and B:D.  These 
results were augmented by comparing mean advantageous selections made in block 5 
to zero.  For conditions A:D and A:C, the number of advantageous selections were 
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greater than zero in block 5 (A:D: &(11) = 3.31, !" = 4.27, ) < 0.05; A:C: &(11) = 
3.83, !" = 4.75, ) < 0.05) but not in condition B:D, (&(11) = 1.23, !" = 6.09, ) < 
0.05) or condition B:C (&(11) = -1.74, !" = 5.82, ) < 0.05).  In the final block of trials 
advantageous selections were greater than zero in all conditions (A:D: &(11) = 4.57,
!" = 4.23, ) < 0.05;  B:D: &(11) = 2.46, !" = 6.11, ) < 0.05; A:C: &(11) = 5.07, !" = 
4.44, ) < 0.05) except condition B:C (&(11) = 1.33, !" = 5.88, ) < 0.05).
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A difference was found between the number of advantageous cards selected in 
condition A:C and condition B:C.  Fewer advantageous selections were made in 
condition B:C suggesting that participants found it harder to select advantageously 
due to a preference for deck B.  This result provides support for the hypothesis that 
participants’ preferences on the IGT distinguished between the disadvantageous 
decks.  However, no significant differences were found in the number of 
advantageous selections in conditions A:D and B:D suggesting that the presence of 
deck C is important.
No differences were found when learning rates between conditions were 
examined, and learning rate was significantly greater than 0 over all 10 blocks in each 
condition.  However, examination of Figure 3.1 suggested that condition B:C does 
differ from the others.  Learning rate during the first hundred trial in condition B:C 
was flat so that by block 5 participants were not selecting advantageously.  Despite a 
huge increase in learning rate as measured over 200 trials, in the final block 
participants were still not showing a preference for the advantageous deck although 
they were heading in that direction.  These results support the experimental 
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hypothesis that due to changes in participants’ preferences observed in the IGT this 
condition would be the hardest for participants to learn on.  However, an alternative 
explanation for these findings is that identifying which option had the better long-term 
consequences was harder because the deck contingencies varied on both the 
magnitude and the frequency of loss whereas all other deck contingencies varied on 
only one (see Table 3.3; A:C and B:D vary on loss magnitude; A:D varies on loss 
frequency).    
The mean number of advantageous selections was greatest when the deck 
comparison involved deck A.  In all blocks the highest advantageous selections were 
seen in these two conditions.  These results provide support for the hypothesis that 
participants generally avoid deck A, meaning that identification of the deck with 
better long-term consequences is easier regardless of the advantageous deck it was 
paired with.  Unfortunately because there were no differences in the number of 
advantageous selections (and consequently disadvantageous deck selections) little can 
be inferred about the relative contribution of loss frequency or magnitude in the 
advantageous decks, except that they do not appear to differentially affect learning 
when the disadvantageous deck is A.
In condition B:D, where only the magnitude of loss differed between decks, 
advantageous selection did not increase in the first 100 trials and no preference for 
deck D had been established by block 5.  Only after more exposure did a preference 
for deck D develop. This reflects an effect of loss magnitude.  Participants learn to 
avoid the larger loss despite the larger gain associated with it.  Table 3.3 shows that 
the lowest overall learning rates are found when deck D is one of the choices.  
However, this may reflect different processes in conditions B:D and A:D.  In 
condition A:D little change in learning rate reflects the general and unchanging 
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preference for deck D.  The later development of a preference for D in condition B:D 
may reflect the similarity in loss frequency between the decks making it harder to 
identify the deck selections which will result in greater long-term gains.
Overman (2004) has also identified the differences in deck contingencies as an 
important factor in behaviour on the IGT.  As well as noting the differences in loss 
frequencies between the decks, Overman (2004), like Peters and Slovic (2000), has 
pointed out that due to the size and frequency of losses on deck C very often no 
overall loss is made when selecting from this deck.  This may be the reason that 
selection from this deck changes across block: participants learn that while there are 
frequent losses on this deck, they rarely result in a net loss for that selection, and even 
when a net loss occurs it is small in comparison to all other decks.  As such, deck C 
varies in a unique respect from the other decks on the IGT: *.& <1++ frequency.  This 
net loss is lower (it varies between 1 and 4 per 10 card selections) than the frequency 
of losses (5 per 10 card selections).  It may take the participants time to learn this, but 
it would mirror the apparent initial preference for the decks with infrequent losses 
(decks B and D) and fit into an explanation utilising the Law of Effect.  Of course, the 
infrequent net losses also means that the magnitude of losses on Deck C are 
substantially lower than on the other IGT decks and it may be this that influences 
preference for this deck.
The results from this experiment provide some support for previous findings 
that participants’ preferences for the disadvantageous decks are not uniform.  In a 
two-choice environment it appears to be harder to select advantageously when deck B 
is one option.  The results also support the hypothesis that learning on the IGT is 
driven by changes in selection from decks B and C.  However, the experiment did not 
inform on whether the frequency of loss or its magnitude affect card selection on the 
122
IGT decks, except to suggest that this relationship may be different in the 
advantageous and disadvantageous decks.  Experiment 5 explores this relationship 
further.
3.3 EXPERIMENT 5
MANIPULATION OF FREQUENCY (AND MAGNITUDE) OF LOSS 
AFFECTS LEARNING ON THE IGT.
!"!"$ %&'()*+,'-)&
The results from Experiment 4 provided some support for the hypothesis that the 
difference in deck contingencies within the disadvantageous and advantageous decks 
contributes to learning on the IGT.  Experiment 5 was devised in order to further test 
this hypothesis by manipulating the reinforcement contingencies in the decks.  The 
hypothesis tested in this chapter is that participants avoid the disadvantageous deck 
with the higher frequency of loss and initially prefer the disadvantageous deck with 
the lower frequency of loss, while within the advantageous decks differential selection 
is less clear, but participants in general prefer the deck with the more frequent losses 
(and lower net losses).  A possible explanation for this behaviour is the amount of 
information available to participants about the ‘goodness’ or otherwise of the decks.  
This information can only come from the schedule of losses, and the frequency with 
which losses occur.  In the decks with the less frequent loss there is less information 
about their ‘goodness’ as there are less penalties, giving fewer opportunities to gather 
information about the long-term ‘goodness’ of the deck.  Whereas in the decks with 
more frequent losses, there are more losses and therefore more information about the 
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overall nature of the decks.  Experiment 5 was designed to test the hypothesis that the 
frequency of loss provides information to participants about deck ‘goodness’ and so 
affects learning behaviour.  To this end, two conditions were created by manipulating 
the frequency of losses on the original IGT decks.  In a Decreased Frequency 
condition the frequency of loss in decks A and C was reduced but unchanged in decks 
B and D.  In an Increased Frequency condition the frequency of loss in decks B and D 
was increased but unchanged in decks A and C.  In the Decreased Frequency 
condition fewer losses occur across the whole task, giving participants less 
information about the nature of the decks, whereas in the Increased Frequency 
condition more information is available.  Any difference in learning and in learning 
rate can be attributed to this difference in frequency of loss.  It was predicted that if 
the frequency of loss is informative then a slower learning rate would be observed in 
the Decreased Frequency condition.  A further prediction is that since participants 
prefer the lower loss frequency decks, selection should be higher from those decks 
within decks with the same expected values.  A sign that loss frequency is in part 
informative would be that this difference is greater when loss frequency is increased 
rather than decreased, as participants will still be avoiding the deck with largest loss 
frequencies.
!"!"# ./'0)*
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Forty-two (twenty-six female) participants were recruited from the undergraduate and 
postgraduate populations at the University of Nottingham.  Participants were recruited 
through a poster advertisement that offered the opportunity to earn up to £6 by taking 
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part in a cognitive psychology experiment.  Data from two participants were excluded 
from the analysis due to an experiment administration error in one case, and an 
expression by the participant of total misunderstanding of the instructions in the other.  
,))$%$&-+
Two modified versions of the Iowa Gambling Task were created.  In the Increased 
Frequency condition the frequency of loss was increased in the two IGT decks with 
low frequency (but high relative magnitude) losses (decks B and D).  In the Decreased 
Frequency condition the frequency of loss was decreased in the IGT decks with high 
frequency (but lower relative magnitude) losses (decks A and C).  In the original IGT 
the schedule of losses was fixed.  This was maintained in the modified decks and the 
occurrence of losses was randomly determined within 10 card blocks for each deck 
with the caveat that the sum of losses did not change the expected value for that deck 
within a ten card block.  Where the magnitude of losses changed (e.g. increased with 
the reduction in loss frequency in modified deck A and decreased with the increase in 
loss frequency in modified deck B) the same amounts were used in decks with the 
same expected value e.g. for the disadvantageous decks 5 losses of 15, 20, 25, 30, and 
35 or one loss of 125 became three losses of 35, 35, and 55.  The manipulated 
schedule of losses used in this Experiment is displayed in Appendix B? In both 
modified IGT versions the unmodified decks remained as they were in Experiment 3 
(see Appendix A).
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A between-subjects design was used to compare participants’ learning on the two 
modified IGT versions.  The number of selections made from the advantageous decks 
minus the number of selections from the disadvantageous decks was calculated for 
each of ten twenty-trial blocks.  From this measure the slope, 0, was calculated as an 
estimate of learning rate.  In addition, the number of cards chosen from each of the 
decks and the change in their selection over time was examined.  
#%1(.2-%.
Participants were randomly assigned to the Increased Frequency or Decreased 
Frequency conditions.  The procedure followed that of Experiment 4.  Participants 
took part in only one session of 200 trials and they saw on-screen, and chose between, 
four decks of cards.  After 100 card selections participants were invited to take a short 
break.  The length of this break was determined by each participant and was not 
recorded.
!"!"! 1/2+3'2
Net score was calculated for each participant over the whole experiment, and for the 
first hundred and the second hundred trials.  Mean net scores in each condition are 
displayed in Table 3.4.  As the table shows mean net score does not differ much 
between groups, although contrary to the experimental hypotheses participants in the 
increased frequency group have a lower net score in the first 100 trials.  However, an 
independent samples &-test found no significant difference in the overall mean net 
score between conditions, &(38) < 1.0.  
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Figure 3.2 displays mean net score in each of ten blocks of twenty trials for 
each experimental condition.  Mean net score increases across blocks in both 
conditions, although only in the Increased Frequency condition does mean net score 
end above chance.  However, contrary to the experimental hypothesis, mean net 
scores do not appear to differ between conditions.  This is confirmed by the results of 
a 2 x 10 (Loss Frequency by Block) mixed design ANOVA.  There was no main 
effect of Loss Frequency, (1, 38) < 1.0, @!A = 536.61, ) > 0.05, nor a significant 
interaction, 3(5.26, 199.72) = 1.57, @!A = 86.13, ) > 0.05.  A significant main effect 
of Block was found, 3(5.26, 199.72) = 6.04, @!A = 86.13, ) < 0.01, which indicated 
the tendency for mean net score to increase across blocks.
Table 3.4:  Mean net score in each condition in the first and second hundred trials, and 
over the whole experiment. 
Trials Decreased frequency Increased frequency
1 - 100 9.5 (8.40) 3.5 (6.25)
101 - 200 20.3 (10.27) †† 23.9 (10.88)*
1 - 200 29.8 (16.47)† 27.4 (16.29) ‡
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The main effect of Block does not provide much information beyond showing 
that mean net score is higher in some blocks than in others.  As a result the change in 
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mean net score across block, or the slope , was calculated as an estimate of learning 
rate in each condition.  Over the entire experiment learning rate was greater in the 
Increased Frequency condition,  = 0.97 (σM = 0.26), than in the Decreased 
Frequency condition,  = 0.50 (σM = 0.29).  However, an independent samples &-test 
found that this difference was not significant, &(38) =-1.21, ) > 0.05.  This result 
suggests that, as with the result of the mixed-design ANOVA, there is no strong 
evidence to support the experimental hypothesis that increasing the frequency of loss 
in the low frequency decks will lead to faster learning.  
Block
& ' ( ) * + , - . &/
M
ea
n
 n
et
 s
co
re
C&'
C&/
C-
C+
C)
C'
/
'
)
+
-
&/
&'
B1$712=19 871D413$E
F3$712=19 871D413$E 
Figure 3.2:  Mean net score across ten twenty-trial blocks in each experimental 
condition.  Error bars are the standard error of the mean (only negative bars are 
displayed for ease of viewing).
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Table 3.5:  Mean learning rate () in both experimental conditions across the first 100 
trials, second 100 trials and all trials.  
Trials Decreased frequency Increased frequency
1 - 100 2.04 (0.61)* 1.46 (0.55)*
101 - 200 -0.59 (0.56) 1.47 (0.52)*
1 - 200 0.50 (0.29) 0.97 (0.26)*
41&.5  3'/-%.+ '* )$%.*&7.+.+ $%. &7. +&$*2$%2 .%%1% 1: &7. 8.$*?  B'*2'($&.+ 
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In Experiment 4, it was argued that as the structure of the task included a 
break after 100 trials and as this is the length of the standard administration of the 
gambling task, learning rate might be examined over the first 100 and second 100 
trials.  Table 3.5 displays mean learning rate over the first and second 100 trials, and
over the entire experiment, in each condition.  Lorch and Myers (1990) regression 
analyses for repeated measures designs compared these learning rates to zero.  These 
analyses reveal that while there is a significant increase in learning rate in the first 100 
trials in both conditions (Decreased Frequency: 0 = 2.04 (σM = .61), &(19) = 3.35, ) < 
0.01; Increased Frequency: 0 = 1.46 (σM = .55), &(19) = 2.67, ) < 0.02), learning rate 
only continues to increase in the second 100 trials in the Increased Frequency 
condition, 0 = 1.47 (σM = .52), &(19) = 2.82, ) < 0.02).  Indeed, learning rate in the 
second 100 trials in the Decreased Frequency condition is negative, 0 = -.59 (σM = 
.56), &(19) = -1.05, ) > 0.05.  An independent-samples &-test found this difference to 
be significant, &(38) = -2.69, ) < 0.02 (the same test for the first 100 trials was not 
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significant, &(38) < 1.0).  This difference and the negative learning rate in the 
Decreased Frequency condition reflects the decline in mean net score in blocks 9 and 
10 in this condition, as illustrated in Figure 3.2.  This decline after 160 trials is what 
affects the overall learning rate in this condition, and is the reason why it is not 
significantly greater than zero.  Whereas, in the Increased Frequency condition mean 
net score continues to increase until by the end of the final block, mean net score is 
significantly greater than chance, &(19) = 3.70, ) < 0.01.  These results give some 
support to the experimental prediction that learning would be greater in the Increased 
Frequency condition.
One reason why selection from C and D was reduced in the last two blocks in 
the Decreased Frequency condition may be that these trials went unpunished and 
participants were attempting to earn as much money as possible.  This may have been 
an unwitting outcome of the break at halfway.  However, as there was no counter for 
participants to keep track of the number of selections they would have had to rely on 
an estimate of time elapsed relative to the first one hundred trials.  One demonstration 
that this strategy was in effect would be greater selection from deck B.  However, 
examination of individual deck selections revealed that while seven participants had a 
net score less than 0 in block 9, only five showed a clear preference for the 
disadvantageous decks (a net score < -10).  Their relative preference for each deck 
can be measured by subtracting selections from A from selection from B.  Of these 
five participants, two preferred deck A (B-A score of -16 and –20), two preferred 
deck B (B-A score of 6 and 20) and one was indifferent between them (B-A score of 
0).  In block 10, nine participants in the Decreased Frequency group had a negative 
net score but only two had a net score less than -10 (one preferred A, B-A score of -4; 
one preferred B, B-A score of 4).  The absence of a uniform pattern suggests that not 
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all these participants were following a strategy based on knowledge of the task 
contingencies and the time remaining, as their selections enountered sufficient losses 
to outweigh any short-term profit.
N*2';'2-$< 2.(O +.<.(&'1*
In Experiments 1 to 3, participants preferred to select the disadvantageous cards with 
the least frequent loss, whereas within the advantageous decks, although this general 
pattern is common early in learning, later in learning participants preferred to select 
from the decks with the more frequent loss. Since participants received the hint in 
both conditions in this Experiment a similar pattern of results should be seen, and if 
this were the case, it would provide additional evidence that the frequency (and 
magnitude) of loss does affect deck selection.  
The relevant data are shown in Figure 3.3. It is clear that participants show a 
similar deck selection preference in both conditions. This is not surprising given the 
similarity in net score measures reported earlier. Unlike in previous Experiments 
there does not appear to be any difference in selection within the advantageous decks. 
However, within the disadvantageous decks participants still appear to prefer the deck 
with the infrequent loss. Figure 3.4 displays deck selection in the first 100 and second 
100 trials in both conditions. Like the behaviour of participants who received the hint 
instructions in Chapter 2, deck selection from deck B decreases from the first to the 
second 100 trials, but unlike those earlier conditions the change in selection from deck 
D (increases from the first to the second 100 trials), is as large as that found in deck C.  
This suggests an equivalence in preference within the advantageous decks; a trend not 
apparent in the disadvantageous decks where deck A is always selected at a level 
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Figure 3.3:  Mean number of cards selected from each deck across all 200 trials in 
each condition.  Error bars are the standard error of the mean.
below chance.  This implies that within the disadvantageous decks participants prefer 
the deck with the less frequent losses.  Separate 2x2 (Deck by Time) repeated 
measures ANOVAs for each condition were run to investigate this claim. For the 
Decreased Frequency condition there was no main effect of Deck, (1, 19) = 3.0, 
@!A = 163.26, ) = .1; no main effect of Time, 3(1, 19) = 1.15, @!A = 104.47, ) > 
0.05; nor was there an interaction, 3(1, 19) = 2.43, @!A = 29.78, ) = .14.  For the 
Increased Frequency condition there was a main effect of Deck, 3(1, 19) = 26.64, 
@!A = 19.89, ) < 0.01; a main effect of Time, 3(1, 19) = 8.49, @!A = 55.40, ) < 
0.01; but no interaction, 3(1, 19) = 1.68, @!A = 26.74, ) > 0.05.  In the Increased 
Frequency condition the selections from B were greater than from A, and the number 
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of selections from these disadvantageous decks was greater in the first hundred than 
the second hundred trials.  That this was not the case in the Decreased Frequency 
condition implies that participants in this condition did not discriminate between the 
two bad decks, whereas in the Increased Frequency condition they did.
Figure 3.5 shows the change in selections from each deck across trial blocks.  
In Figure 3.5a the change in selections from the disadvantageous decks follow the 
same trend in both conditions.  Selection from deck B begins well above chance in the 
first block, but by block 5 selection from B is below chance.  Selection from A 
remains below chance in both conditions.  However, in the second 100 trials 
differences emerge between the conditions.  Selection from both A and B increases in 
the Decreased Frequency condition, whereas they continue to decline in the Increased 
Frequency condition (although this is partly due to the increase in selection between 
blocks 5 and 6).  This difference in selection between conditions would appear to be 
what underlies the difference in learning between these conditions.  Figure 3.5b 
mirrors Figure 3.5a; selection in C and D increases in both conditions in the first 
hundred trials, but in the Decreased frequency condition selection from both declines 
in block 8 for deck D and block 9 for deck C.  In the Increased Frequency condition
selection from both decks continues to increase (although there is a dip in block 9 
from D), with selection from both ending above chance.
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Figure 3.4:  Mean number of cards selected from each deck across the first 100 and 
second 100 trials in the: A) the Decreased Frequency condition and B) the Increased 
Frequency condition. Error bars are the standard error of the mean.
B: Increased Frequency
A: Decreased Frequency
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Figure 3.5a:  Mean number of cards selected from the disadvantageous decks in each 
condition.  Error bars are the standard error of the mean.
A: Increased Frequency
B: Decreased Frequency
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Figure 3.5b:  Mean number of cards selected from the advantageous decks in each 
condition.  Error bars are the standard error of the mean.
B: Decreased Frequency
A: Increased Frequency
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Table 3.6 presents the change in selection (the slope, ,) from each deck in the 
first and second halves of the task.  The observations from Figure 3.5 are borne out.  
In the Decreased Frequency condition selection from the disadvantageous decks 
increases and selections from the advantageous decks decreases in the second hundred 
trials – the opposite to what happens in the Increased Frequency condition.  These 
differences in selection support the experimental hypothesis.  With a reduction in the 
overall frequency of losses (and a consequent increase in magnitude of loss), 
participants end the task with less differentiation between decks.
Table 3.6:  Mean selection rate from each deck in the first and second 100 trials in 
each condition.
Trial Decreased Frequency Increased Frequency
A
1 – 100 -.18 (.20) -.28 (.17)
101 – 200 .18 (.28) -.28 (.16)
B
1 – 100 -.84 (.27)  -.53 (.18)
101 – 200 .12 (.22) -.46 (.17)
C
1 – 100 .53 (.34) .61 (.33)      
101 – 200 -.05 (.23) .47 (.34)
D
1 – 100 .49 (.28) .20 (.27)    
101 – 200 -.25 (.17) .27 (.40)
41&.5 3'/-%.+ '* )$%.*&7.+.+ $%. &7. +&$*2$%2 .%%1% 1: &7. 8.$*?
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Figure 3.6:  Mean number of card selections across block from the disadvantageous 
decks with probability of loss of 0.3.  Error bars are the standard error of the mean.
It was noted that within the disadvantageous decks participants prefer the 
decks with the less frequent losses.  This is apparent in Figure 3.5a.  Figure 3.6 
displays selections from deck A in the Decreased Frequency condition and selections 
from deck B in the Increased Frequency condition.  These decks have the same 
probability of a loss, .3, but what differs between them is the context in which they 
are presented.  In the Increased Frequency condition this deck is preferred initially as 
it has the lowest probability of loss, although selection continues to decline across 
block, whereas in the Decreased Frequency condition this deck has the greatest 
frequency of loss and is selected below chance right up until the last two blocks.  
Figure 3.6 illustrates that participants initially prefer the disadvantageous deck with 
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the lowest frequency of loss.  In the Decreased Frequency condition this is not the 
case at the end of the task – perhaps because it is more difficult to avoid a deck that 
provides higher magnitude gains on seven out of ten trials.
!"!"4 5-2,+22-)&
Frequency of loss was manipulated in order to test the hypothesis that learning would 
be affected by the amount of information participants received about how good or bad 
their choices were.  This hypothesis received some support.  Although there was no 
difference in learning rate across all two hundred trials, in the second half of the task, 
learning rate was only greater than zero in the Increased Frequency condition.  In the 
Decreased Frequency condition it was negative.  
A more detailed examination of selection from the individual decks, revealed 
that although selection was similar between conditions in the first one hundred trials, 
in the second one hundred trials participants in the Decreased Frequency condition 
increased their selection from the disadvantageous decks, whereas in the Increased 
Frequency condition selection from these decks continued to decline.  At the end of 
the task participants in the Decreased Frequency condition were not selecting from 
any deck above or below chance at the end of the experiment, unlike in the Increased 
Frequency condition where there was preferential selection from the advantageous 
decks.  This result supports the experimental hypothesis.
It was hypothesized from the results of Experiment 4 that changes in selection 
from decks B and C drives learning on the IGT.  There was no sign of differential 
selection within the advantageous decks in either experimental condition.  However, 
participants do appear to prefer, at least initially, the disadvantageous deck with the 
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lower frequency of loss.  That this preference is associated with frequency of loss and 
not magnitude of loss was demonstrated in Figure 3.6 where selection from deck A in 
the Decreased Frequency condition was compared to deck B in the Increased 
Frequency condition.  Selection patterns from these decks with the same frequency 
and magnitude of loss differed between groups.  Participants in the Increased 
Frequency condition initially selected more from their deck B, while in the Decreased 
Frequency condition selection from their deck A remained below chance until the last 
two blocks.  The only difference between these decks was the context in which they 
were presented.  In the Increased Frequency condition, deck B still had the lower 
frequency of loss relative to the other disadvantageous deck.  A possible explanation 
for this difference, and the higher learning of this group, is that participants in the 
Increased Frequency condition encountered more losses earlier than participants in the 
Decreased Frequency group.  In the Decreased Frequency group, selections from deck 
B could go on unpunished for longer than selections from any other disadvantageous 
deck.  This is because in the original task’s fixed schedule of losses, the large 
infrequent loss in deck B occurs after nine selections of a large magnitude gain (in 
comparison to decks C and D).  In the random order of this experiment the schedules 
of loss were not the same for decreased loss frequency deck A and increased loss 
frequency deck B.  But the first loss was earlier in the modified deck A than in the 
modified deck B.  This suggests that the number of unpunished selections before a 
loss in the disadvantageous decks impacts on participants’ learning.
In conclusion, there was strong evidence that frequency of loss affects 
learning.  Participants in the Increased Frequency condition were preferentially 
selecting from the advantageous decks by the end of the Experiment while those in 
the Decreased Frequency condition were not.  There was evidence that participants 
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avoid the disadvantageous deck with the more frequent losses.  However, this result 
may have been confounded by the fixed order of losses within decks.
3.4 GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results from Experiment 4 supported the hypothesis that differential selection 
within the disadvantageous and advantageous decks was driving learning on the IGT.  
Participants learned to select from the advantageous deck more slowly when their 
choice was between deck C and deck B.  One possible reason for this was that 
participants found it easier to identify deck A as one of the worst decks because the 
frequency of loss was high, whereas in the advantageous decks deck C appeared 
better because when a frequent loss occurred it was often not a net loss.  
Experiment 5 tested the hypothesis that the frequency of loss was influencing 
learning on the IGT in two conditions.  In the Decreased Frequency condition, the 
identification of deck A as a bad deck and deck C as a good deck was made more 
difficult by reducing the frequency of loss from .5 to .3, while leaving the other decks
unchanged.  In the Increased Frequency condition, decks A and C were unaltered 
relative to the original schedules and the frequency of loss in decks B and D was 
increased from .1 to .3.  Although there were no significant differences between 
overall learning rates, only learning rate in the Increased Frequency condition was 
significantly greater than zero, supporting the experimental hypothesis.  In the 
Decreased Frequency condition there were no significant differences in selections 
from the bad decks suggesting that participants did not select preferentially from 
between these decks, whereas they did in the Increased Frequency condition.  This 
non-differential selection also appeared to affect participants’ selection in the 
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Decreased Frequency condition in the few blocks where selection from the 
disadvantageous decks increased, implying that these participants, on average, had not 
learned that decks A and B were disadvantageous.  However, another possibility is 
that they had learned that losses were infrequent and thought they could exploit it.  
This issue of participants’ knowledge will be returned to in Chapter 5.
That the frequency of punishment influences deck selection, at least in the 
disadvantageous decks, was further illustrated when selection from decks with the 
same frequency of loss were compared between the different conditions.  There was a 
clear decrease in selection from deck B, but little change across blocks for deck A 
(until the last two blocks).  The key difference between the decks was that deck B in 
the Increased Frequency condition had the lower frequency of loss relative to the 
other disadvantageous deck, whereas deck A in the Increased Frequency condition 
had a higher frequency of loss.  A similar comparison within the altered advantageous 
decks did not find any differences suggesting that the manipulations to these decks 
made it more likely that participants would not distinguish between these decks, but 
gradually increase selections from them.
The issue of what exactly participants are responding to on the IGT is an 
important one.  As Yechiam et al (2005a) found, differential selection may offer 
insights into what is affecting selection behaviour on the IGT.  Recently, Bechara et al 
(2000) have described a modification of the task (the A′B′C′D′ version) where the 
frequency of loss and the magnitude of losses and gains is altered in successive blocks 
of ten choices from each deck.  The manipulations make the differences in expected 
value between the disadvantageous and advantageous decks greater.  In deck A′ the 
frequency of loss is increased 10%, but the magnitude of loss remains the same.  In 
deck B′ it is the magnitude of loss that increases every ten cards while the frequency 
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of loss is unchanged.  The same pattern is followed in decks C′ and D′ except that the 
frequency of loss is reduced in deck C′ and the magnitude of loss is reduced in deck 
D′.  These changes would appear to make the task easier in that differentiation 
between what the worst decks are should be clearer.  This is certainly so for deck A′ 
where frequency of loss increases.  However, patients with VMpfc damage still 
perform below the level of healthy controls who, if anything, asymptote at a lower 
level of advantageous deck selections compared to the original task.  Performance 
was analysed using the standard net score measure and no mention was made of any 
differential selection within the advantageous and disadvantageous decks.  However, 
given the results of Experiments 4 and 5, closer examination of individual deck 
selection will reveal more information about what is influencing selection.  
Yechiam et al (2005a) found that high-level drug abusers showed differential 
deck selection behaviour.  Bechara et al (2002) have reported that both their substance 
abusing participants and healthy controls could be split depending on their 
performance on the A′B′C′D′ task.  However, they do not report any individual deck 
selection patterns and the possibility has not been ruled out that differences exist 
between the groups on these measures.  Bechara et al (2000) created a similar, but 
more complex, manipulation to their variant IGT, in that as well as gains being altered 
(equivalent to the A′B′C′D′ task changes), gains were also increased or decreased in 
the advantageous and disadvantageous decks respectively.  Performance on this task 
(E`F`G`H`) allowed Bechara et al (2002) to further divide their substance abusing 
population into those who were not impaired on either task, a subgroup who were 
impaired on this task and on A′B′C′D′, and those who were normal on E′F′G′H′ but 
had large physiological responses to reward.  They concluded that some substance 
abusers were hypersensitive to reward while others were myopic for future 
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consequences.  However, if there was differential selection behaviour between decks 
then these conclusions may be extended and even supported.  For example increased 
selection from deck B′ over deck A′, coupled with preference for G′ over E′ would 
support a conclusion of hypersensitivity to reward, whereas no differences in A′ and 
B′ selection and E′ and G′ selection would support their conclusion that participants 
are myopic for the future.  
As mentioned in the introduction, one of the problems with manipulations of 
the contingencies on the IGT is that gains, loss frequencies and magnitudes and 
expected values are all confounded with each other.  This interdependency of 
reinforcement magnitude, reinforcement frequency and expected value makes 
identifying the differential effects of each difficult.  Peters and Slovic (2000) 
successfully removed the confound that the largest magnitudes of reinforcement were 
in the disadvantageous decks, but their manipulation affected loss frequencies across 
the decks.  In support of an explanation of the importance of the frequency of loss 
selection was highest from the deck with the lowest losses.  They also found 
individual differences in performance in that selection of decks with high gains 
correlated with extraversion whereas selection of decks with low losses correlated 
with high scores on the behavioral inhibition system scale (BIS; Gray, 1970).  And as 
neither of their measures correlated with selection from the decks with the highest 
expected values the suggestion is that this is not the most important factor in 
determining deck selection.  However, the participants who completed the task in this 
study were the forty with the most extreme scores on the each measure (less than half 
the total who completed the initial questionnaires, meaning that these participants 
were a somewhat unrepresentative sample of the normal population even if their 
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performance suggests individual differences are important (again this point will be 
returned to in Chapter 5 with regard to participants’ knowledge of the task).
One of the reasons that deck B might be “preferred” so much more than deck 
A is that with the schedules of reinforcement in the original study, selection from 
deck B goes unpunished for eight consecutive card selections, whereas the first loss in 
deck A occurs on the third selection.  The same pattern is true in the advantageous 
decks although the first net loss on deck C occurs later than in deck A.  Thus, 
participants may develop a justifiable preference for the disadvantageous deck with 
the infrequent loss that is more difficult to overcome because of the unlikelihood of a 
loss from this deck, although when it comes it is massive.  The order of losses in this 
deck has gone at least some way to explaining the performance of VMpfc patients.  
Fellows and Farah (2005) found patient performance as measured by net score was no 
different from controls when the order of losses was altered so that the first loss in 
deck B occurred earlier.  The frequency of loss may contribute to preference for this 
deck but the schedule of losses is also important.  The use of fixed reinforcement 
schedules has been criticised by Dunn et al (2006) in their recent review of the 
clinical use of the IGT.  An implication of the order in which participants encounter 
losses is that the disadvantageous decks are actually the best decks up until the point 
the accumulated losses are greater than the accumulated gains (Maia and McClelland, 
2004).  Seen in this way selection from the deck with the infrequent loss is reasonable 
if the first loss occurs relatively late in that deck.  If this were the case then it would 
also account for the differential selection between decks A and C.  This issue will be 
explored further in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE NATURE OF THE REINFORCEMENT SCHEDULE 
INFLUENCES LEARNING
4.1 INTRODUCTION & OVERVIEW
The behaviour of healthy control participants on the IGT has typically seen rapid 
learning of the correct strategy that asymptotes at a level below exclusively optimal 
behaviour.  The results of the Experiments reported in Chapter 2 suggested that this is, 
in part, due to the instructions participants receive.  This behaviour is interesting 
because in arguably simpler choice environments, learning is slower and often does 
not result in optimal behaviour (Herrnstein et al, 1993; Tunney and Shanks, 2002).
As an example consider a binary choice environment in which selection of 
option ! is reinforced 30% of the time and option " is reinforced 70% of the time.  
This is a common scenario in probability learning tasks where the participants’ task is 
to make as many correct (i.e. reinforced) choices as possible.  The optimal strategy is, 
after a period of sampling, to select uniformly from the option with the high 
probability of reinforcement.  Such behaviour in the example environment would 
result in reinforcement with a probability of 0.7.  However, in the early days of 
experiments using such a task it was commonly observed that participants’ learning 
would reach asymptote with the proportion of choices matching the probability of 
reinforcement from each option (e.g. Neumark and Shuford, 1959).  This phenomenon 
is known as probability matching and is sub-optimal behaviour because the 
probability of reinforcement is (0.3 * 0.3 = 0.09) + (0.7 * 0.7 = 0.49) = 0.56, 
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substantially less than that obtained from exclusive choice of the high probability 
reinforcement (0.7).  Probability matching behaviour presented a challenge to 
adherents to expected utility theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) as a 
descriptive theory of human choice.
However, a number of criticisms of the methodology employed in the early 
probability matching experiments questioned whether matching behaviour really was 
sub-optimal.  One criticism that applies directly to the nature of the IGT was that the 
probability of reinforcement was not independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) 
across all choices, i.e. they were not truly random (Myers, 1976; Vulkan, 2000). 
Fiorini (1971) showed that sampling without replacement within blocks of trials alters 
the probability of reinforcement within blocks.  This means that the maximizing 
strategy of selecting only one option does not necessarily provide the most 
reinforcement.   Because randomisation without replacement within blocks alters the 
probability of reinforcement, patterns of reinforcement can emerge between blocks.  If 
participants are searching for a selection strategy, or if they do not believe the 
experimenter’s claim that reinforcement is random, they may find at least enough of 
the pattern to encourage non-exclusive choice.  And while this may look like 
probability matching to an experimenter who does not realise that the reinforcement 
environment is not random, for the subject, non-exclusive choice might actually 
approach an optimal strategy (Fiorina, 1971).  
Jones and Myers (1966) found that people chose the reinforced response more
when the trials in a probability learning task were randomised in short blocks (e.g. 20 
trials) than when they were randomised in long blocks (e.g. 300 trials).  The reason 
for this was due to the distribution of sequential dependencies - the distribution of 
runs of reinforcement of the same option.  Randomization of reinforcement in short 
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blocks made the occurrence of long runs of reinforcement of one option unlikely.  As 
a  result participants exhibited more negative recency - the selection of the opposite 
option to the one previously reinforced with longer runs of reinforcement for that 
option.  This indicates that with randomisation in short blocks participants are better 
able to predict the contingencies of the reinforcement schedule in probability 
matching experiments. 
The findings from probability matching experiments apply to the IGT because 
the occurrence of reinforcements (losses) are fixed within ten-trial blocks.  This 
means that the probability of loss is not independent and identically distributed across 
all selections from the decks.  This may make the task easier to learn.  The probability 
of loss fluctuates within blocks of selections from each deck contingent upon the 
number of choices that have been made from that deck and the number of losses 
encountered within that block.  Consider the example of ten selections from deck A 
on the IGT as presented in the original Bechara et al (1994) study.  The probability of 
loss from this deck is ostensibly 0.5 and viewed across a ten-trial block there are five 
losses per 10 cards.  The reinforcement pattern on deck A is WWLWLWLWLL, 
where W is a win and L is a loss.  However, the probability of loss changes within this 
block thus: 
Loss/cards remaining: 5/10, 5/9, 5/8, 4/7, 4/6, 3/5, 3/4, 2/3, 2/2, 1/1, or
#(loss): 0.5, 0.55, 0.63, 0.57, 0.66, 0.60, 0.75, 1.0, 1.0
With the probability of loss contingent on the number of cards selected within a block 
of ten cards, on the ninth and tenth selection a loss is guaranteed.  Similarly, for the 
decks with low frequency of loss (B and D), the probability of loss within a block of 
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ten cards increases with selection from that deck until the loss is encountered, and 
then becomes zero until that block ends.  The probability matching experiments 
suggest that such a pattern might affect participants’ behaviour although the pattern of 
reinforcement is complex (blocks of ten cards and four decks of cards provide a mass 
of permutations to mask any pattern).  But the regularity with which losses are 
encountered within ten card blocks on decks may make their frequency more 
conspicuous.  With such fixed schedules, in decks A and C the number of loss-free 
trials can be no greater than 5, and in practice are no greater than 3, while in decks B 
and D it is no greater than 9.   This contingent learning environment results in non-
normal distributions of loss-free runs in each deck and may be an important factor in 
the rapid learning observed on the IGT.  
These observations also apply to Bechara et al’s (2000) variant IGT mentioned 
in Chapter 1. In this version of the IGT, the task is switched from the domain of gains 
to the domain of losses.  Bechara et al (2000) interpreted the behaviour of VMpfc 
patients on this task as supportive of their myopia for the future hypothesis in that 
they were impaired relative to the healthy controls.  But the selections these patients
made were not reliably different from chance on any trial and mean net score 
increased with block.  This is not commensurate with insensitivity to future 
consequences and suggests learning may occur with sufficient experience.  This poses 
the question of why the behaviour of these patients differs between tasks.
One possibility is that the variant task is easier than the standard IGT.  The 
behaviour of healthy controls is informative.  In block 1 on the variant IGT net score 
was not reliably different from chance, whereas it was reliably below chance in the 
standard IGT (Bechara et al, 2000).   Net score then increased towards an asymptote 
above chance after 60 trials in the variant task meaning learning rate was positive but 
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not as large as in the standard version.  The steeper slope in the standard task is due to 
the initial preference for the “bad” decks on this task.  Given the results of  the 
previous Experiments this probably reflects a preference for deck B.  Fellows and 
Farah (2005) suggested that a reversal learning deficit is behind the behaviour of 
VMpfc patients on the standard IGT.  They modified the standard IGT by changing 
the order in which the first losses occurred.  They took the first eight cards and put 
them to the bottom of the deck.  This resulted in the first card selected from deck B 
providing an immediate loss.  A further change to this deck (switching card 14 with 
card 11) meant that on the third selection from deck B a further loss was received.  
Fellows and Farah (2005) reported that on the standard task, VMpfc patients’ 
performance was impaired compared to controls, although not at the level of that 
reported of VM patients in the Iowa group (6 of 9 of Fellows and Farah’s VMpfc 
patients selected > 50 cards from the advantageous decks).  On their modified task, 
the behaviour of VMpfc patients was not significantly different from controls.  One 
consequence of changing the order of losses in the fixed schedules is that the expected 
value of deck B becomes much more negative for the first block of ten cards. With 
two losses in the first three cards the frequency of loss as experienced by most 
participants is also not representative of the probability of loss as in the original task.  
Consequently, the manipulation does illustrate the importance of when the first losses 
occur and supports the hypothesis that a reversal learning deficit may explain VMpfc 
patient performance on the standard IGT.  
It is notable that on the variant task the first win is earlier in the schedules for 
the good decks (E and G) than for the bad decks (F and H), and that compared to the 
standard task, the deck with the infrequent large win (deck E) provides this 
reinforcement much earlier (after 3 selections rather than 9).  Thus the superior early 
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performance of healthy controls (Bechara et al, 2000) in the variant task may be an 
artefact of the reinforcement schedule.  In Fellows and Farah’s (2005) manipulated 
version of the standard IGT the number of advantageous cards selected by healthy 
controls was significantly above chance in the first block and remained stable across 
subsequent blocks.  This suggests that the earlier placement of the events that are 
informative about the nature of a deck is a key determinant of the number of 
selections made from that deck. 
The Experiments in this Chapter explore whether the nature of the 
reinforcement schedules, rather than their contingencies, affect learning on the IGT. 
In Experiment 6, the standard version of the IGT is used but the contingencies within 
each deck are independent and identically distributed across all cards.  The results 
from the previous Experiments have shown the loss frequency results in differential 
selection between decks.  As behaviour on the variant IGT has been used to support 
Bechara et al’s (2000, 2001) conclusion that patients with VMpfc damage are myopic 
for future consequences it is important to understand whether what influences choice 
in this task varies in the same way as in the standard task.  In Experiments 7 and 8 
manipulations are made to the reinforcement schedules on the variant version of the 
IGT.  Experiment 7 manipulates the fixed order of reinforcement in the variant task to 
match that of the standard task.  While learning is still rapid, participants’ pattern of 
selection is changed.  In Experiment 8 the effect of using probabilistic reinforcement 
schedules on learning on the variant IGT is examined.
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4.2 EXPERIMENT 6
NO LEARNING ON A PROBABILISTIC VERSION OF THE IGT
!"#"$ %&'()*+,'-)&
Experiment 6 was designed to examine behaviour when the deck schedules on the 
IGT are independent and identically distributed.  No previous research has used such 
schedules on the IGT.  Some authors have randomised the occurrence of losses within 
the ten-trial blocks (e.g. Crone et al, 2004; Crone and Wagenmakers, personal
communication).  They have done this to counterbalance order effects across 
individuals while ensuring that the experienced payoffs are representative of the 
desired contingencies.  However, the occurrence of losses is still constrained within 
blocks of ten trials.  This method does mean that, like the fixed order schedules, 
reinforcements are not independent and identically distributed.  This change to the 
methodology is better experimental practice as the occurrence of losses are 
randomised across participants and so not in the same fixed order.  However, this 
change does not fundamentally alter the schedules and they remain deterministic 
because the informative events still only vary within ten-trial blocks.  
The investigation of schedule type is also relevant to the claim that the IGT 
“simulates real-life decision-making in the way it factors uncertainty, rewards, and 
penalties” (Bechara et al, 1997a, p.1293).  It could be argued that truly randomised 
fixed probability reinforcement schedules are much more realistic.  Given the 
evidence from probability matching experiments cited in the Chapter introduction, it 
was predicted that when the events in the reinforcement schedules are independent 
and identically distributed (henceforth referred to as probabilistic), the task will be 
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made harder such that participants will fail to distinguish between the advantageous 
and disadvantageous decks.
!"#"# ./'0)*
To determine if manipulating the schedules had any effect on learning the same 
experimental design employed in the Real Money – Hint condition of Experiment 3 
was used.  The only changes in methodology were made to the reinforcement 
schedules where the occurrence of losses was made probabilistic.
$%&'()(#%*'+
Twenty-two participants were recruited from the undergraduate and postgraduate 
populations at the University of Nottingham.  Two participants failed to turn up for 
the second session and their data were excluded from the analysis.  Participants were 
recruited through a poster advertisement that offered participants the opportunity to 
earn up to £6 by taking part in a cognitive psychology experiment.
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A modified version of the computerised version of the IGT using real money 
reinforcers was created and run on a PC.  The modifications made the probability of 
losses within each decks independent and identically distributed. This meant that for 
every selection of deck A, the probability of receiving a loss was 0.5 and on deck B 
the probability of a loss was 0.1 etc.  Loss magnitudes, where they varied in the 
original task, were selected randomly if a loss occurred.  In the fixed-schedule task ten 
selections from Deck A would encounter five losses of amount -£0.15, -£0.20, -£0.25, 
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-£0.30 and -£0.35.  On the probabilistic schedule a loss with probability 0.5 would 
have an equal chance of being one of the five loss amounts for this deck.  Similarly on 
deck C, the three loss amounts of -£0.025, -£0.05 and -£0.075 were equally likely if a 
selection resulted in a loss.  Losses were always -£1.25 on deck B and -£0.25 on deck 
D.  In all other respects the task was unchanged from the previous versions where 
fixed schedules of reinforcement were used.  Real money reinforcers were used and 
have been described in the procedure for Experiment 3.
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A repeated measures design was utilised where participants’ deck selections in each 
of five twenty-trial Blocks in two experimental Sessions were the repeated factors.  
Participants’ performance was assessed by calculating a net score from the number of 
cards selected from the advantageous decks (A and B) minus the number selected 
from the disadvantageous decks (C and D).  From this measure the slope, 0, was 
calculated as an estimate of learning rate.
$&1).2,&.
The procedure followed exactly that of the Real Money – Hint condition in 
Experiment 3.  As such participants were informed that “some decks are worse than 
others.  You may find all of them bad, but some are worse than others.  No matter 
how much you find yourself losing you can still win if you stay away from the worst 
decks” (Bechara et al, 1999; Bechara et al, 2000).  
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Table 4.1: Mean probability of loss and received value (in pence) for each deck in 
each session in Experiment 6.
#(loss) Received Value
Session 1 Session 2 Session 1 Session 2
A 0.54 (0.04) 0.67 (0.04) -4.12 (1.31) -6.88 (1.30)
B 0.10 (0.01) 0.11 (0.01) -2.87 (1.78) -3.16 (1.58)
C 0.51 (0.03) 0.55 (0.05) 2.40 (0.14) 1.87 (0.34)
D 0.17 (0.05) 0.14 (0.02) 0.62 (1.15) 1.95 (0.51)
31'.4  5(/,&.+ (* #%&.*'6.+.+ %&. '6. +'%*2%&2 .&&1& 17 '6. 8.%*9
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The net score for each participant was calculated in both sessions.  Additionally, net 
score was calculated in blocks of twenty trials for each participant allowing the 
change in net score across time, the slope 0, to be calculated as an estimate of learning 
rate.  To ensure that deck contingencies were similar to those of previous Experiments 
the probability of loss and the received value on each deck were calculated for each 
participant in each session.  Table 4.1 displays the mean probability of loss and mean 
received value for each deck.  With fixed schedules and uniform selection and 
experience of each deck, decks A and B would have an expected value of -£0.025 and 
decks C and D would have an expected value of £0.025.  In Experiment 6 the 
probabilistic randomisation of losses resulted in more variability in the deck 
contingencies.  Mean received values were more disadvantageous in decks A and B in 
each session, and slightly less advantageous in deck C and D.  However, despite this 
variability, the nature of the decks remains the same as in previous experiments.  
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Mean loss amounts in decks A and C were similar to the mean amounts of the original 
task so are not considered further.  As in Chapter 2, performance in each session is 
discussed separately.   
IGT - Probabilistic schedule
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Figure 4.1:  Mean net score across 20-trial blocks for each session in Experiment 6 
(Probabilistic reinforcement schedules).  The dashed line represents chance selection, 
or no preference for either advantageous or disadvantageous decks.  Error bars are the 
standard error of the mean.
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Figure 4.1 displays the mean net score across block in each session and across the 
whole experiment.  Mean net score in session 1 was -6.2 (:- = 37.81).  A one-sample 
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'-test found that this was not significantly different from chance, '(19) < 1.0, :- =
37.81, # > 0.05.  
Two measures can be used to determine whether learning occurred in session 
1.  The mean net score in the final block of twenty trials was compared to chance and 
not found to be significantly greater than chance, '(19) < 1.0, :- = 10.77, # > 0.05, 
indicating that with probabilistic reinforcement schedules participants do not show a 
preference for the decks C and D after one hundred trials.  Examination of Figure 4.1 
suggests that although participants did not end session 1 with a preference for the 
good decks, the change in selection from them may be increasing.  The possibility that 
learning rate increased across the session was assessed using Lorch and Myers (1990) 
regression analysis for repeated measures designs.  Mean learning rate was estimated 
from the slope, 0, and in session 1 was 2.07 (:- = 3.21).  This was significantly 
greater than zero, '(19) = 2.89, # < 0.01.  While participants did not preferentially 
select from the advantageous decks at the end of session 1, the increase in learning 
rate over the session indicates that this would occur with more exposure.
:.++(1* <
The mean net score in session 2 was 3.7 (:- = 41.14).  A one sample '-test found that 
this was not significantly greater than zero, '(19) < 1.0.  A paired samples '-test 
compared net score between sessions and revealed no significant difference '(19) < 
1.0, :- = 49.32, # < 0.05.  Despite a shift between sessions from a negative to a 
positive mean net score, and the expectation of improved performance predicted from
the increasing learning rate in session 1, mean net score for the session did not reflect 
a preference for the advantageous decks.  Examination of Figure 4.1 shows that this 
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Figure 4.2:  Mean total cards selected from each deck in each session of Experiment 
6.  Error bars are the standard error of the mean.  The dashed line represents selection 
at chance.
may be because of the exceptionally low net score in block 6.  This low net score is 
not predicted from the increasing learning rate found in session 1 and suggests that by 
the end of the first session participants have not learned which decks are 
advantageous.  Another interpretation is that the low value in block 6 reflects 
exploration behaviour by participants.  It is possible that they did not trust the 
Experimenter’s assertion that the task was unchanged from the first session.  
However, there is a rapid increase in net score across the session, which suggests that 
participants do at least learn to make fewer selections from decks A and B.  A 
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regression analysis using the Lorch and Myers (1990) method was run and determined 
that mean learning rate, estimated using the slope 	, was 1.68 (σM = 0.92).  This was 
not significantly different from zero, '(19) = 1.83, :- =  4.11, # = 0.08.  By examining 
participants’ selections in the final block of the experiment it can be determined if 
learning, as indicated by a preference for the advantageous decks, had developed.  Net 
score in block 10 was compared to zero using a one sample '-test and was not 
significantly different from zero, '(19) < 1, :- = 14.16, # > 0.05.  These results 
suggest that when probabilistic reinforcement schedules are used participants do not 
learn to select preferentially from decks C and D.  Looking at the number of cards 
selected from each deck supports this conclusion.  Figure 4.2 shows that in both 
sessions participants made most selections from decks B and D, with selection from B 
greater than chance.  However, some indication that participants are learning 
something about the nature of the task is found in the increase in selections from deck 
C between sessions, while selections from the other decks decrease.
!"#"! 5-3,+33-)&
The results from Experiment 6 suggest that probabilistic reinforcement schedules 
make it hard for participants to learn preferential selection from decks C and D.  Yet 
there were signs that participants did increase the number of cards selected from the 
advantageous decks across each session.  This resulted in a learning rate that was 
significantly greater than zero in session 1 and almost reached significance in session 
2.  The pattern of net score across block in session 1 is similar to that seen in the 
previous experiments using fixed reinforcement schedules, although in the current 
experiment there is more selection from A and B in the first blocks of session 1.  One 
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Figure 4.3:  The range of participants’ net scores in both sessions of Experiment 6.
possible explanation for this difference in behaviour is that with the probabilistic 
schedules some participants do not encounter as many losses on decks A and B as do 
others.  Until sufficient losses are encountered to outweigh the continual high reward, 
decks A and B are actually the more profitable alternatives (Maia and McClelland, 
2004).  This should be especially true of deck B where the probability of a loss is 
much lower and so the possibility of continued selection without loss is greater than in 
deck A.  This is the likely location for the effect of probabilistic schedules on learning 
and it may account for the large change in selection between sessions that is apparent 
in Figure 4.1.  Despite mean received values that showed decks A and B were 
disadvantageous and C and D were advantageous, the fluctuation in received value 
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across trials is greater with the probabilistic schedule than in the previous fixed 
schedule experiments.  This may be partly why preferential selection for decks C and 
D does not develop across the group.  In Figure 4.1 the variance in net score increases 
with trial block.  This reflects the increased divergence in selection between 
participants for whom the advantageous decks are the best decks and those for whom 
the disadvantageous decks are not necessarily disadvantageous.
Figure 4.3 depicts the net scores of individual participants in both sessions.  In 
session 1 55% of the participants had a negative net score (* = 11) while 45% had a 
positive net score (* = 9).  Table 4.2 displays the mean probability of loss and mean 
received value for each deck for participants with a positive and negative net score in 
session 1 and in session 2.  For participants with a preference for decks A or B, those 
with a negative net score, selecting from deck B was rewarding and selecting from 
deck D was not.  The opposite is true in participants with a positive net score, those 
with a preference for deck C or D.  Session 1 performance in this IGT with 
probabilistic schedules may be better than represented in Figure 4.1.  Participants with 
a negative net score, as a result of selecting more from deck B, are doing so because it 
is a more rewarding deck than deck D.  This is illustrated in Figures 4.4 and 4.5, 
where the mean received value within each block (filled circles) and the mean number 
of selections (open circles) from each deck is displayed for participants with a positive 
net score (Figure 4.4) and a negative net score (Figure 4.5).  Like Figure 4.2, Figures 
4.4 and 4.5 show that participants generally avoided deck A in both sessions, while 
selection from deck C was also generally below chance in session 1 (chance selection 
is presented by the dashed line).  The differences between the participants split on the 
net score measure lie mainly in their selections from decks B and D.  In the first 
block, when participants generally sample from all the decks, for participants with a 
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Table 4.2: Mean expected value and probability of loss for each deck in each session 
of Experiment 6 for participants with a positive or negative net score.
p(loss) Received Value
Group Session 1 Session 2 Session 1 Session 2
A
Positive 0.53 (0.07) 0.65 (0.05) -3.41 (2.16) -6.08 (1.35)
Negative 0.55 (0.04) 0.70 (0.08) -4.83 (1.57) -7.77 (2.35)
B 
Positive 0.13 (0.05) 0.12 (0.02) -6.43 (3.00) -4.46 (2.41)
Negative 0.07 (0.01) 0.09 (0.02) 0.69 (1.24) -1.56 (1.94)
C
Positive 0.56 (0.03) 0.54 (0.07) 2.20 (0.14) 1.97 (0.41)
Negative 0.47 (0.05) 0.57 (0.10) 2.59 (0.23) 1.71 (0.65)
D
Positive 0.10 (0.02) 0.12 (0.02) 2.11 (0.62) 2.47 (0.54)
Negative 0.24 (0.09) 0.15 (0.04) -0.88 (2.18) 1.25 (0.96)
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positive net score the mean received value within block 1 from selecting deck B was 
negative, while it was positive for deck D (the dotted line represents a received value 
of 0).  Participants in this group show a decrease in selection from deck B and an 
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increase in selection from deck D to levels below and above chance respectively.  
Because the mean received value from deck B generally stays below zero and the 
mean received value from deck D is generally greater than zero, these are 
advantageous choices.  The increase in selection from deck C with block also 
contributes to these participants’ positive net scores.
For participants with a negative net score, the mean received value in the first 
block was positive for deck B and negative for deck D.  Many of these participants 
did not encounter a loss in their initial selections from deck B but did so on deck D.  
Mean received value for deck B stays above zero for blocks 1 to 3, driving selection 
from deck B that remains well above chance despite a decrease in the later blocks of 
the session.  The increase in selection from deck D follows an increase in the mean 
received value from this deck.  While, the received value is dependent on the number 
of selections, frequency of loss and the loss amount, if there are no losses on some 
decks then it is sensible to continue to pick from these decks.  What Figure 4.5 shows 
is that participants with a negative net score have a negative net score because they 
make the majority of their selections from deck B.  And for the majority of these 
participants deck B is an advantageous choice because it has both a large immediate 
gain and a positive received value.
Group membership changed between sessions as four participants who had a 
negative net score in session 1 selected more cards from decks C and D in session 2, 
while two participants moved from a preference for deck D to selecting more from 
deck B.  In these two cases, the initial selections in session 2 from the previously 
reinforcing deck D resulted in losses.  In the same block there were very few, if any, 
losses on deck B, although a sufficient number were encountered across the task for 
the deck to be a disadvantageous choice.  These participants experienced a change in 
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the occurrence of losses between sessions on a deck they had learned to prefer.  This 
perhaps made them doubt the experimenter’s claim that nothing had changed, 
resulting in more exploratory behaviour.  It also suggests that these participants had 
not learned why deck D was advantageous.  Discussion of participants’ knowledge 
will be addressed in Chapter 59
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Figure 4.4:  Mean received value and mean number of selections in each 20-
trial block for participants with a mean net score ? 0.  In session 1 ! = 9.  In 
session 2 ! = 11.  Error bars are the standard error of the mean.
Figure 4.4:  Mean receiv  l  ean number of sel ctions in each 20-trial 
block for participants with a mean net score ≥ 0.  In session 1 ! = 9.  In session 2 
! = 11.  Error bars are the standard error of the mean.
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Figure 4.5:  Mean received value and mean number of selections in each 20-trial 
block for participants with a mean net score < 0.  In session 1 ! = 11.  In session 
2 ! = 9.  Error bars are the standard error of the mean.
Table 4.2 shows that, unlike in session 1, in session 2 for both groups, decks C 
and D have the largest received values.  These values are higher for participants with 
a positive net score while received value for deck B is more negative.  Figures 4.4 and 
4.5 show a similar pattern of reinforcement and selection behaviour as was described 
for session 1.  For participants with negative net scores deck B is initially reinforcing 
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enough to maintain preferential selection above chance.  It is plausible that the 
absence of losses that drives the initial positive received value for deck B, which was 
also experienced through much of session 1, makes it difficult for participants to 
identify deck B as a disadvantageous deck.  For most of these participants, the 
occasional large losses mean deck B is a more favourable option than a switch to 
selection from deck C, as observed in participants with a positive net score.  
The results from Experiment 6 suggest that deck B is the important deck in 
IGT selection.  As with the earlier Experiments participants readily identify the 
disadvantageous deck with more frequent losses (A) as a bad choice.  Initial 
preference for deck B is followed by a decline in selection as losses are encountered,
as reflected in the behaviour of participants with a positive net score in this 
Experiment.  If insufficient losses are encountered on this deck then, because of the 
large immediate gain from selecting it, it is clearly the best deck to select from.  So 
much so that even with increased frequency of loss in later blocks (and decreased 
received value) selection persists.  
Experiment 6 has shown that participants do not learn to select advantageously 
when, arguably more realistic, probabilistic reinforcement schedules are used on the 
IGT.  This has some implications for learning using the standard IGT schedules that 
concern the occurrence of losses on deck B.  This is linked to the explanation offered 
by Fellows and Farah (2005) for the behaviour of participants with VMpfc damage.  
When the original fixed schedules were altered so that participants encountered the 
initial losses on deck B earlier, the behaviour of patients with VMpfc damage was no 
different to that of healthy controls.  Net scores for these controls were never near 
chance values indicating that they had learned all they needed to succeed on the task 
in the first block.  That patients with VMpfc patients did not do so on the standard 
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version of the task, Fellows and Farah (2005) suggested was due to a deficit in 
reversal learning.  This contention is explored further in Experiment 7 using the 
variant version of the IGT.
4.3 EXPERIMENT 7
THE VARIANT IGT – ORDER OF LOSSES AFFECTS LEARNING
!"1"$ %&'()*+,'-)&
The previous experiments have shown that normal participants readily learn to avoid 
deck A, but it takes longer to learn to avoid deck B.  The results from Experiment 6 
suggested that when the first losses on a deck occur are the key determinants of 
further selection from that deck.  This is especially true for deck B because the gains 
are large and the losses infrequent.  When the occurrence of these losses is 
independent and identically distributed over all selections from decks, participants 
who encounter losses earlier make fewer choices from this deck.  The importance of 
the number of selections without loss on IGT behaviour has been recognised by 
Fellows and Farah (2005).  These authors suggested that patients with VMpfc damage 
have a deficit in reversal learning wherein they cannot reverse initial preference for 
the disadvantageous decks.  This contrasts with the Iowa group’s hypothesis that these 
patients’ behaviour is the result of insensitivity to future consequences (Bechara et al, 
2000), an explanation that fits in with their behaviour in their daily life (Damasio, 
1994). The behaviour of healthy controls on these tasks suggests that the variant task 
is easier to learn and one reason may be the information received in the first selections 
from a deck.  Experiment 7 tests the hypothesis that the order in which informative 
167
reinforcing events are encountered within fixed reinforcement schedules influences 
selection behaviour, and therefore learning, on the IGT.  If the order in which gains 
are encountered is unimportant, as implied by the assumption of a maximizing system 
and in the calculation of the net score measure, then selection from each deck with the 
same expected value (the same long term outcome) should be similar.  However, if 
deck selection mirrors that found in the examination of the standard IGT then this 
assumption cannot be supported.  This hypothesis is tested by altering the variant 
version of the IGT so that the infrequent informative events (the wins) occur in the 
same order in each deck as the losses occurred in each deck in the standard version of 
the task.  If the manipulation has no effect, learning as measured by net score should 
still be found and above chance selection from each of the good decks should result. 
!"1"# ./'0)*
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Twenty-three participants were recruited from the undergraduate and postgraduate 
populations of the University of Nottingham.  Three participants failed to return for 
the second session and their data were excluded from the analysis.  Participants were 
recruited through a poster advertisement that offered participants the opportunity to 
earn up to £6 by taking part in a cognitive psychology experiment.
!##%&%',+
The experiment took the same format as in the Real Money – Hint condition of 
Experiment 3 with the exception that the variant version of the IGT was used 
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(Bechara et al, 2000).  Instead of earning money with every card selection, 
participants lost money.  This amount was ten pence in decks E and G and five pence 
in decks F and H.  As in Bechara et al (2000) decks E and G were advantageous as the 
amount won exceeded the amount lost and decks F and H were disadvantageous as 
the amount won was less than the amount lost.  The schedules of reinforcement were 
altered so that they were exactly analagous to those used in Experiment 3b and in 
Bechara et al (1994).  The major change that resulted from this was that the first win 
on deck E moved from the third to the ninth selection from that deck, making the 
occurrence of the first win on that deck synonymous with the first loss on deck B in 
the schedules used in the previous Experiments (see Appendix C). 
-.+(/*
A repeated measures design was used where participants’ deck selections in each of 
five twenty-trial Blocks in two experimental sessions were the repeated factors.  
Participants’ performance was assessed by calculating a net score from the number of 
cards selected from the advantageous decks (E and G) minus the number selected 
from the disadvantageous decks (F and H).  In addition, following the results of the 
previous Experiments individual deck selection was also examined.
$&1).2,&.
The procedure followed that of the Real Money – Hint condition of Experiment 3.  
The necessary alterations were made to all verbal and written instructions to reflect 
the change from the standard to the variant IGT.  
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Net score was calculated by subtracting the number of cards selected from decks F 
and H from the number selected from E and G.  Net score was calculated in both 
sessions for each participant.  Additionally, net score was calculated in blocks of 
twenty trials for each participant allowing the change in net score across time, the 
slope 
, to be calculated as an estimate of learning rate.  Figure 4.6 displays the mean 
net score across block in each session and across the whole experiment.  As in 
previous experiments performance in each session will be discussed separately.  
:.++(1* ;
Mean net score in session 1 was 4.7 (:- = 52.72).  A one sample '-test found that this 
was not significantly different from zero, '(19) < 1.0, :- = 52.72, # > 0.05.  To 
investigate whether learning occurred across the session learning rate was estimated 
for each participant and compared to zero using the Lorch and Myers (1990) 
regression analysis for repeated measures designs.  Mean learning rate was 1.70 (:- = 
2.30) and significantly greater than zero, '(19) = 3.31, :- = 2.30, # < 0.01, indicating 
that as experience with the task increased, selection from decks F and H decreased.  
To investigate whether this learning had developed into a preference for decks E and 
G at the end of the session a one sample '-test compared mean net score in the final 
block of session 1 to chance.  There was no significant difference,  '(19) < 1.0, :- = 
12.16, # > 0.05, indicating that while participants shifted their selection away from 
decks F and H, they did not prefer decks E and G after 100 card selections.
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Figure 4.6: Mean net score across 20-trial blocks for each session in Experiment 7 
(reversed IGT with fixed schedules).  The dashed line represents chance selection, or 
no preference for either advantageous or disadvantageous decks.  Error bars are the 
standard error of the mean.  
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Mean net score in session 2 was 23.7 (:- = 65.01). A one sample '-test found that this 
was not significantly greater than zero '(19) = 1.63, :- = 65.01, # > 0.05.  A paired 
samples '-test compared net score between sessions and revealed that net score in 
session 2 was significantly greater than net score in session 1, '(19) = -2.46, :- = 
34.55, # < 0.05.  Figure 4.6 shows that selection in the second session is mainly from 
decks E and G, and net score is above chance in all blocks except the first.  Net score 
does not increase after block 7 and asymptotes at a value of around 6.  For this reason 
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it is no surprise that learning rate was not significantly greater than zero,  = 0.68,
'(19) = 1.27, :- = 2.39, # > 0.05.  It is surprising that although mean net score in the 
final block is smaller than in the previous blocks, it was not significantly greater than 
zero as revealed by a one sample '-test, '(19) = 1.45, :- = 14.19, # > 0.05.  These 
results reflect the large variability in individual selection.  Figure 4.7 depicts the range 
of participants’ net scores in both sessions.  Three participants clearly show a 
preference for one or both of decks F and H that does not change with experience on 
the task.  In fact, one of these participants (HF) chose from deck H on almost every 
selection, one (HM) chose from F on almost every selection, and one (PJ) chose 
mostly from F but also sampled from H.  Excluding these participants the majority 
have a positive net score and thus a preference for decks E, G or both.  The presence 
of these three participants increases the variance in net score, which resulted in the 
large mean net score for the group that was not significantly greater than zero.
Figure 4.8 depicts the number of cards selected from each deck in each session 
of Experiment 7.  It shows that participants avoid deck E and that most selection is 
from the cards with frequent wins (decks F and G) with substantially greater selection 
from G than from any other deck.  Deck G is the only deck from which selection is 
increased between sessions.  A similar pattern was observed in Experiment 3 on the 
standard IGT where selection from deck C was observed to increase between sessions.  
These results show again the pattern of differential selection from the disadvantageous 
decks that was reported in Experiments 1 to 5.  Additionally, selection from the 
advantageous decks is not uniform.  As hypothesised this is influenced by the position 
in the fixed order of cards of the less frequent reinforcer.
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Figure 4.7:  The range of participants’ net scores in both sessions of Experiment 7.
Table 4.3 presents the mean probability of win and mean received value for 
each deck experienced by participants in each session of Experiment 7.  The below 
chance selection from decks E and H, depicted in Figure 4.8, is reflected in a 
probability of win that is lower than the description of these decks commonly given in
the literature.  These measures are related; with a fixed schedule if insufficient cards 
are chosen then less wins will be experienced and the probability of a win will be 
decreased.  In the case of deck E this resulted in many participants not experiencing a 
win on deck E, which in turn resulted in the large negative expected value shown in 
Table 4.3.  The manipulation of the placement of the first win in this deck thus 
affected the number of cards chosen from it, the deck contingencies reported here and 
173
consequently the measure of learning determined from net score.  However, the large 
standard errors for deck E in each session indicate that for some participants, deck E 
was actually an advantageous deck.  This required perseverance through eight non-
rewarded selections.
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Figure 4.8: the number of cards selected from each deck in each session of 
Experiment 7.  Error bars are the standard error of the mean.  The dashed line 
represents chance selection.
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Table 4.3: Mean probability of win and received value for each deck in each session 
in Experiment 7.
p(win) Received Value
Session 1 Session 2 Session 1 Session 2
E 0.04 (0.01) 0.05 (0.02) -5.21 (1.52) -2.97 (2.04)
F 0.46 (0.01) 0.40 (0.03) -2.76 (0.06) -3.01 (0.17)
G 0.45 (0.04) 0.48 (0.03) 1.05 (0.93) 2.03 (0.71)
H 0.05 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) -3.85 (0.25) -4.39 (0.24) 
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The fixed order of wins used by Bechara et al (2000) in their variant IGT was altered 
in Experiment 7 to match the fixed order of losses used in the equivalent decks on the 
standard version of the IGT.  On the variant task used by Bechara et al (2000) learning 
is rapid and above chance selection from the advantageous decks is found from the 
second block onwards.  In the version used in Experiment 7 the deck contingencies 
were exactly the same i.e. decks in each version have the same expected values and 
the same probability of win.  All that was manipulated was the fixed order in which 
the informative events, the wins, occurred in each deck with specific interest on the 
deck with the infrequent but large magnitude event (deck E).  The manipulation of the 
fixed order of wins resulted in selection from E that was significantly below chance as 
illustrated in Figure 4.8.  This is very like the pattern of selection from deck A on the 
standard task, but instead of making the task easier, the manipulation made it harder 
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for participants to idenitfy deck E as an advantageous deck.  This in turn made the 
task more difficult.  The below chance selection on deck E results because many 
participants stop selecting from this deck before they encounter the first win.  This is 
reflected in the values for the mean probability of loss and the mean received value 
for deck E, shown in Table 4.3, that are below what would occur with selections 
numbering in multiples of ten.  This result illustrates the importance of the order in 
which informative events are placed within the decks on IGT performance as 
measured using the change in net score.  These results extend, using the variant IGT, 
those of Fellows and Farah (2005) using the standard IGT.
Despite below chance selection from one of the advantageous decks, evidence 
that participants’ performance did improve both within and across sessions was found 
using the net score measure.  This improvement was driven by selection from deck G 
that was significantly greater than chance and occurred despite participants showing 
some preference for deck F over decks E and H.  It is of note that, in general, 
participants avoided the decks with infrequent wins, a finding also reported by Crone 
et al (2004).  In Experiment 6 preference for the decks with infrequent losses was 
observed (this was also observed to some extent in the Real Money – Hint condition 
of Experiment 3), again similarly reported by Crone et al (2004) and others 
(MacPherson et al, 2002; Wilder et al, 1998).  This behaviour should not be 
unexpected.  In the context of a losing environment, participants’ behaviour tends 
towards choices with more frequent gains, while in the context of gains, it tends away 
from frequent losses.  This behaviour is in keeping with the Law of Effect.  It also 
suggests that selection from the decks on the variant IGT, like on the standard IGT, is 
not uniform between decks with the same expected value.  
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Bechara et al (2000) found higher net scores earlier on the variant than the 
standard task, but made no comment upon this.  From their Figure 2, selection from 
the advantageous decks in the first three trial-blocks appears to be significantly 
greater in the variant than in standard task.  This suggests that the variant task is easier 
to learn than the standard task.  The results of Experiment 7 suggest that this may in 
part be attributable to differences in the schedule of the informative events which 
occur later on the standard task.  However, it may also be reflective of the decision-
making environment.  Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) value function predicts that 
when people are faced with certain losses, more risk-seeking behaviour results.  In the 
context of the variant version of the gambling task, risk seeking could be defined as 
more selection from the decks with higher immediate losses – the behaviour that is 
observed in normal participants.  Whereas, when people are faced with certain gains, 
the value function hypothesises risk aversion and in the context of the IGT this is 
selection from the decks with lower immediate gains.  The hypothesis that the variant 
task is easier to learn is supported by a probability learning study that incorporated 
losses into the alternate options.  Bereby-Meyer and Erev (1998) reported faster 
learning of the maximising strategy (exclusive choice for the high probability option) 
when the options created a loss making environment. Bereby-Meyer and Erev (1998) 
found that the model which best fitted the data was Erev and Roth’s (1998) 
quantification of the Law of Effect.  This learning principle also predicts the pattern of 
selection found on both versions of the gambling task.
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4.4 EXPERIMENT 8
THE VARIANT IGT – PROBABILISTIC SCHEDULES AFFECT 
LEARNING
!"!"$ %&'()*+,'-)&
The results from Experiment 7 found that changing the fixed order of losses within 
decks on the variant task resulted in participants avoiding the advantageous deck with 
infrequent but large magnitude wins.  Evidence of learning was found, but it was 
driven by the participants’ selections from the advantageous deck with frequent wins.  
Experiment 8 goes on to examine how the nature of the reinforcement schedules 
affects IGT behaviour.  The same manipulation as conducted in Experiment 6 is 
applied to the variant IGT.  In Experiment 6, as well as being probabilistic, 
participants’ learning environment was framed in terms of gains, and this may have 
contributed to their failure to distinguish between the advantageous and 
disadvantageous decks.  If participants are capable of learning on the IGT with the 
theoretically more difficult probabilistic schedules then their motivation, and therefore 
their learning, may be increased if the decision-making environment is framed in 
terms of losses, as in the variant task.   In examining behaviour on a variant IGT with 
probabilistic schedules the assumption that participants’ deck selection is directed 
solely by long-term outcomes can also be tested in an outwardly similar, but 
theoretically more difficult environment.  
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Twenty-two participants were recruited from the undergraduate and postgraduate 
populations of the University of Nottingham.  Two participants failed to return for the 
second session and their data were excluded from the analysis.  Participants were 
recruited using the same poster as for Experiment 7.
!##%&%',+
The gambling task used in Experiment 7 was modified in the same way as in 
Experiment 6 to make the schedule of wins on all decks probabilistic.  The 
modifications were the same as those made in Experiment 6 except that the changes 
were made to the schedule of wins.  
-.+(/*
As in Experiment 7.
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The procedure followed exactly that of Experiment 7.
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Mean net score was calculated in the same way as in Experiment 7:  the number of 
cards selected from decks F and H were subtracted from the number selected from 
decks E and G.  
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Mean net score in session 1 was 11.0 (:- = 31.08).  A one sample '-test found that 
this was not significantly greater than zero, '(19) = 1.58, # < 0.05.  Figure 4.9 displays 
mean net score across each twenty-trial block in both sessions.  It shows that net score 
increases across block and that by the end of the session most cards are being selected 
from decks E and G.  This is reflected in a mean learning rate that is significantly 
greater than zero as revealed using Lorch and Myers (1990) regression analysis for 
repeated measures designs, 0 = 1.31, '(19) = 2.31, :- = 2.53, # < 0.05.  Similarly, 
when compared to zero, mean net score in the final block of session 1 is significantly 
greater than zero, '(19) = 2.10, :- = 8.72, # < 0.05.  These results show that 
participants experiencing the reversed probabilistic schedules are learning to select 
cards from the advantageous decks.
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Mean net score in session 2 was 24.10 (:- = 38.12).  A one-sample '-test found that 
this was significantly greater than zero, '(19) = 2.83, # < 0.05.  A paired sample '-test 
found that mean net score was not significantly greater in session 2 than in session 1, 
'(19) = 1.44, :- = 40.77, # > 0.05.  However, from Figure 4.9 it is clear that the 
increasing learning rate found in session 1 continues in session 2.  Lorch and Myers 
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(1990) regression analysis for repeated measures designs revealed that mean learning 
rate in session 2 was also significantly greater than zero,  = 1.33, '(19) = 2.29, :- = 
2.59, # < 0.05.  Participants who experienced the reversed IGT with probabilistic 
schedules develop a preference for the advantageous decks that is apparent by the end 
of session 1 and continues through session 2. 
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Figure 4.9:  Mean net score across 20-trial blocks in Experiment 8 (reversed IGT with 
probabilistic schedules).  The dashed line represents chance selection, or no 
preference for either advantageous or disadvantageous decks.  Error bars are the 
standard error of the mean.  
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Figure 4.10:  The range of participants’ net scores in both sessions of Experiment 8.
The clear evidence of learning found in this Experiment are reflected in the 
change in the number of participants with a negative net score between sessions.  This 
is depicted in Figure 4.10 and decreases from seven participants in session 1 to five in 
session 2.  In session 1 five of these seven participants have negative net scores only 
marginally below zero.  In session 2 all five participants had more negative scores 
than in the first session, but two of these were only marginally below zero (having 
been marginally above in session 1).  Only three participants’ net scores were well 
below zero.  Participant KH chose predominantly from deck G in session 1, but in 
session 2 chose increasingly from deck F.  One reason for this is that for KH the 
received value over the first selections of deck G in session 2 was negative.  This is 
true for many of the participants with a negative net score.  
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Table 4.4 displays the mean received value and mean probability of loss for 
each deck across all participants.  Due to the nature of the probabilistic schedules all 
decks except G have a negative expected value.  Like in Experiment 7, the mean 
received value for deck E is negative in part because some participants did not receive 
a win early enough in their selections from that deck and stopped selecting from it 
before a win was received.
Table 4.4: Mean probability of win and received value for each deck in each session 
in Experiment 8.
p(win) Received Value
Session 1 Session 2 Session 1 Session 2
E 0.07 (0.01) 0.06 (0.01) -1.82 (1.74) -2.60 (1.71)
F 0.50 (0.02) 0.51 (0.04) -2.57 (0.12) -2.52 (0.23)
G 0.46 (0.02) 0.45 (0.03) 1.49 (0.52) 1.16 (0.81)
H 0.09 (0.02) 0.05 (0.02) -2.74 (0.41) -3.55 (0.43)
31'.4 5(/,&.+ (* #%&.*'6.+.+ %&. +'%*2%&2 .&&1&+ 17 '6. 8.%*9
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As in Experiment 7 participants in Experiment 8 learned to select more from one of 
the advantageous decks with increasing exposure to the variant gambling task.  
Despite the use of probabilistic schedules, performance in Experiment 8 is superior to 
that found with the fixed schedules used in Experiment 7.  This is likely due to the 
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manipulation made to the fixed schedules, especially on deck E, in Experiment 7.  In 
Experiment 7 the first win on deck E occurred after nine selections for all participants.  
With an equal probability of encountering a win on every selection from deck E in 
Experiment 8, more participants encountered a win on this deck.  This resulted in 
greater selection from deck E as displayed in Figure 4.11.  However, selection from E 
was still below chance as was selection from deck H.  These results replicate the 
pattern observed in Experiment 7.  On the variant task people do not sample as 
frequently from the decks with low frequency of wins.  As in Experiment 7 learning 
was driven by increasing selection from deck G.  
However, as Table 4.4 suggests and Table 4.5 displays in more detail, deck G 
was not a rewarding deck for all participants.  For the five participants with a negative
net score in session 2, the mean received value on deck G was almost zero.  However, 
decks G and E were still the better decks for these participants to select despite their 
received values.  But as Figure 4.12 illustrates these participants preferred the lower 
immediate losses and relatively more frequent gains on deck F in both sessions. In 
session 1 this was countered by increasing selection from deck G, while those few 
participants with a negative net score in session 2 selected at chance from G was 
mirrored in deck H.  This contrasts with the majority of participants depicted in the 
corresponding Figure 4.13.  Here selection from deck G clearly drives learning in both 
sessions with selections from deck E at chance and declining selection from decks F 
and H.  Figure 4.13 shows that despite an initial low probability of win (reflected in 
mean received value < 0) selection from deck G never dips below chance levels.
Experiment 8 investigated behaviour on the variant version of the IGT when 
probabilistic reinforcement schedules were used.  Participants’ behaviour showed 
evidence of learning to select preferentially from the advantageous decks, despite the 
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use of these theoretically more difficult reinforcement schedules. When results are 
compared to participant behaviour reported in Bechara et al (2000), participants in 
Experiment 8 do not reach the same level as measured by net score until the end of the 
second session.  However, unlike on the standard IGT with probabilistic schedules 
evidence of learning was found across both sessions.  This may be in part because 
learning is faster in the context of losses (Bereby-Meyer and Erev, 1998) making the 
variant IGT easier.
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Figure 4.11:  Mean number of cards selected from each deck in each session of 
Experiment 8. Error bars are the standard error of the mean. The dashed line 
represents chance selection.
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Table 4.5: Mean expected value and probability of win for each deck in each session 
of Experiment 8 for participants with a positive or negative net score.
p(win) Expected Value
Session 1 Session 2 Session 1 Session 2
E
Positive 0.07 (0.02) 0.06 (0.01) -0.14 (2.20) -3.09 (1.76)
Negative 0.04 (0.02) 0.07 (0.04) -4.94 (2.65) -1.12 (4.71)
F 
Positive 0.49 (0.05) 0.51 (0.05) -2.43 (0.24) -2.57 (0.29)
Negative 0.54 (0.03) 0.51 (0.03) -2.48 (0.19) -2.36 (0.25)
G
Positive 0.46 (0.02) 0.45 (0.04) 1.47 (0.55) 1.42 (1.05)
Negative 0.49 (0.04) 0.43 (0.04) 1.98 (1.12) 0.37 (0.83)
H
Positive 0.08 (0.02) 0.04 (0.02) -2.72 (0.54) -3.99 (0.39)
Negative 0.09 (0.03) 0.11 (0.05) -2.79 (0.65) -2.20 (1.13)
31'.4 5(/,&.+ (* #%&.*'6.+.+ %&. +'%*2%&2 .&&1&+ 17 '6. 8.%*9
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Figure 4.12:  Mean received value and mean number of selections in each 
20-trial block for participants with a mean net score < 0.  In session 1 ! = 7.  
In session 2 ! = 5.  Error bars are the standard error of the mean.
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Figure 4.13:  Mean received value and mean number of selections in each 
20-trial block for participants with a mean net score ? 0.  In session 1 ! = 13.  
In session 2 ! = 15.  Error bars are the standard error of the mean.
In Experiment 7 the change in win order made to the fixed reinforcement 
schedules particularly affected selection from one advantageous deck.  This 
manipulation made the task more difficult for all participants as in order to obtain a 
win on deck E persistent selection despite mounting losses was required.  So although 
the expected value of the deck across a block of ten trials remained the same as in the 
unaltered variant (Bechara et al, 2000), selection was affected.  In Experiment 8 with 
Figure 4.1 :   received value and mean number of selections in each 20-trial 
block for participants w th a mean net score ≥ 0.  In s ssion 1 ! = 13.  In session 2 !
= 15.  Error bars are the standard error of the mean.
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probabilistic reinforcement each selection from deck E carried the same probability of 
a win.  As a result more participants encountered a win on this deck, and did so earlier 
in their selections from that deck than participants in Experiment 7.  This resulted in 
selection from E being greater in Experiment 8 than in Experiment 7.  Despite this, 
selection from deck E was still at chance and for the majority of participants deck G, 
with its more frequent wins, was the preferred deck.  This selection behaviour shows 
again that selection from decks with the same (or similar) expected values is not 
uniform.  The frequency of the informative event, the reinforcer or punishment, 
affects selection behaviour.
4.5 GENERAL DISCUSSION
It was hypothesised that the rapid learning of the advantageous strategy found in the 
gambling task literature may be due to the nature of the reinforcement schedules used.  
In Experiment 6, on the standard task, across participants there was no preference for 
the advantageous decks in the final 20-trial block.  Advantageous deck preference 
with fixed schedule decks usually occurs after three blocks (e.g. Bechara et al, 2000; 
Bowman and Turnbull, 2003; Fellows and Farah, 2005).  In Experiment 8, using the 
variant task, learning rate increased at a rate greater than chance in both sessions and 
using the net score measure a preference for the best decks was found in the last block 
of trials.  However, mean net score did not rise to the asymptotic levels reported by 
Bechara et al (2000) until the second session.  On this basis it was concluded that the 
probabilistic nature of the reinforcement schedules had affected learning.  
On the probabilistic schedules each selection from a deck has the same 
probability of the infrequent informative event (the loss on the standard task, the win 
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on the variant task) occurring as any other.  With a constrained fixed schedule as used 
by the Iowa group or a randomised with constraint schedule used by others (e.g. 
Crone et al, 2004; Crone and van der Molen, 2004) the probability of the infrequent 
reinforcer changes depending on the number of prior reinforcements and the number 
of selections remaining within that block.  This means that with a probabilistic 
schedule predicting when the infrequent event will occur is harder.  Runs of trials 
without the infrequent reinforcer can be longer than those that occur with a 
constrained schedule.  One consequence of this is that in the decks with the more 
infrequent event (e.g. decks B or E), long sequences of cards can be selected without 
encountering the infrequent event.  Experiment 7 found that selection from deck E 
was greatly below chance when the infrequent events in each deck occurred on the 
same fixed schedule as in the standard task.  The first win from deck E was often not 
encountered by participants.  Selection from E in Experiment 8 was close to chance, 
in part because more participants had received a win earlier in their selections from 
this deck and therefore knew such an event was possible.  The results of these 
experiments show that the order of events within decks on the IGT is crucial to the 
number of cards selected from them.  These figures form the units of the standard 
measure of learning and so support the hypothesis that learning on the IGT is 
influenced by the reinforcement schedules used.  This claim is also supported by the 
increase in net score found in Fellows and Farah’s (2005) manipulated version of the 
standard IGT.
Despite the use of probabilistic schedules increasing selection from the 
advantageous decks was reported on the variant task in Experiment 8.  This was not 
found on the standard task in Experiment 6.  It is possible that this may be because the 
variant task is easier to learn.  Learning is faster on probability matching tasks where 
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losses are the consequences of incorrect choices (Bereby-Meyer and Erev, 1998).  
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) have shown that when faced with a certain loss, 
people prefer the option with the higher probability of winning.  Translated to the 
gambling task this may mean that people are more readily willing to accept the larger 
immediate loss from selecting E or G for the chance of winning a higher amount on 
the variant task, than they are to accept the smaller win from selecting C or D for the 
chance of losing a smaller amount on the standard task.  This would mean that 
difference in the value between loss amounts to the difference between gain amounts 
is larger in favour of the advantageous decks in the variant task than in the standard 
task.  This may make the variant task easier to learn.
It has been claimed by Bechara et al (1994) that keeping track of the 
contingencies on individual decks is a difficult task, even for participants with higher 
than average IQs and memory.  Part of the reason for this may be that the IGT 
incorporates features of various classic reinforcement schedules that combine to cloud 
comprehension.  In turn this makes understanding what is influencing behaviour on 
the IGT more difficult to pin down.  Peters and Slovic (2000) addressed this point by 
redesigning the IGT without confounding expected value with average gain and loss 
amounts. Table 4.10 displays the contingencies used in this task.  In the standard IGT 
the disadvantageous decks also have the highest gains and losses associated.  As many 
of the Figures in the preceding Experiments show, this also results in larger variances 
in received value for these decks.   In unconfounding this relationship, Peters and 
Slovic were able to compare deck selections by gain (B and D versus A and C) or loss
amount (A and D versus B and C) or expected value (A and B versus C and D).  Their 
results showed that some individuals’ selections were influenced by loss information.  
Similarly, other individuals’ selections were influenced by gain information.  
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However, neither measure of reactivity to positive or negative events correlated with 
selection based on expected value and learning rate, nor improvement across trials, is 
not reported.  Examination of Peters and Slovic’s (2000) Figure 1 suggests that 
participants did slightly improve across trials, but performance did not reached the 
level of participants on the unmodified version of the IGT.  In other words their 
modifications affected task difficulty.
Peters and Slovic’s (2000) modifications did unconfound gain and loss 
amounts from expected value, but these modifications also altered the probability of 
loss among their new decks.  While this feature of decks is a characteristic of the 
relationship between loss and gain amount and expected value, it was not entirely 
removed from the modified task.  On three of the four decks the probability of loss 
was uniform (#(loss) = 0.5) meaning that any effect of probability loss could not be 
examined directly.  In the fourth deck (C), one of the advantageous decks, the 
probability of loss was substantially lower (0.20).  The hypothesis that learning is 
influenced by the loss probability is supported, as this was the deck most selected by 
participants.  However, this behaviour also supports the hypothesis that expected 
value is important in influencing choice behaviour as the relationship between the 
deck contingencies mean this deck also has the highest EV (see Table 4.6).  From the 
evidence collected in this chapter and those preceding it seems probable that the 
difference in probability of loss is clearer to participants than any difference in 
expected value, or may at least form the basis for determining any difference in 
expected value.  
The experiments reported in this chapter and those preceding revealed
differences in selection from decks with the same (or similar) expected values.  This 
suggests that participants do not link the uniform magnitudes of immediate gains or 
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losses on two decks and their expected values.  This may suggest that knowledge of 
what is happening on the task is not complete.  Of course participants may possess 
this knowledge but are not forced to demonstrate it behaviourally because there are 
sufficient cards to select from only one deck.  In this case they prefer the deck with 
infrequent losses on the standard task (deck C has infrequent actual losses) and the 
deck with frequent wins on the variant task.  The extent of participants’ knowledge 
has ranged from the original claim that 70% of participants had an understanding of 
the deck contingencies (Bechara et al, 1997a), to a more detailed examination where a 
minority of participants (40%) could express this level of knowledge (Maia and 
McClelland, 2004).  
Table 4.6:  Deck contingencies in Peters and Slovic’s (2000) modified gambling task
A B C D
Gain amount: 50-150 150-250 50-150 150-250
Average gain amount 100 200 100 200
Probability (gain) .5 .5 .8 .5
Loss amount 100-200 200-300 200-300 100-200
Average loss amount 150 250 250 150
EV -25 -25 +30 +25
Another indication that participants may not fully know the contingencies of 
the decks is the difference in selection behaviour between sessions where net score 
always dips.  As suggested in Chapter 2 this may reflect participants’ distrust of the 
experimenter’s claim that the task remains unchanged.  This may be a more credible 
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position when the task is probabilistic as the appearance of infrequent events may 
appear to be more random. The absence of clear evidence of learning in session 2 of 
Experiment 6 implies that participants do not have complete knowledge of the task in 
session 1.  This would imply that people are not learning why decks are good – i.e. 
developing conceptual knowledge, but reacting to the stimuli as they are presented.  
However, there was clear evidence of learning in both sessions of Experiment 8.  The 
issue of what participants know about what they are learning will be addressed in 
Chapter 5.  
194
CHAPTER FIVE
LEARNING ON THE IGT FOLLOWS EMERGENCE OF 
KNOWLEDGE BUT NOT DIFFERENTIAL SOMATIC ACTIVITY
5.1 INTRODUCTION & OVERVIEW
Chapter 1 introduced three assumptions the SMH makes about behaviour on the IGT.  
Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrated that the third assumption that decks were selected 
solely on the basis of their expected value was not supported by an examination of 
behaviour.  Chapter 2 revealed that receiving more information about the decks in the 
form of a hint led to improved performance.  This suggested that knowledge about the 
decks affected performance.  The second assumption of the SMH about IGT 
behaviour is that initial selection is guided by somatic markers not available 
knowledge.  The support for this claim came from Bechara et al’s (1997) results 
where skin conductance responses (SCRs) were recorded as a measure of somatic 
activity and knowledge was periodically assessed.   Bechara et al (1997a) claimed that 
anticipatory SCRs (aSCRs) developed in their healthy control participants before they 
reported any idea about a successful strategy to pursue in their deck selections on the 
IGT.  Additionally, although 30% (! = 10) of controls did not develop explicit 
knowledge of the best strategy they still chose predominantly from the good decks by 
the end of the task "!# showed increased aSCRs to the bad decks.  Whereas, 50% (! = 
6) of the patients with VMPFC damage did gain an explicit understanding of the task 
but still chose disadvantageously and #$# !%& show the difference in aSCRs.  Bechara 
et al (1997a) concluded that somatic markers, as measured by aSCRs, were necessary 
to choose advantageously on the IGT (assumption 1).  Further, as the difference in 
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aSCRs preceded any “conscious knowledge” they concluded that somatic markers act 
as nonconscious biases that guide behaviour (assumption 2).  These results arguably 
increased awareness of the SMH and made the IGT the widely used paradigm it is 
today.
Since the publication of Bechara et al (1997a) many more studies have 
examined SCRs during IGT performance.  But few studies have questioned Bechara 
et al’s (1997) account of how knowledge changes during the IGT.  Maia and 
McClelland (2004) have offered a different account and claim that healthy 
participants have access to knowledge sufficient to guide behaviour earlier than found 
by Bechara et al (1997a).  However, to my knowledge, no study since Bechara et al 
(1997a) has investigated the relationship between somatic markers "!# knowledge 
during the IGT.  This chapter describes such an experiment.  It aims to answer two 
questions of importance for understanding behaviour on the IGT that also have critical 
implications for using the IGT as a test of the SMH: when during the IGT do SCRs 
that differentiate between deck types emerge, and when do participants have 
knowledge about the task sufficient to guide behaviour?  These questions directly 
address the second assumption the SMH makes about IGT behaviour, or put another 
way they address the suitability of the IGT as a test of the SMH.
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The only concerted attempt at answering this crucial question has been by the Iowa 
group.  Bechara et al (1996) suggested that this difference emerges as healthy 
participants become experienced on the task.  Their Figure 4 showed the mean peak 
SCR amplitude prior to selections from each deck.  It appears that the aSCR 
difference between deck types emerges after approximately 10 selections each from 
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both decks A and B, although it is earlier for deck A.  Since these decks are initially 
preferred these observations suggest a difference emerging possibly as early as 
between 16 and 20 card selections, but more realistically between 20 and 30 
selections given participants’ sampling from each of the four decks.  However, as the 
observations were drawn from varying numbers of participants dependent on each 
participant’s total selections from each deck these observations cannot provide an 
exact timescale for an aSCR difference.  Indeed it is precisely this issue that makes 
any statistical analysis of differences between decks difficult.   Here it is also worth 
bearing in mind that decks A and B are good decks to choose from until the first loss 
is encountered.  Indeed from Bechara et al’s (1996) Figure 4 it appears that the aSCR 
difference between deck types emerges after experience of punishment on the 
disadvantageous decks.  As shown in Chapter 4 this is the crucial information that 
guides decision-making on this task. 
Bechara et al (1997a) looked at change in aSCRs across the task in more 
detail. First they divided trials into periods depending on an individual’s first 
encounter with a punishment (to determine the end of the “pre-punishment” period 
and the start of the “pre-hunch” period) and their expression of some knowledge 
about the task (dependent on the detail of the knowledge expressed this would end the 
“pre-hunch” period and start the “hunch” period or end the “hunch” period and start 
the “conceptual” period).  These knowledge assessments were not constant but took 
place after the first twenty trials and then on each subsequent ten trials.  Because the 
mean values of SCRs between deck types in each period is of great interest, the way 
in which these periods were created is of importance.  Participants were defined as 
having a “hunch” if they could express the idea that decks A and B were riskier (or C 
and D were safer) but not articulate explicitly why. If they could detail why A and B 
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were riskier (or C and D were safer) they had “conceptual” knowledge.  The question
period when either type of knowledge was expressed determined the start of the new 
knowledge period and the end of the previous one (although problems with this 
classification will be returned to in section 5.2.3.2).  
Bechara et al (1997a) reported that anticipatory SCRs for the bad decks were 
larger relative to the good decks and claimed that this difference emerged in normal 
participants approximately between trials 10 to 50.  This corresponded to the “pre-
hunch” period when participants did not articulate any knowledge of differences 
between decks.  According to Bechara et al (1997a) during the pre-hunch period 
participants also showed no behavioural preference for either deck type.  However, 
while healthy participants went on to show significant differences in choices from the 
good and bad decks, the difference in aSCR between deck types was not statistically 
significant in any knowledge period (although aSCRs for the bad decks, but not the 
good decks, were different in the hunch and conceptual periods when compared to the 
pre-punishment period).  Despite this non-significant difference in pre-hunch aSCRs 
between deck types the paper generated a great deal of interest.  One potential 
problem in the knowledge periods as determined by the method above is that the pre-
punishment and pre-hunch periods may include different data points for each 
participant.  Since the pre-punishment period ends on first encounter with a loss, 
when, and on which deck, this loss occurs will be different for each participant.  This 
means that, for example, the ninth selection from deck B may be included in the pre-
punishment period for one participant and the pre-hunch period for another dependent 
on when they make their third selection from decks A or C, or their tenth selection 
from deck D (see Appendix A for the fixed schedule of losses on the IGT). This 
effectively means that, depending on deck sampling, some participants may have 
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more knowledge about the rewarding contingencies of more of the decks before they 
encounter a loss and move to the pre-hunch period than others.  It is therefore unclear 
what is being compared when the pre-punishment and pre-hunch period are 
compared.  Despite these issues the core idea that emerged from Bechara et al’s 
(1997) study was that a difference in aSCRs preceded participants’ ability to express 
knowledge about the IGT, with all that such an assumption implies.  Many other 
researchers have accepted this assumption as a starting point in investigations using 
the IGT.  The validity of this conclusion will be discussed in subsequent sections.  
With the importance of aSCRs on the IGT assumed, few other researchers 
have looked at their development across the task.  Suzuki et al (2003) did consider 
their emergence, though not as directly as in Bechara et al’s (1997) attempt.  They 
found a difference in aSCR between deck types that did not change across their early 
(first 40) or late (second 40) blocks of trials.  This result suggests, like that of Bechara 
et al (1996) that any difference in aSCRs may emerge in the first half of the IGT.  The 
results of another study where aSCR change was plotted across blocks of trials 
suggested that any aSCR difference emerged in the third quarter of the task, but the 
task used in this study was considerably modified from the standard IGT (Jameson et 
al, 2004).  In addition to modifying the task by using three decks (one bad, one good 
and one neutral), participants were also given a secondary task to load their working 
memory.  In two of the secondary task conditions the aSCR difference between deck 
types resulted from a reduction in the aSCR for the good deck rather than an increase 
in the aSCR for the bad decks relative to the good as in Bechara et al (1997a).  
Kleeberg et al (2004) did examine change in both aSCR and post-punishment SCRs 
across trials and found them to start at a higher level and increase faster in their 
healthy comparison group compared to patients with MS.  Faster learning (earlier 
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preferential selection of the advantageous decks) was also reported in the healthy 
controls but no correlation between the measures was reported.  (Problems with such 
an analysis are that as the number of AB choices decreases the variance in the SCR 
records increases because they are drawn from fewer and fewer samples).   In the 
comparison group the average aSCR, collapsed over all decks, increased from a flat 
rate between 20 and 40 card selections.  This may be attributed to selections from 
decks A and B and the increased probability that most participants have experienced 
losses on both by this point in the task.  Other than these studies no others chart a 
change in either aSCRs or post-selection SCRs across the course of the IGT.  But 
most studies using the IGT cite and accept the version of events presented by Bechara 
et al (1997a).  
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In addition to knowing when any aSCR difference emerges the question of when 
participants have knowledge about the deck contingencies sufficient to guide their 
choices on the IGT is of importance for any interpretation of the SMH.  Damasio 
(1994, p. 184 and 187) has said that somatic markers can act as conscious or non-
conscious biases to decision-making.  But it is the stronger, non-conscious version of 
the SMH (Tranel et al, 1999) supported on the back of the Bechara et al (1997a) 
results that has caught the imagination of researchers and this interpretation that is 
most widely reported.  In this version of the SMH somatic markers bias the decision-
making environment before knowledge can have an influence.  
So the issue of when enough knowledge about the task to guide behaviour 
emerges relative to a differential aSCR between deck types is of fundamental 
importance to the interpretation of the SMH and the assumptions it affords for IGT 
behaviour.  Since Bechara et al (1997a) a number of other groups have probed 
participants’ knowledge of IGT contingencies, although few have examined the 
development of that knowledge during the task.  These studies are briefly reviewed 
below.  First, more detail about Bechara et al’s (1997) results is provided.  Table 5.1 
displays the results of their analysis of the emergence of knowledge on the IGT.  
Bechara et al (1997a) found that on average, healthy participants entered the “hunch” 
period by the fourth questioning (after trial 50, although the range was between trials 
30 and 80) and the “conceptual” period by the seventh questioning (following trial 80 
with a range of 60 to 90).  All healthy participants achieved “hunch” knowledge, but 
30% (! = 3) did not reach “conceptual” knowledge.  This is coincidentally also the 
proportion of healthy participants who do not show “normal” behaviour in later 
studies (Bechara and Damasio, 2002).
Table 5.1:  Summary of participants’ knowledge expression in Bechara et al (1997a).
% participants who did not reach the hunch period: 0
Average trial number in which participants reached
the hunch period: 50 (30 – 60)
% participants who did not reach the conceptual period: 30
Average trial number in which participants reached
the hunch period: 80 (60 – 90)
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Maia and McClelland replicated Bechara et al’s (1997) study and found 
broadly similar results when participants were questioned in the same way.  However, 
the attempt to replicate was not straightforward due to the lack of detail about how 
Bechara et al assessed knowledge and categorised it into two of their four (hunch and 
conceptual) knowledge periods.  Maia and McClelland (2004) developed a detailed 
solution to resolve this that resulted in a decision tree (reproduced here as Figure 5.1) 
to categorise each participants’ knowledge at each question period into one of the six
knowledge categories possible on the IGT.  These are: no professed knowledge, 
incorrect or incomplete hunch/knowledge, partial hunch, hunch, partial conceptual 
and conceptual.  Even with this decision tree there were still several ways knowledge 
could be assessed in order to integrate it into Bechara et al’s knowledge periods.  This 
integration is effectively along two axes.  The first concerns whether knowledge 
expressed about only one of the good decks is included as conceptual knowledge 
(partial conceptual).  In a strict interpretation of Bechara et al’s criteria partial 
conceptual knowledge would not count as conceptual knowledge because it is not full 
understanding of both good decks – Maia and McClelland (2004) called this grouping 
“both”.  In the “partial” grouping partial conceptual knowledge is included in the 
conceptual period.  
The second axis in integration of the two knowledge assessment systems 
concerns when participants first show any level of knowledge. A conservative 
approach would only count knowledge expressed consistently throughout all question 
periods from the one where it was first expressed through each subsequent 
questioning i.e. if upon reaching one level of knowledge the participant never returned 
to a lower state of knowledge.  An aggressive interpretation would allow an earlier 
expression of knowledge to be counted even if later questioning revealed that this 
level of knowledge was no longer being expressed at a later question period.  Table 
5.2 summarises Maia and McClelland’s (2004) results from their replication condition 
along both these axes.  Their aggressive, “partial” grouping best fit Bechara et al’s 
(1997) results.  However, Maia and McClelland focused on the “both” grouping as it 
more reflected Bechara et al’s (1997) classification of conceptual knowledge.  Using 
these figures and an aggressive approach, Maia and McClelland reported that, like 
Bechara et al, their participants preferentially selected the advantageous decks when 
they were classified as being in the hunch or conceptual knowledge periods.  
Table 5.2:  Summary of participants’ knowledge expression in Maia and 
McClelland’s replication condition.
Approach
Conservative Aggressive
% participants who did not reach hunch period: 37.5 (5.8) 12 (2.9)
Average trial number in which participants 
reached the hunch period: 62 (5.8) 43 (4.6)
Partial Grouping
% participants who did not reach conceptual period: 47 (7.6) 25 (8.7)
Average trial number in which participants reached
the conceptual period: 74 (1.6) 62 (6.6)
Both Grouping
% participants who did not reach conceptual period: 77 (5.8) 60 (5)
Average trial number in which participants reached
the conceptual period: 91 (5.6) 72 (4.8)
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Figure 5.1:  Maia and McClelland’s (2004) decision tree for classifying participants’ 
knowledge about the IGT.
The main thrust of Maia and McClelland’s (2004) paper was not merely to 
replicate their results and specify their method in greater detail.  They also challenged 
the ability of this method as an effective probe of participants’ knowledge.  This 
challenge stemmed from criticisms applied to the large literature on implicit learning, 
where the question of what knowledge participants possess is fundamental.   This 
literature was extensively reviewed and critiqued by Shanks and St John (1994) who 
developed criteria necessary for determining whether learning without awareness has 
occurred.  This was essentially the claim made by the Iowa group (Bechara et al, 
1997a; Tranel et al, 1999).  But Maia and McClelland (2004) pointed out that the 
methods used in Bechara et al (1997a) to assess knowledge (learning) failed to fulfil 
Shanks and St John’s “Sensitivity” criterion.  This concerns whether the test of 
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awareness reveals all the relevant knowledge that a participant consciously possesses.  
Maia and McClelland contended that the broad, open-ended questions used by 
Bechara et al (1997, “Tell me all that you know about what is going on this game” 
and “Tell me how you feel about this game”) may not result in participants divulging 
information that they still consider to be tentative, or “may not reliably cue recall of 
all relevant knowledge” (Maia and McClelland, 2004, p.16075).  They also contended 
that such questioning may be influenced by factors like an individual’s personality or 
their level of engagement with the task.  Because of these possibilities Maia and 
McClelland speculated that participants could have access to knowledge sufficient to 
guide their behaviour much earlier than revealed using Bechara et al’s questioning.  
As a result they developed a more focused questionnaire designed to probe all 
knowledge about the IGT.  They found that participants were able to report a level of 
quantitative and qualitative knowledge that would have been sufficient to guide their 
behaviour from the first period of questioning.  Indeed, the level of knowledge in 
many cases preceded advantageous selection behaviour.  Despite the more detailed 
questioning a comparison between the behaviour of participants in this and the 
Bechara et al (1997a) replication condition found no significant differences.  This 
ruled out the possibility that more detailed questioning cued participants to relevant 
information available in the task (otherwise learning would have been positively 
affected, the goal of the task being to earn as much money as possible).  Thus, Maia 
and McClelland’s study undermines Bechara et al’s claim that the difference in 
aSCRs precedes knowledge on the IGT and indeed invites the suggestion that the 
aSCRs are a product of the conscious knowledge – what I termed in Chapter 1 a 
Knowledge-Somatic hypothesis to challenge the Somatic-Knowledge assumption 
prevalent in the IGT literature since Bechara et al (1997a). Maia and McClelland’s 
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findings also challenge the claim from the Iowa group that the IGT remains 
cognitively impenetrable even to those with above average memory and IQ.  
In support of Maia and McClelland’s (2004) findings, Evans, Bowman and 
Turnbull (2005) also found that participants could rate each deck’s “goodness” and 
“badness” at above chance levels after 20 trials using a deck rating scale similar to 
one of Maia and McClelland’s (2004) measures.  Other researchers who have probed 
participants’ knowledge of the deck contingencies on the IGT have primarily used 
post-test questioning.   However, this method cannot reveal anything about 50(!
participants possess adequate knowledge to guide behaviour and fails to fulfil Shanks 
and St John’s (1994) Sensitivity criterion.  Nevertheless this method has been 
employed.  Suzuki et al (2003) asked participants to rate each deck’s riskiness on a 7-
point scale but found no link between what they called “conscious knowledge” and 
two groups split on their post-selection SCR levels.  This is troublesome for the 
Knowledge-Somatic hypothesis as it implies no relationship between knowledge and 
SCR levels.  However, as previously pointed out any post-hoc questioning cannot 
inform on when awareness arises, especially in this case where group membership 
was also determined post-hoc.  One cannot say if those in the high SCR group had 
awareness of deck riskiness any earlier than the low SCR group.  This cannot be ruled 
out either and so the Knowledge-Somatic hypothesis remains viable.
Elsewhere, post-task questioning has revealed mixed accounts of participants’ 
knowledge.  Kleeberg et al (2004, p.794) informally asked one of their groups of 
interest (patients with MS) at the end of testing which decks it was best to avoid and 
state that they were generally correct.  The aSCRs of less neurologically impaired 
patients increased across the task and they made fewer disadvantageous deck 
selections than less able patients.  The authors concluded that since knowledge 
equated between patient groups, but somatic activity did not, cognitive appraisal is not 
sufficient to account for advantageous IGT behaviour.   However, the authors did not 
assess when individuals possessed any level of knowledge, or whether they acted 
upon it.  Instead they claimed that patients with more neurological dysfunction 
continued to make disadvantageous choices between cards 30 to 60 because they were 
not guided by adequate somatic markers and so did not reach the “hunch” phase.  
They only began to select advantageously when “reason and comprehension became 
dominant”.  The claim here is that the somatic markers are necessary to guide 
advantageous decision-making until comprehension of the task is achieved.  But this 
claim cannot be supported on the basis of post-hoc questioning.
Fishbein, Hyde, Eldreth, London et al (2005) found that several participants 
from their control and substance abusing groups did not express knowledge of the 
correct strategy. They suggested that this absence of knowledge might explain the
absence of any SCR differences between deck types or participant groups and is 
effectively the Knowledge-Somatic assumption.  Fischer et al (2005) found overall 
poor behavioural performance and anecdotally reported poor knowledge of the task.  
They attributed the absence of learning in the majority of their participants, in part, to 
using participants from a technical college suggesting that they may have been too 
used to using reasoning processes to guide behaviour.  In other words, they did not 
pay attention to their somatic response during the task, and this was the root of the 
absence of evidence of learning in their behaviour and anecdotal post-test verbal 
reports.  This learning system hypothesis was tested by Evans, Kemish and Turnbull 
(2004) who found greater advantageous selection in the final two twenty-trial blocks 
in female participants who had left school when aged 16 compared to female age-
matched university students.  This difference was attributed to better emotion-based 
learning in the early school leavers as a result of less time in formal education.  
None of these attempts to assess knowledge can offer any replication of 
Bechara et al’s (1997) description of the emergence of knowledge about the IGT.  Nor 
do they challenge it and indeed most studies that do not assess knowledge repeat the 
Somatic-Knowledge assumption advanced by these authors.  The only study that has 
extensively examined the progression of knowledge through the IGT is Maia and 
McClelland (2004).  Their finding that participants possessed knowledge adequate to 
guide behaviour earlier than claimed by Bechara et al (1997a) seriously undermines 
the strong version of the SMH and the Somatic-Knowledge assumption of IGT 
behaviour.  
The role aSCRs have, as an index of somatic markers, in decision-making on 
the IGT has been discussed in Chapter 1.  While some studies have suggested SCR 
activity and IGT performance are related (Bechara et al, 1997a, 1999, 2000, 2002; 
Crone et al, 2004) others have failed to find a link (Tomb et al, 2002; Suzuki et al, 
2003; Campbell et al, 2004; Kleeberg et al, 2004).  Where knowledge has also been 
assessed it has generally been through post-hoc questioning and thus can offer no 
information about when knowledge appears.  In such cases any attempt to link 
knowledge and somatic activity cannot differentiate between a Somatic-Knowledge 
hypothesis and a Knowledge-Somatic alternative.
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This introduction addressed two questions of importance for understanding behaviour 
on the IGT: when during the IGT do SCRs that differentiate between deck types 
emerge, and when do participants have knowledge about the task sufficient to guide 
behaviour?  These questions also have critical implications for using the IGT as a test 
of the SMH.  The widely cited conclusion of Bechara et al (1997a) that differential 
aSCR activity precedes the emergence of knowledge has some support in studies 
correlating aSCR activity with behavioural performance.  However, such relationships 
have not been universally found and indeed many results offer conflicting evidence.  
Principally, Maia and McClelland (2004) have shown that knowledge sufficient to 
guide behaviour exists very early in the task.  Additionally, several studies (Hinson et 
al, 2003; Jameson et al, 2004; Turnbull et al, 2003) have shown that impairments in 
executive components of working memory detrimentally impact on IGT performance 
suggesting that differences in aSCRs are driven by cognitive processes (implying 
knowledge) rather than vice versa.  Experiment 9 considers these three dependent 
measures (behavioural performance, SCR activity and participants’ knowledge) in an 
attempt to untangle the relationship between them.
5.2 EXPERIMENT 9
DIFFERENTIAL SKIN CONDUCTANCE RESPONSES BETWEEN DECK 
TYPES EMERGE AFTER PARTICIPANTS DISPLAY KNOWLEDGE ON 
THE IOWA GAMBLING TASK.
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Experiment 9 is a replication of Maia and McClelland’s (2004) study with the 
addition of SCR recording.  Maia and McClelland’s study was important because 
participants possessed consciously available knowledge about the IGT deck 
contingencies at the first time of questioning (after 20 trials).  This result undermined 
Bechara et al’s (1997) claim that knowledge developed later (after ~50 trials) 
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allowing an explanation utilising somatic markers to explain improving performance.  
However, Maia and McClelland’s (2004) study was not a full replication of Bechara 
et al (1997a).  Few studies have investigated SCR change across the IGT and none 
since Behara et al (1997) have also attempted to assess knowledge.  It therefore 
remains a possibility that differential SCR activity between deck types precedes 
consciously accessible knowledge .  Such a finding would support the assumption of 
causality of the strong version of the SMH to explain IGT performance.  
Alternatively, as Maia and McClelland’s (2004) questioning was more specific than 
Bechara et al’s (1997) it is also possible that differential SCR activity develops after 
consciously accessible knowledge.  This would support a Knowledge-Somatic 
explanation for somatic activity.  
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Thirty-two participants who were predominantly post-graduate students were 
recruited from the University of Nottingham community.  They were recruited using a 
poster advertisement, an online advert and via direct email to members of a 
participant pool.  Participants were told that they would be participating in a really 
interesting cognitive task and have the opportunity to earn up to £12.  They were told 
that some physiological measures would be recorded and that the experiment took 
approximately one hour.  Sixteen participants were randomly assigned to each 
question group (the General questions of Bechara et al, 1997a; or the Specific 
questions of Maia and McClelland, 2004).  The mean age was 25.68 (σM = 1.22) in 
the specific question group and 24.63 (σM = 0.92) in the general question group.  
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There were nine and seven male participants in the Specific and General question 
group respectively.
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The computerized version of the IGT with the hint instructions and real money 
incentives was used.  Breaks in the behavioural task occurred after the first twenty 
and each subsequent ten trials so that participants’ knowledge could be probed using 
the condition-specific questions.  More detail on these are provided in the next 
section.  As a result of the addition of questionnaires and skin conductance recording 
the time to complete the task was increased from previous Experiments (to around 
one hour).  To reflect this increase the reinforcers were also increased to maintain the 
relative incentive per hour across Experiments.  As this experiment took on average 
four times longer than the previous purely behaviour studies (although it was longer 
in the specific question group), reinforcer values were also four times the amount of 
previous experiments.  Therefore wins increased from 10p to 40p in decks A and B, 
and from 5p to 20p in decks C and D.  All values for losses increased similarly.
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The administration and structure of the questionnaires followed the procedure of Maia 
and McClelland (2004).  The task was interrupted after twenty trials and thereafter 
after every ten trials when instructions on the computer screen informed participants 
that they would now be asked some questions about the task.  In the Specific question 
group participants were given the detailed questionnaire as used in Maia and 
McClelland (2004; see Appendix D).  The questionnaire was computer-based and 
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required selection of options using the mouse or entry of answers using the numerical 
keypad.
Participants in the General Question Group were presented on subsequent 
screens with the two questions used by Bechara et al (1997a):   “Tell me all that you 
know about what is going on in this game” and “Tell me how you feel about this 
game”.  Participants’ responses were recorded using a tape recorder operated by the 
experimenter who sat behind a large room-dividing screen in the same room as the 
participant.  The presence of an experimenter during task performance was a 
deviation from the procedure used in the previous Experiments but was necessary in 
order to monitor the skin conductance record and, in this condition, to operate the tape 
recorder.  The questions were presented on the computer in an attempt to minimise 
any experimenter influence and to equate the two question conditions.  Interaction 
with the experimenter was kept to a minimum and was initially restricted to 
prompting participants to answer the question before them.  However, some 
participants’ answers were so minimal that some additional prompting was 
occasionally required.  In the main this took the form of directing participants’ 
answers to their knowledge of the decks.  
The presentation and cessation of the questions in both conditions was 
accompanied by a computer beep to mark the beginning and end of the question 
period on the skin conductance record (more information on why this was necessary 
is provided in section 5.2.2.5), and to inform the experimenter when to start and end 
the tape recorder in the General question condition.
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Participants’ question answers were transcribed from the tape recording. Three 
individuals naïve to the experimental hypothesis were recruited and paid to assess the 
transcripts and classify the knowledge displayed at each question period using Maia 
and McClelland’s (2004) decision tree (Figure 5.1).  The assessors first undertook 
training on the decision tree using sample answers created to cover all possible 
outcomes from the tree.  One hundred percent accuracy was required before the actual 
transcripts were assigned.  When sample transcripts were not correctly rated the 
assessor was told and asked to try again.  Most raters accurately rated each transcript 
on their first attempt.  Rarely were three attempts required, but following correct 
answers the assessor had to convince the experimenter of why they had reached the 
assessment they had.
Once the actual transcripts had been assessed the assessors met to compare 
results.  If there was disagreement on any participant’s answer the assessors were 
instructed to debate their disagreement until a unanimous decision was reached.  If 
this was not possible a majority decision for that answer was used.  These final 
assessments of participants’ answers were used to determine when knowledge was 
displayed in the General question group.
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A BIOPAC Systems MP30 system running on a Macintosh computer was used to 
record electrodermal activity.  Skin conductance was recorded at 10Hz using two 
Ag/AgCl electrodes connected to the volar surfaces of the medial phalanges on 
participants’ index and middle fingers of the left hand (all participants were right 
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handed).  Because the MP30 system does not have the facility for a direct link 
between the recording computer and the task presentation computer, marking the 
occurrence of events was achieved by recording the sounds produced on the task 
presentation computer during the task.  These sounds were recorded by the MP30 via 
an analogue input.  As described in Experiment 1, during the task gains and losses 
were accompanied by concurrent auditory stimuli which also served as markers for 
events in this experiment.  Additionally, the experimenter marked the skin 
conductance record when an event occurred.  However, this measure is less reliable 
and not as temporally accurate.  For this reason it was only referred to when the 
auditory record was ambiguous about when an event occurred.
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Skin conductance responses were analysed using the Student Lab Pro software for the 
MP30 system.  The first step in the analysis was the removal of the downward drift in 
the SCR record.  A mathematical transformation provided by the Student Lab 
software was used to remove it prior to analysis.  This “difference” transformation 
measures the difference in amplitude between two data samples separated by a 
particular number of points (in this case it was 10).  The difference is then divided by 
the time interval between the two samples. 
The SCRs were analysed using the area under the curve measurement.  This 
measurement calculates the total area between a waveform and a baseline value 
within the endpoints of a selected area.  In effect a line is drawn between the user 
defined start and end points of the waveform.  For anticipatory SCRs this was the five 
seconds prior to deck choice as determined by the auditory signal’s mark on the 
analogue channel.  For post-selection SCRs the start point was one second after this 
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marker and the end point was again five seconds later.  These area under the curve 
measurements were then divided by the time interval to give a value in amplitude 
units per second (µS/second).  
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The experiment was a replication of Maia and McClelland’s (2004) study with the 
addition that skin conductance responses were measured.  A mixed-design was used 
with Question Group (General or Specific) a between-subjects factor, and block of 
trials a within-subjects factor.  Three dependent measures were obtained:  
participants’ behaviour on the IGT, participants’ knowledge of the task contingencies, 
and the change in participants’ physiological arousal prior to card selection (aSCRs) 
and following card selection (r or pSCRs; reward or punishment SCRs).  
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On arrival for testing participants were given a brief description of the task, an 
account of what was involved in the recording of electrodermal activity, and in the 
General Question Group, information about the recording of their answers using the 
tape recorder.  These participants were told that questions would appear on the 
computer screen periodically throughout the task and they must speak their answers 
into the tape recorder.  It was emphasised to all participants that the experimenter 
would not interact with them nor answer any questions about the task after the 
opportunity to ask them had ended (following their acknowledgement that they 
understood the task instructions).  Informed consent was obtained from all 
participants.
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The index and middle fingers of participants’ left hands were cleaned using an 
alcohol free wet-wipe.  Once dry an isotonic (0.5% saline) gel (Biopac Gel 101) was 
rubbed into the skin of the medial phalanges of the index and middle fingers of 
participants’ left hand before the MP30 electrodes were attached.  Participants were 
instructed that it was important to stay as still as possible throughout the experiment 
and to make themselves comfortable so that they only moved their right hand when 
controlling the mouse, and in the Specific Question Group, when they entered 
answers using the keyboard. 
Participants then read the task instructions.  These were exactly the same as 
for previous experiments with the addition of information about the periodic
interruptions in which questions would be asked (for full task instructions see 
Experiment 1).  A period of at least five minutes was allowed to elapse from electrode 
attachment to task commencement to allow the electrode gel time to be absorbed into 
each participant’s skin.  During this time participants were informed that the 
experimenter would be present in the room but would not be monitoring their 
performance.  Participants were told that the purpose of the experimenter’s presence 
was to monitor the SCR record and, in the General Question Group, to operate the 
tape recorder when required.  They were told that there would be no interaction with 
the experimenter except if, in the Specific Question Group, clarification was needed 
on the terms used in the questionnaire.  Participants were then reminded that the most 
important thing was to earn as much money as possible, or to avoid losing as much as 
possible. 
SCRs were recorded without interference until the task ended.  When visual 
inspection indicated that SCRs were present, participants were instructed to begin the 
task.  Participants saw the IGT screen as displayed in Figure 2.1 except that a message 
216
displayed in the middle of the screen instructed the participant to consider from which 
deck they would choose.  The mouse pointer was not displayed and the decks could 
be selected while this message was on-screen.  It remained for 5 seconds when it was 
replaced with another telling participants to “Please select a card”.  The mouse pointer 
re-appeared and the decks became active.  The five seconds prior to deck choice 
constituted the period during which SCRs were considered to be anticipatory.  
Following the selection of a card the computer displayed the amount won 
accompanied by the sound of a man shouting “Yippee!”  This sound was marked on 
an analogue channel of the SCR record and allowed the accurate pinpointing of SCR 
events in relation to deck choices.  One second after the reward, the amount lost was 
displayed accompanied by the sound of a man shouting “Doh!”.  The reward and loss   
information remained on-screen for five seconds.  The instruction to “Consider your 
next choice” was then displayed for five seconds before participants were again 
instructed to choose a card.  SCRs in the five seconds following deck selection were 
considered to be post-selection SCRs.  Therefore, the inter-trial interval was at least 
twelve seconds but varied depending on how long participants took to choose their 
next card following the instruction to do so. 
The experiment concluded following 100 trials on the IGT and when 
participants’ task knowledge had been probed nine times.  The length of the 
Experiment differed between participants and was dependent on the speed with which 
they selected cards and answered the questions.  As there were more questions in the 
specific question group these participants tended to take longer.  The experiment took 
around one hour but this depended on the speed with which participants answered 
questions and made selections.  So although participants were told the prospective 
length of the task this information could provide no hint about when it would end.  
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On completion of the task all electrodes were removed and participants were 
fully debriefed.  Each participant received the amount they had earned on the task 
plus an additional £2.  As in previous experiments participants were unaware of the 
additional payment and were asked not to mention it to anyone else.
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Mean net score was calculated by subtracting the number of cards selected from decks 
A and B from the number selected from decks C and D.  Additionally, net score was 
calculated in each block of ten trials for each participant.  This differs from previous 
experiments where blocks of twenty trials were used.  The reason for this change was 
twofold: to examine in more detail when the change in behaviour emerges, and as the 
task was interrupted after every ten trials for questioning this blocked the trials 
together for participants anyway.   
Mean net score for the General Question group was 20.44 (CD = 22.06).  A 
one sample &-test found that this was significantly greater than zero, &(15) = 3.93, CD
= 22.06, / < 0.01 indicating that participants in this condition showed an overall 
preference for the advantageous decks.  The same was true of participants in the 
Specific Question group.  Their mean net score was 28.56 (CD = 29.04) and this was 
significantly greater than zero, &(15) = 3.71, CD = 29.04, / < 0.01. 
Mean net score was calculated for each block of ten trials and compared 
between Question Group and across Block.  Figure 5.2 displays this comparison.  It 
can be seen that net score increases across block at a similar rate in both Question 
Groups.  A mixed-design ANOVA revealed no main effect of Question Group, *(1, 
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Figure 5.2:  Mean net score across 10-trial blocks.  The closed circles represent the 
Specific question group and the open circles represent the General question group.  
Error bars are the standard error of the mean.
29) < 1.  There was a main effect of Block, (4.31, 124.89) = 15.43, MSE = 44.26, /
< 0.01, that reflects the increase in mean net score with more trials, but no interaction, 
(4.31, 124.89) = 1.53, MSE = 29.0, / > 0.05 indicating that learning proceeded at a 
similar pace in both question groups.  This was confirmed by estimating learning rate, 
using the slope 2, for each participant and comparing between groups.  Mean learning 
rate was 0.88 (C = 0.72) in the Specific question group and 0.77 (C = 0.63) in the 
General question group.  An independent-samples &-test found no significant 
difference between them, &(30) = 0.44, / > 0.05.  However, Lorch and Myers (1990) 
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regression analyses revealed both learning rates were significantly greater than 0: 
Specific group &(15) = 4.90,  < 0.01; General group, &(15) = 4.90,  < 0.01.  These 
results indicate that learning progressed at the same rate in both Question Groups.  
This is important because it shows that the nature of the questions participants 
received did not differentially affect their behaviour.  Maia and McClelland (2004) 
found the same result.
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The overall impression gained from participants in the General Question group was 
that most struggled to achieve any comprehension of the task.  Indeed, on many 
occasions the experimenter had to probe participants to elicit some answer to the 
standard questions.  This took the form of asking what each participant knew about 
the decks, without leading them directly to the knowledge the experimenter was 
seeking.  This was a measure of the generally unsatisfactory nature of this questioning 
method, a point returned to in the discussion.
Despite these limitations the independent ratings suggested at least half the 
participants reached the conceptual period.  This result was more like Bechara et al’s 
(1997) than that found by Maia and McClelland (2004).  However, the results do 
depend on the method of classifying conceptual knowledge.  Like Maia and 
McClelland (2004) the aggressive approach provides the best fit to Bechara et al’s 
(1997) data and the discussion that follows in this paragraph will refer to this 
approach only.  However, unlike Maia and McClelland, in this experiment the 
‘partial’ rather than the ‘both’ grouping of conceptual knowledge best matched 
Bechara et al’s data.  The summary of the raters’ knowledge assessments is presented 
in Table 5.3.  In classifying knowledge aggressively all but one participant displayed 
Hunch (or in Maia and McClelland’s terms level-1) knowledge and this occurred on 
average after 43 trials.  This compares favourably with both Bechara et al (all 
participants had hunch knowledge on average by trial 50) and Maia and McClelland 
(88% of participants showed hunch knowledge on average by trial 43).  However, 
unlike Maia and McClelland, the ‘partial’ grouping for conceptual knowledge fit 
Bechara et al’s data better than the ‘both’ grouping.  In this case only around 30% of 
participants (versus 62.5% using the conservative approach) failed to exhibit 
conceptual (or level-2) knowledge.  Bechara et al’s figure was also 30% and there 
conceptual knowledge was achieved on average by trial 80.  Using either grouping 
methods and an aggressive approach, conceptual knowledge was achieved 
substantially earlier on average in the current study (by 53 or 55 trials for the ‘partial’ 
and ‘both’ groupings respectively, although by different numbers of participants).  
Maia and McClelland also found that the ‘partial’ grouping resulted in the majority of 
participants (~75%) being classified as having conceptual knowledge and on average 
this occurred by trial 62.  However, they used the ‘both’ grouping when comparing 
their results to Bechara et al’s.  With the current data, the ‘both’ grouping would 
decrease the proportion of participants with conceptual knowledge to 50%.  However, 
the ‘both’ grouping does seem more in keeping with the idea of conceptual 
knowledge.  If this grouping were used and a conservative approach taken one would 
find that the vast majority of participants did not reach the conceptual period and if 
they did it was only established by the final question period.  This conclusion most 
accurately reflects the subjective impressions of the experimenter but conflicts with 
the conclusions of both Bechara et al (1997a) and Maia and McClelland (2004).   
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Table 5.3: Knowledge assessment for General question group
Approach
Conservative Aggressive
% participants who did not reach the hunch period: 50 6.25
For participants who reached the hunch period, 
average trial number in which they did so: 73 (6.8)   43 (3.9)
‘Partial’ Grouping ‘Both’ Grouping
Conservative Aggressive Conservative Aggressive
% participants who did not reach the conceptual period: 62.5 31.25 87.5 50
For participants who reached the conceptual period, 
average trial number in which they did so: 83 (9.2)   53 (6.2) 100 (0.0) 55 (8.0)
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Three measures of knowledge were obtained for each deck at each question period: a 
deck rating from -10 to 10, an estimate of the average net amount won or lost on the 
deck and a calculated net amount based on participants’ estimates of how much they 
would win, how often they lost, and how much that average loss was.  In addition 
participants were also asked which deck they would choose if they only had one 
choice.  This last measure and the qualitative deck ratings were used to assess level-1
knowledge, equivalent to Bechara et al’s (1997) “hunch”.  Level-2 knowledge 
(equivalent to Bechara et al’s “conceptual” knowledge) was determined by the 
answers to the quantitative estimate questions.  Maia and McClelland (2004) pointed 
out that  it was possible in the early question periods that one of the ‘bad’ decks in the 
long-term would be a ‘good’ deck at that time because the participant had not yet lost 
sufficient amounts on that deck to make the actual net amount from that deck 
negative.  Thus for Maia and McClelland’s analysis, knowledge of the best decks up 
to that question period was based on the actual net amounts won or lost from each 
deck at that time.  Nevertheless, in order for a direct comparison to be made with the 
General Question condition, knowledge here is first examined assuming decks C and 
D are the best decks throughout the task.  Table 5.4 displays the proportion of 
participants who attained either hunch level or conceptual level knowledge for each 
measure.  Also displayed is the mean trial on which this knowledge was displayed.
Maia and McClelland’s (2004) analysis of knowledge, at both the hunch and 
conceptual level, relied only on an identification that %!( of the best decks is better, or 
in other words the ‘partial’ grouping used in the analysis of conceptual knowledge in 
the General question condition.  In calculating when knowledge first appears across 
participants, both an aggressive and a conservative interpretation of their knowledge 
can be made.  With an aggressive interpretation the earliest display of knowledge is 
used regardless of what later questioning revealed, whereas consistent demonstration 
of knowledge is required for the conservative interpretation.  Maia and McClelland 
(2004) did not consider this distinction in their analysis as they focused on each 
question period alone.  Such a method gives an overall picture of the change in 
knowledge but the interpretation is different from the more global analysis of 
participants’ knowledge applied with the General questions.  If one is seeking to 
establish when participants 1$-.& show knowledge, the aggressive/conservative 
definition of what demonstrates knowledge is important.  
The left-hand columns in Table 5.4 show this distinction with a ‘partial’ 
grouping.  As with the General questions hunch level knowledge emerges earlier 
using the aggressive approach and all participants demonstrated knowledge at this 
level.  This was true with deck ratings and identifying the best deck.  With a 
conservative approach some participants did not display any hunch level knowledge 
(20% using the deck ratings measure; 6.25% for the best deck measure).  A similar 
pattern is found for the conceptual level knowledge measures – using an aggressive 
approach resulted in more participants being categorized as displaying knowledge 
earlier than a conservative approach.  For the expected net measure, using an 
aggressive approach, only 12.5% (! = 2) of participants failed to display conceptual 
level knowledge whereas using a conservative approach this proportion was more 
than double (31.25%).  An aggressive approach also resulted in conceptual level
knowledge being found earlier (after 41 trials versus 51 with a conservative 
approach).  The same pattern occurred for the calculated net measure, although many 
fewer participants were classed as displaying conceptual level knowledge (25% and 
50% for aggressive and conservative approaches).  Those that did display knowledge 
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on this measure did so later than revealed by the expected net measure.  With a 
conservative approach knowledge was present at approximately trial 64 whereas with 
an aggressive approach it was around trial 37.   The data in Table 5.4 show that using 
the Specific questions and the aggressive approach that provided the best fit to 
previous results for the General questions, a larger percentage of participants possess 
hunch level and conceptual level knowledge earlier than is found when General 
questions are used.  
In the analysis of the General questions a second grouping method was 
described to classify differences within participants’ conceptual knowledge.  To 
possess conceptual knowledge in the ‘both’ grouping required participants to display 
knowledge of why both of the best decks were better, whereas the ‘partial’ grouping 
classified similar knowledge for only one deck as conceptual.  With the current 
analysis of the Specific questions it is possible to use a grouping that corresponds to 
this ‘both’ grouping.  In such a grouping knowledge that the two best decks at the 
time of questioning are the best decks is required (decks C and D in the current 
examination). Thus the ‘both’ grouping is a more stringent criterion than the ‘partial’ 
grouping used by Maia and McClelland. The relevant data is displayed in the right-
most columns of Table 5.4 and the stringency of this grouping is reflected across all 
measures as conceptual level knowledge was found later and in fewer participants 
than if the ‘partial’ grouping is used.
Table 5.5 explores the data when actual received values at each time of 
questioning are considered.  In this case, decks A and B are the best decks until such 
time as losses on them exceed gains.  The comparison between tables is informative in 
some important ways.  First, and most importantly, more participants show evidence 
of knowledge of the best decks earlier when the actual received values are used to
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Table 5.4: Knowledge assessment for Specific question group using ‘partial’ grouping (either C or D had to have received the best score on each 
measure) or ‘both’ grouping (C and D had to have received the best scores on each measure).
‘Partial’ Grouping ‘Both’ Grouping
Question Type Conservative Aggressive Conservative Aggressive
Ratings
% participants who did not reach Hunch level: 25 0 50 12.5
average trial number in which they did so: 47 (5.7) 36 (4.4) 60 (7.1) 33 (3.8)
One deck
% participants who did not reach Hunch level: 6.25 0  ". G/"-&$";H +-%,/$!+ ". &0(-( $.
average trial number in which they did so: 49 (7.2) 29 (3.2)  %!;? %!( -(./%!.( /%..$2;(
Expected net
% participants who did not reach Conceptual level: 31.25 12.5 56.25 25
average trial number in which they did so: 51 (6.4) 41 (2.9) 56 (6.9) 52 (5.1)
Calculated net
% participants who did not reach Hunch level: 50 25 68.75 31.25
average trial number in which they did so: 64 (9.2) 37 (3.6) 72 (12.4) 44 (4.9)
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determine the best decks.  This is certainly the case for the aggressive approach and 
reflects participants’ early identification that decks A or B are generally profitable in 
the first question period.  When the aggressive approach is used with a partial 
grouping participants, on average, demonstrate hunch level knowledge at the first 
question period (trial 20) and conceptual level knowledge by the second (trial 30). 
Second, when a conservative approach is used the differences between Tables 
5.4 and 5.5 essentially disappear.  This is in part because for most participants by trial 
30 decks C and D have become the decks with the best received values.  That the 
values in each table do not greatly differ with such an approach is informative.  
Remember that the difference between the aggressive and conservative approach is 
that sustained demonstration of knowledge is required to fulfil the conservative 
criteria.  We can assume that the similarities between the figures in the two tables 
demonstrates that participants’ knowledge does not keep up with the change in actual 
received values as decks A and B become disadvantageous (generally between the 
second and third question period) otherwise the average trial on which knowledge was 
reached with a conservative approach would be lower in Table 5.5 than in Table 5.4.  
A third point has already been mentioned but is worth re-emphasising here. 
When the ‘both’ grouping is used it is clear that most participants can identify the two 
best decks at some point in the early part of the task as evidenced by the figures 
generated from an aggressive approach.  However, only a minority go on to 
demonstrate conceptual level knowledge that both of the good decks are the best.  In 
other words few participants appear to have complete understanding of the deck 
contingencies.  However, though important for a discussion on the extent of 
participants’ task knowledge, it is actually not surprising given the constraints of the 
task.  The stated goal is to earn as much money as possible but there is an unknown
Table 5.5: Knowledge assessment for Specific question group using ‘partial’ grouping (either deck with the highest net value at the time of 
questioning received the best score on each measure) or ‘both’ grouping (both decks with the highest net value at the time of questioning 
received the best scores on each measure).
‘Partial’ Grouping ‘Both’ Grouping
Question Type Conservative Aggressive Conservative Aggressive
Ratings
% participants who did not reach Hunch level: 20 0 50 12.5
average trial number in which they did so: 39 (6.8) 22 (1.0) 59 (7.6) 33 (3.04)
One deck
% participants who did not reach Hunch level: 6.25 0 ". G/"-&$";H +-%,/$!+ ". &0(-( $.
average trial number in which they did so: 47 (7.5) 21 (0.6) %!;? %!( -(./%!.( /%..$2;(
Expected net
% participants who did not reach Conceptual level: 25 0 62.5 12.5
average trial number in which they did so: 51 (7.9) 26 (2.2) 57 (9.5) 36 (4.2)
Calculated net
% participants who did not reach Conceptual level: 50 0 68.75 12.5
average trial number in which they did so: 65 (8.5) 26 (2.4) 72 (12.4) 36.4 (4.3)
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and limited time period to do this within.  These constraints make the exploration 
necessary to achieve complete understanding and the goal of the task somewhat 
incompatible.  It is also important to remember that complete knowledge is not 
required to profit on this task.  As Maia and McClelland (2004) have pointed out, 
knowledge that one of the good decks is a good deck is sufficient to successfully 
guide behaviour on the IGT.  A participant does not need to know that both good 
decks are best in order to select advantageously.  As in many decision-making 
environments a simple heuristic that led one to choose one advantageous deck 
achieves the same result as total comprehension of the task structure.  Given these 
reflections a conservative approach using a ‘partial’ grouping would seem to be the 
best to capture the emergence of knowledge sufficient to guide behaviour.
Indeed, in Maia and McClelland’s (2004) knowledge assessment they used the 
‘partial’ approach throughout (referred to in notes to their Figures 2 and 3).  Their 
Figure 2 displayed the proportion of participants who selected one of the two best 
decks for each measure at each question period.  This can be considered an aggressive 
approach as it takes no account of a change in individual participants’ reports over 
time.  As shown in Table 5.5 using the ‘partial’ grouping and an aggressive approach 
most participants in Experiment 9 have hunch level knowledge the first time they are 
asked about the task and a large majority show evidence for conceptual level
knowledge. 
Indeed if this approach is used at each question period a similar figure to Maia 
and McClelland’s is produced.  Figure 5.3 is this figure.  Like Table 5.5 it shows that 
the majority of participants have hunch level knowledge at the first question period.  
However, whereas for Maia and McClelland the number of participants displaying 
knowledge stayed high and relatively consistent across question period on each 
229
knowledge measure, here the numbers fluctuate much more.  As observed in the 
discussion of Tables 5.4 and 5.5 accurate partial knowledge dips on all measures as 
decks A and B become disadvantageous (between trials 20 and 40).  The majority of 
participants recover some hunch level knowledge, but fewer reach conceptual level.  
This is despite the majority consistently selecting one of the best decks on each trial.
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Figure 5.3: The number of participants in the Specific Question Group who displayed 
knowledge that one of the best decks is the best deck on each measure.  The grey line 
represents the number of participants who chose one of the best decks available on 
each trial.  On trial 40, 50, 60 and 90 the one deck marker covers the rating marker. 
On trial 40 the calculated net covers the expected net marker.  On trial 70 and 100 the 
rating marker covers the expected net marker.
What is also informative from Figure 5.3 is that for many participants the calculated 
net measure (the open triangle) does not reflect one of the best decks.  The vastly 
varying answers that participants provided in the calculation of this measure may be 
responsible.  Figure 5.4 displays the calculated net measure for each deck from every 
participant in the final question period.  The dashed line shows that the mean received 
value for each deck is close to its pre-test expected value.  The figure shows that the 
calculated net measure does not correspond to individual participants’ received values 
on each deck.  Figure 5.5 shows that the same is true for the expected net measure. 
Together these Figures suggest that most participants’ quantitative knowledge of the 
deck contingencies is not accurate. Indeed for many participants the expected or 
calculated nets are positive for decks A and B, and negative for decks C and D.  This 
may indicate that participants are unable to retain quantitative knowledge about the 
decks or that they did not comprehend what was required in the answer for the 
measures themselves.  In support of the latter explanation Figure 5.3 shows that on 
less complex measures most participants were able to select one of the better decks.  
Remember again that complete knowledge is not required to succeed on this task.
Figure 5.6 shows the number of times each deck was identified as the one deck 
participants would choose if they could only choose one for the remainder of the task.  
Aside from the first question period when deck B is often advantageous, most 
participants would choose deck C or deck D.  Indeed the number of participants who 
would choose deck C increases with experience of the task, mirroring the behavioural 
data from this and previous experiments.  As Figure 5.3 shows, using this measure the 
majority of participants were able to identify one of the best decks at each question 
period.  However, given the choice most did not subsequently choose it exclusively. 
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Figure 5.4:  Calculated versus actual expected value on each deck after 100 trials for 
each participant (except for participant 3 for whom figures are following 80 trials).  
The calculated expected value was calculated from a participant’s estimates of the 
average gain, average loss and frequency of loss over ten selections from that deck.  
The dashed lines are the mean actual expected values.
Figure 5.5:  Estimated versus actual expected value on each deck after 100 trials for 
each participant (except for participant 3 for whom figures are following 80 trials).  
The dashed lines are the mean actual expected values.
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Figure 5.6:  The number of participants at each question period who selected each 
deck as the one deck they would choose if forced to only pick from one.
Figure 5.7 shows the change in ratings for each deck across block.  The ratings 
are mostly negative for all decks and this may partly explain the discrepancy between 
the measures collected from participants and the actual received values displayed in 
Figures 5.4 and 5.5.   It is clear that most participants do not believe any of decks are 
good.  However, it is equally clear that decks C and D are perceived as being less bad 
than decks A and B.  Although this indicates that participants have not comprehended 
the nature of the decks, and thus of the task, such knowledge would be sufficient to 
guide behaviour advantageously.  This knowledge is present in most participants at 
the second question period.   Participants also consistently rate deck A as one of the 
worst decks from the first opportunity they are given.  This supports the hypothesis 
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developed in Chapter 2 that participants are able to identify deck A as a bad choice 
very early on, and this is the reason it is chosen much less than chance.
Trial
20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
M
ea
n
 r
at
in
g
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
A 
B 
C 
D 
Figure 5.7:  Mean rating for each deck across question period.  Error bars are the 
standard error of the mean.
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The focus of this section has been the extent of participants’ knowledge and when that 
knowledge emerges.  In the General question condition an aggressive approach 
provided the best fit to the data in the previous studies and using this approach most 
participants (93.75%) in that condition had hunch level knowledge by trial 43.  
However, using a conservative approach resulted in fewer participants being 
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categorized as displaying knowledge about the decks, a situation that reflected the 
experimenter’s subjective impressions.  
In the Specific question group and regardless of classification strategy most 
participants make a distinction between the advantageous and disadvantageous decks 
following trial 30.  But although an aggressive, ‘partial’ approach applied to all 
measures revealed a majority of participants had knowledge at the first question 
period, this number was fewer than found by Maia and McClelland (2004).  It was 
argued that in order to identify the earliest point at which knowledge sufficient to 
guide behaviour is reached consistently, a conservative approach using a ‘partial’ 
grouping would be best.  This strategy suggests that most participants have hunch 
level knowledge by trial 39 using the ratings measure or trial 47 using the one deck 
measure.  Neither are substantially different to trial 43 provided by the best-fitting 
strategy in the General question condition.  But as deck ratings required more 
information from participants the figures gained from this measure will be used in the 
further analyses where differences pre- and post-knowledge are considered.  
Although, the strategies used to determine when knowledge was present were 
different in each group, this is appropriate because participants showed no differences 
in behaviour and so it can be assumed that their experience of the task was similar.  
We can further assume that their pre-task knowledge was similar and as their 
behaviour did not differ their knowledge remained similar throughout the task.  All 
that differed between the groups then was the specificity of knowledge probe.  If this 
is the case then an aggressive approach is appropriate for the General group because 
their knowledge was not probed as effectively as the Specific group participants.  
Ideally, a conservative partial approach would have been used throughout but this 
Figure 5.8:  Mean proportion of cards selected from each deck in (a) the pre- and post-
knowledge periods for participants who displayed knowledge (n = 27), and (b) the 
comparable periods for participants who did not display knowledge (n = 5).  Error 
bars are the standard error of the mean.  The dashed line represents chance selection.
would not have been sensitive enough in the General condition to indicate when 
knowledge sufficient to guide behaviour appeared.  The use of these two approaches 
results in data that is consistent between groups and with the previous literature using 
the General questions.  It is also consistent with the behaviour shown in Figure 5.2.  
Mean net score first moves above chance in both groups in block 4, the block during 
which the above measures suggest participants can determine C and D to be the best 
decks.
Further support is provided by an analysis of the proportion of selections from 
each deck in the pre- and post-knowledge periods across all participants who were 
categorized as having displayed knowledge (displayed in Figure 5.8a).  The 
proportion of selections from decks A and B declines from the pre- to post-knowledge 
period, whereas the proportion increases for decks C and D.  This supports the 
supposition that participants’ choices are guided by knowledge of the decks.  A 4 x 2 
(Deck by Time) repeated measures ANOVA examined these data.  A significant 
interaction between Deck and Time was revealed, (2.28, 59.35) = 17.41, ICA = 
0.03, / < 0.01; as was a main effect of Deck, *(3, 78) = 7.48, ICA = 0.03, / < 0.01.  
There was no effect of Time, *(1, 26) < 1.  A complex interaction comparison 
examined the interaction between Deck Type and Time by collapsing data across 
advantageous and disadvantageous decks in each knowledge period.  This 2 x 2 
repeated measures ANOVA found a significant interaction between Deck Type and 
Time, *(1, 26) = 35.60, ICA = 0.03, / < 0.001; a main effect of Deck Type, *(1, 26) 
= 15.38, ICA = 0.03, / < 0.001; but no main effect of Time, *(1, 26) = 2. 09, ICA < 
0.01, / > 0.05.  Subsequent simple comparisons found that the proportion of 
advantageous choices in the pre-knowledge period was not significantly greater than 
the number of disadvantageous choices, *(1, 26) = 2. 41, ICA = 0.03, / > 0.05; 
whereas it was in the post-knowledge period, (1, 26) = 31.84, ICA < 0.01, / < 
0.001. Figure 5.8a shows that, consistent with previous experiments, this difference 
appears to be due to changes in selections from decks B and C.  In the post-knowledge 
period the proportion of selections from deck B has decreased below chance and the 
proportion of selections from deck C has increased above chance.  Similar patterns are 
found in decks A and D, but the major changes lie in decks B and C.
A similar pattern is shown in Figure 5.8b for the participants who displayed no 
knowledge.  The early period shown in the Figure represents the proportion of choices 
from each deck up until the mean trial at which participants in the knowledge group 
displayed knowledge.  The late period is the period from this mean trial until the end 
of the task.  While behaviour in this group looks similar to the knowledge group, there 
are several differences.  The proportion of selections from each deck is much closer to 
chance in both time periods.  In the late period, unlike the participants with 
knowledge, selections from B are not below chance nor are selections from deck C
above chance.  These observations were tested in a 4 x 2 (Deck by Time) repeated 
measures ANOVA.  It found no interaction, *(1, 26) = 2. 44, ICA = 0.01, / > 0.05; 
no main effect of Deck, *(1, 26) = 1.29, ICA < 0.01, / > 0.05; and no main effect of 
Time, *(1, 26) <  1.  These results suggest that only with knowledge sufficient to 
guide behaviour do participants select advantageously on the IGT.  The next section 
will examine whether differences in physiological responses exist prior to knowledge 
being displayed and so leave an opportunity for an explanation of IGT behaviour 
incorporating somatic markers.  
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Anticipatory SCRs were the mean area under the curve of the SCR in the five seconds 
prior to selecting a card.  Mean aSCRs for each deck were obtained by taking the 
average aSCR for that deck for each participant and dividing across participants.  
These mean aSCRs are displayed by Group in Figure 5.9a.  The Figure shows that 
mean aSCRs are generally very low and that they are similar in each Group.  To 
determine if any differences existed, a 2x4 (Group by Deck) mixed-factor ANOVA 
was run.  Although mean aSCR was higher in the Specific Question Group than in the 
General Question Group no main effect of Group was found, *(1, 30) < 1.  There was 
also no main effect of Deck, *(1,30) < 1.  Despite the higher mean aSCR for deck B 
in the Specific Question Group, there was no interaction between Question Group and
Deck, *(3, 90) = 2.02, ICA < 0.01, / = .12.  As in the behavioural analysis no 
differences in aSCR were found between groups nor were any differences observed 
between decks.  This first result supports the conclusion that the different questioning 
did not differentially affect participants, whereas the second contrasts with the data 
reported by Bechara et al (1997a).  
In the previous section it was determined that most participants in each group 
display at least hunch level knowledge of the task between trials 40 and 50.  In order 
to determine whether aSCR differences existed between decks prior to this period, 
average aSCRs before and after each participant’s expression of knowledge were 
calculated for each deck for those participants who displayed knowledge (80% in the 
Specific group, 93.75% in the General group).  As there were no differences in aSCR 
between groups in the previous analysis this factor was not included in the subsequent 
analyses.  This also removes the problems associated with unequal sample sizes that 
would result with its inclusion.  Some participants did not select cards from some of 
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the decks in the period following their expression of knowledge.  As a result there is 
no SCR on these decks for these participants.  As identifying missing values provided 
statistical results that did not correspond to the actual data (estimated marginal means 
were different to the descriptive mean) missing values were replaced by the mean 
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value for each level of each factor.  For deck A, there were 2 missing values post-
knowledge in each group.  They were replaced by 0.039 in the Specific question 
group and 0.052 in the General question group.  For deck B, there were 4 missing 
values post-knowledge in the Specific question group (replaced by 0.043) and 3 
missing values post-knowledge in the General question group (replaced by 0.031).  
Finally, for deck D one post-knowledge missing value in the Specific question group 
was replaced by 0.037.  The missing values all came from the same people who either 
chose only one deck in the period after they displayed knowledge (deck C in one 
participant in the Specific question group), or no longer chose from both deck A or B 
(two participants in both groups) or did not select from deck B (two participants in the 
Specific question group and one in the General question group).  The resulting 4 x 2 
(Deck by Time) repeated measures ANOVA found no significant effects: Deck by 
Time, (1.78, 46.41) = 1.25, ICA < 0.01, / > 0.05; Deck, *(2.04, 52.99) < 1; Time, 
*(1, 26) < 1.  
The main purpose of this experiment was to determine if any physiological 
responses distinguish between decks prior to participants’ expression of knowledge 
i.e., SCR changes in the pre-hunch period of Bechara et al’s (1997).  No differences in 
aSCR were found between decks in the pre-knowledge period.  This replicates 
Bechara et al’s result, and like their data the mean values found in the present study 
within this period, displayed in Figure 5.9b, suggested that a difference between decks 
A and B and decks C and D may exist although there was no significant interaction.  
Therefore no evidence was found to support the hypothesis that differences in aSCRs 
precede knowledge expression in participants who express hunch level knowledge.  
Indeed, Figure 5.9c shows that in participants who did not display any knowledge 
mean aSCRs across the same time periods were at a similar level.  Additionally, for 
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those participants’ who did display knowledge, aSCRs did not appear to be related to 
their knowledge state as no differences pre- and post-knowledge in any deck were 
found.  
60?.$%;%+$7"; B(".,-(. > /%.&9.(;(7&$%! CJK.
Post-selection SCRs were the mean area under the curve of the SCR in the five 
seconds after a card was selected.   These SCRs were split into those following a 
reward with no punishment (reward SCRs or rSCRs) and those following trials on 
which punishment occurred (punishment SCRs or pSCRs).  Mean rSCR and pSCRs 
for each deck were calculated for each individual.  The mean of these values provided 
the mean post-selection SCRs displayed by Group in Figures 5.10a and 5.11a for 
reward and punishment SCRs respectively.  Figure 5.10a shows that mean rSCRs are 
similar in each Group but that there is a trend for rSCRs to be higher in decks A and 
B.  A 2x4 (Group by Deck) mixed-factor ANOVA was run to examine rSCRs across 
all selections.  There was no interaction, *(1,30) < 1; no main effect of Group, 
*(1,30) < 1; but a main effect of Deck was found, *(1, 30) = 5.97, ICA < 0.01, / < 
0.01.    A planned complex main comparison was performed to investigate whether 
rSCRs differentiated between the advantageous and disadvantageous decks4 It found 
that rSCRs were higher for the disadvantageous decks, *(1, 30) = 10.12, ICA < 0.01, 
/ < 0.01.  In addition, separate pairwise comparisons revealed that mean rSCR was 
higher for deck A than deck C, *(1, 30) = 11.44, ICA < 0.01, / < 0.01; and deck D, 
*(1, 30) = 8.20, ICA < 0.01, / < 0.01.  Mean rSCR was also higher for deck B than 
deck C, *(1, 30) = 5.55, ICA < 0.01, / < 0.05.  The difference in rSCR between 
decks B and D was marginally non-significant, *(1, 30) = 3.44, ICA < 0.01, / =  
0.07.  There was no difference in rSCR between decks A and B or between decks C 
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and D.  These results suggest that, in keeping with previous research (e.g. Tomb et al, 
2002), selections that provided a larger reward result in larger rSCRs.
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To investigate whether rSCRs distinguished between selections prior to or 
following the display of knowledge a 4 x 2 (Deck by Time) repeated-measures design 
ANOVA was conducted.  As no group differences were discovered in the initial 
analysis Group was removed as a factor in subsequent analyses.  As with the 
equivalent aSCR analysis missing values due non-selection of a deck in the post-
knowledge period were replaced by the group mean.  For deck A, 2 missing values 
post-knowledge in each group were replaced by 0.093 in the Specific question group 
and 0.099 in the General question group.  For deck B, the 4 missing values post-
knowledge in the Specific question group were replaced by 0.093 and the 3 missing 
values post-knowledge in the General question group were replaced by 0.089.  
Finally, for deck D the single post-knowledge missing value in the Specific question 
group was replaced by 0.063.
An interaction was found between Deck and Time, (2.39, 62.13)
1
= 4.65, 
ICA < 0.01, / = 0.01.  As with the overall analysis a main effect of Deck was also 
found, *(3, 78) = 5.00, ICA < 0.01, / < 0.01, but there was no effect of Time, *(1, 
26) < 1.  Figure 5.10b displays the mean rSCRs pre- and post-knowledge in each 
deck.  The interaction between Deck and Time appears to be the result of lower mean 
rSCRs in the post-knowledge period for the advantageous decks as compared to the 
disadvantageous decks.  In order to examine this further data was collapsed across 
Deck to provide values for the advantageous and disadvantageous decks in each time 
period and an interaction contrast was performed.  This is effectively a 2 x 2 (Deck 
Type by Time) repeated-measures ANOVA.  It revealed a significant interaction 
between Deck Type and Time, *(1, 26) = 11.83, ICA < 0.01, / < 0.01; a main effect 
of Deck Type, *(1, 26) = 15.74, ICA < 0.01, / < 0.001; but no effect of Time, *(1, 
26) < 1.  Subsequent simple comparisons found a difference between Deck Types in 
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the post-knowledge period, (1, 26) = 19.56, ICA < 0.01, / < 0.001, and not in the 
pre-knowledge period, *(1, 26) < 1.  In the selections after knowledge is displayed 
participants’ physiological reactions following reward distinguish between the good 
and bad decks.
This interaction should not have been affected by the replacement of missing 
values with group means for several participants.  Nevertheless, to rule out this 
possibility the participants for whom there were two or more missing values in the 
post-knowledge period (two in the Specific Group and three in the General group) 
were excluded and the analysis run again.  The three additional participants in the 
Specific group who did not select deck B in the post-knowledge period were retained 
as excluding them would have left only nineteen participants.  The resulting ANOVA 
revealed identical results with the relevant interaction between Time and Deck still 
significant, *(2.38, 47.56) = 2.96, ICA < 0.01, / < 0.05.  This suggests that the results 
from the full analysis are legitimate and do reveal that a difference in rSCRs between 
deck types exists only after knowledge has been displayed.  
Figure 5.10c presents rSCRs for the participants who did not display 
knowledge.  Here the pre- and post-knowledge periods are based on the mean values 
from the participants who did display knowledge.  The early period includes the trials 
up to trial 39 and 43 for participants in the Specific and General groups respectively.  
The late period includes all the subsequent trials.  The mean values depicted in this 
Figure are much lower than those for participants with knowledge, suggesting that 
knowledge and physiological activity may be linked.  A similar pattern of reduced 
physiological activity in the post-knowledge period in decks C and D is also found in 
this group as in the participants with knowledge, but here it is also found for deck B.  
A 4 x 2 (Deck by Time) repeated-measures ANOVA was also conducted on this data.  
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There was no interaction between Deck and Time, (3, 12) = 1.31, ICA < 0.01, / > 
0.05; no main effect of Deck, *(3, 12) = 1.54, ICA < 0.01, / > 0.05; and no main 
effect of Time, *(1, 4) < 1.  This result supports the conclusion from the analysis of 
the with-knowledge group that knowledge influences physiological activity.  
However, this conclusison is qualified by the low number of participants included in 
this analysis.
Figure 5.11a shows pSCRs over all selections and all participants.  Mean 
pSCRs are higher in the decks with low frequency of punishment (B and D).  Mean 
pSCRs are also higher than mean rSCRs.  A 4 x 2 (Deck by Group) mixed-factor 
ANOVA revealed no interaction, *(3, 90) < 1 and no main effect of group, *(1, 30) < 
1, thus replicating the other SCR data that found no group differences in SCRs.  A 
main effect of Deck was found, *(2.12, 63.66)
1
= 4.40, ICA < 0.01, / < 0.05.  
Subsequent simple comparisons revealed that pSCRs following selections from deck 
A were significantly lower than those from deck B, *(1, 30) = 6.73, ICA < 0.01, / <
0.05; as were selections from deck C, *(1, 30) = 10.02, ICA < 0.01, / < 0.05; while 
pSCRs for deck D were also significantly higher than those from deck C, *(1, 30) = 
5.73, ICA < 0.01, / < 0.05.  There was no difference in pSCRs following selections 
from decks B and D, *(1, 30) = 2.96, ICA < 0.01, / > 0.05, nor between decks A and 
D, *(1, 30) = 2.96, ICA < 0.01, / = 0.10, which replicates Crone et al (2004) and 
supports their conclusion that it is the magnitude of punishment and not the frequency 
that is influential for pSCRs.  
Due to the infrequent nature of punishment relative to reward in all of the 
decks (far greater in decks B and D), many participants received no punishment in the 
post-knowledge period on some decks either as a result of not choosing them or 
because no punishment resulted from their choices.  As this applied across so many 
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participants a 4 x 2 (Deck by Time) analysis became impractical with the addition of 
missing values reaching unacceptable levels.  However, the question of interest was 
whether physiological activity distinguished between the decks prior to a display of 
knowledge.  As such pSCRs were averaged within participants in two ways.  First, the 
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mean pSCR for the advantageous and disadvantageous decks in the pre- and post-
knowledge period were calculated for each participant.  Figure 5.11b displays these 
means for those participants who displayed knowledge.  A 2x2 (Deck Type by Time) 
repeated measures ANOVA, equivalent to that performed on the rSCR data, revealed 
a significant interaction between Deck Type and Time, (1, 26) = 4.44, ICA = 0.02, 
/ < 0.05; but no main effect of Deck Type, *(1, 26) < 1; nor a main effect of Time, 
*(1, 26) = 1.96, ICA = 0.02, / > 0.05.  Subsequent simple comparisons revealed that 
pSCRs were higher for the disadvantageous decks prior to knowledge being displayed 
than in the period after, *(1, 26) = 6.04, ICA = 0.01, / < 0.05. 
Second, the mean pSCRs for the decks with frequent and infrequent 
punishments were also calculated in each knowledge period.  A 2 x 2 (Punishment 
Frequency x Time) repeated measures ANOVA found no interaction, *(1, 26) < 1; no 
main effect of Punishment Frequency, *(1, 26) < 1; and no main effect of Time, *(1, 
26) = 1.96, ICA = 0.02, / < 0.05. This result contrasts with Crone et al (2004) who 
found higher pSCRs following choices from decks B & D. 
Similar analyses were carried out for the participants who showed no 
knowledge.  Figure 5.11c displays the mean values of pSCRs collapsed across the 
advantageous and disadvantageous decks up to and after the mean trial at which 
participants with knowledge displayed that knowledge.  The 4 x 2 (Deck Type by 
Time) ANOVA revealed no interaction, *(1, 26) = 1.42, ICA < 0.01, / > 0.05; no 
main effect of Deck Type, *(1, 26) < 1; and no main effect of Time, *(1, 26) = 1.11, 
ICA < 0.01, / > 0.05.  The Punishment Frequency x Time ANOVA also revealed no 
interaction, *(1, 26) = 1.43, ICA < 0.01, / > 0.05; no main effect of Deck Type, *(1, 
26) < 1; and no main effect of Time, *(1, 26) < 1.  
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No differences in any SCR type were found between groups suggesting that the 
questions did not affect participants’ physiological responses.   There was also no 
difference in aSCR between decks or deck types at any point during the task.  
Differences in post-selection SCRs were found.  Reward SCRs distinguished between 
the advantageous and disadvantageous decks across the whole experiment.  This 
effect was found to emerge only in participants who displayed knowledge and then 
only in later trials following their display of knowledge.  No differences in rSCRs 
between decks were found in those who did not display knowledge.  Punishment 
SCRs were found to be larger for the disadvantageous decks in the pre-knowledge 
period but only for participants who displayed knowledge.   
Overall, the SCR values recorded were low in comparison to other studies.  
However, a consistent pattern was apparent.  Anticipatory SCRs were generally low, 
but rSCRs were higher and pSCRs were higher still.  This is consistent with previous 
research in the literature and argues against any methodological flaw in SCR 
recording.
5.3 GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results of this experiment are not definitive and provide only mixed support for 
the theories of IGT behaviour explored in the introduction.  This is because no 
difference in aSCRs between any of the decks were found.  The absence of this 
previously reported effect makes it impossible to determine whether such an effect 
precedes or follows participants’ displays of knowledge.  However, while no aSCR 
differences were found participants on the whole learned to select from decks C and 
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D.  This suggests that differential somatic activity, reflected in aSCR activity, is not 
necessary for learning to proceed.  
While it was found that aSCRs do not differentiate between deck types prior to 
knowledge being displayed, a difference between deck types found over all rSCRs 
was localised  within participants who displayed knowledge in the period following 
that knowledge being displayed.  This result provides more support for the 
Knowledge-Somatic than the Somatic-Knowledge hypothesis, although that support 
must be qualified.  The absence of any difference in aSCRs is problematic as a null 
effect can never be evidence for any hypothesis, and the results from the pSCRs 
suggest physiological responses occur for larger primary punishers but only in the 
initial period of the task.  It could be argued that pSCRs did not distinguish between 
decks in the post-knowledge period because participants were aware that those decks 
had the worst losses.  Conversely, it could also be argued that the pre-knowledge 
pSCRs influence subsequent decisions and constitute the first stage in a process 
towards somatic markers.  This position is supported by the absence of these effects in 
participants who displayed no knowledge.  So the physiological results are ambiguous 
showing that differences in post-selection SCRs emerge following knowledge for 
rewards but prior to knowledge for punishments.  It could be argued that the post-
knowledge difference in rSCRs indicates relief at escaping from a choice on a 
disadvantageous deck without a punishment.  This would constitute an effect of 
knowledge and offer better support for the Knowledge-Somatic hypothesis than the 
Somatic-Knowledge hypothesis.  After all, these decks are more risky than the 
advantageous decks.  Differential SCR activity, including aSCRs, may just reflect this 
awareness of risk.
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The absence of an aSCR difference between deck types is not without 
precedent (Kleeberg et al, 2004; Campbell et al, 2004).  That aSCRs did not increase 
over time also replicates earlier results using a computerized version of the task 
(Suzuki et al, 2003; Carter and Pasqualini, 2004).   A possible explanation for the 
absence of differences in the aSCRs is the automated way in which they were 
gathered.  The experimenter controlled the length of the inter-trial interval between 
SCR acquisitions in Bechara et al (1997a).  This was to ensure that participants’ 
physiological activity had returned to baseline following the previous choice.  It is 
possible that as the inter-trial interval was fixed to a greater extent in the current 
experiment, physiological activity following the previous choice interfered with 
anticipatory physiological activity on the next choice.  But Crone et al (2004) 
employed a similarly automatic methodology ensuring that the inter-trial interval was 
as long as reported by Bechara et al (1997a) and found similar effects to them.  The 
inter-trial interval in the current study was as long as the mean given in Bechara et 
al’s report (twelve seconds).  If interference between SCR types occurred then larger 
aSCRs would be expected following a loss than following a gain, mirroring the results 
with the post-selection SCRs.  But an examinination of aSCRs in each deck following 
a gain and a loss found no difference.  This data was calculated for each participant 
and entered into a 4 x 2 (Deck by Reinforcer) repeated measures ANOVA.  No main 
effect of Reinforcer was found, (1, 27) < 1; nor was there a main effect of Deck, 
(1.98, 53.33) < 1; nor an interaction, (1.74, 46.88)
1
< 1.  This suggests that 
automatic gathering of SCRs did not impact on the clarity of the physiological record.
The SCRs recorded were also small in comparison to previous studies, with 
area under the curve measures one-tenth the size of some reported in the literature 
(Bechara et al, 1997a).   This suggests that an error in the recording or analysis 
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clouded the results.  But differences between SCR types were found in line with the 
previous literature.  The aSCRs were smaller than the rSCRs, which were smaller than 
the pSCRs.  A possible explanation, that may also have a bearing on the absence of an 
aSCR effect relates to a difference in the methodology employed as compared to most 
other studies.  It will be remembered that the experimenter, though present in the 
same room as the participant, sat behind a screen and did not interact.  This was 
communicated to the participant prior to task commencement.  This absence of an 
interpersonal interaction has been maintained throughout the Experiments reported in 
this thesis, but is a major difference between this computerized task and the manual 
task.  How might this impact the physiological record?  Carter and Pasqualini (2004) 
reported that they switched from a computerized to a manual task because participants 
SCRs decreased substantially as the computerized task progressed.  The absence of an 
interpersonal interaction or even the presence of an actively observing person may be 
required for SCRs to exist.  In support, Van ’t Wout, Kahn, Sanfey and Aleman 
(2006) reported that SCRs were higher when unfair offers were made and rejected in 
an Ultimatum Game, but only when those offers were made by a human rather than a 
computer.  This interpersonal interaction hypothesis does not explain the presence of 
differential SCRs between deck types as reported by Bechara et al (1997a) and others 
even using a computerized task (Hinson et al, 2003; Crone et al, 2004) but without 
more detail about their exact procedure (e.g. the presence and position, or absence of 
an experimenter) it is difficult to entirely reject it .  
This experiment found that the emergence of knowledge occurred at a similar 
time as Bechara et al (1997a), yet found no replication of the aSCR effect.  If accepted 
at face value this result is problematic for the SMH.  Participants in this experiment 
improved on the IGT at levels similar to those in the previous Experiments, and 
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displayed knowledge of which decks were worst in the long-run, yet the results 
suggest aSCRs played no part in this process.  It may be that participants in this 
experiment did not have the same physiological reaction as those in other experiments 
but if this is the case it suggests that like other, clinical studies (North and O’Carroll, 
2001; Heims et al, 2004) the absence of autonomic activity does not preclude learning 
on the IGT.  
The results of this experiment are not only problematic for Bechara et al’s 
(1997) account of IGT behaviour. Knowledge sufficient to guide long-term 
advantageous selection emerged in the majority of participants at around the same 
time as Bechara et al (1997a) claimed.  Participants are able to identify one of the best 
decks at the initial question times as Maia and McClelland (2004) claimed.  But when 
the change over from the disadvantageous to the advantageous decks as the best decks 
occurs participants have a problem keeping up.  This was reflected in the similarity of 
the data displayed in Tables 5.4 and 5.5.  This overlaps with when Bechara et al 
(1997a) claimed the aSCR difference emerged (trials 10 – 50).  Kleeberg et al (2004) 
reported that although they found no difference in aSCRs between deck types the 
increase in aSCR they observed averaged across all decks emerged between trials 20 
and 40.  These aSCR differences may be related to the shift in polarity of deck 
received values.  The results from this study mean that Maia and McClelland’s (2004) 
assertion that participants have knowledge sufficient to guide their behaviour from the 
first questioning has not been replicated here and this does leave open the possibility 
that somatic activity precedes knowledge.  However, no evidence was found to 
support this hypothesis in this study.
As Maia and McClelland (2004) found, the assessments of participants’ 
knowledge here often indicated that their behaviour did not reflect the knowledge they 
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possessed.  Participants often did not select one of the best available choices despite 
the knowledge probes indicating that they were able to make this distinction.   One 
explanation for this behaviour that Maia and McClelland did not consider, but which 
is apparent from the detailed examination of participants’ knowledge, is that their 
knowledge is not complete and few possess accurate knowledge of the deck 
contingencies.  This makes non-optimal deck selection a reasonable option as 
participants attempt to explore the decks to learn more about their contingencies.  
However, as Figures 5.4 and 5.5 suggest few come close to achieving this 
understanding.
Most participants gave all the decks a negative rating suggesting that they 
were unaware that either decks C or D were profitable with repeated selection.  This 
also suggests that for participants in this experiment the times when they lost money 
were most influential when they made their ratings.  This accords with the hypothesis 
emerging through this thesis that the short-term outcomes of deck choice are more 
important than has been previously assumed.  Certainly the pattern of changing 
selection from decks B and C driving learning observed in previous Experiments was 
replicated here and was reflected in the question responses of participants given the 
Specific questions. 
These results differ from those reported by both Maia and McClelland (2004) 
and Bechara et al (1997a).  Both groups suggest that the majority of their participants 
end the experiment with conceptual knowledge of the IGT.  Little evidence was found 
in this experiment to support this conclusion, but the results did show that conceptual 
knowledge is not critical for learning to occur.  But the difference in degree of 
knowledge at the end of the task may help explain why participants in the present 
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Experiments make fewer advantageous choices than those of the Iowa group.  Such 
differences in performance have been recorded in other tasks (Brase et al, 2006).
In conclusion, the results from this experiment suggest that participants do not 
generate anticipatory physiological activity sufficient to differentiate between deck 
types in the period prior to acquiring knowledge sufficient to guide their behaviour.  
Knowledge required to profit on the IGT emerges later than claimed by Maia and 
McClelland (2004) but it is not a complete understanding of the nature of the IGT.  
Despite this, advantageous deck selection is learned mainly through learned avoidance 
of B and increased selection from C.  
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